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The spread of the new coronavirus in the spring of 2020 upended nearly every aspect of life as 
we know it. On March 11, as contagion traversed the globe with shocking speed, scale, and 
severity, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic.  
 
That same day, Columbia Law School began moving our entire curriculum online—more than 
300 courses—for the first time in our history. Not only did we transform our teaching, but our 
faculty also turned its gaze outward, to the plight of individuals and communities in the United 
States and elsewhere facing new and urgent challenges wrought by the pandemic.  
 
Against this backdrop, a group of colleagues joined forces to publish an e-book addressing 
myriad legal questions the coronavirus pandemic would introduce. Scholars across the faculty 
drew on their deep expertise to identify and examine a range of vital legal issues implicated by 
COVID-19. They were joined in this effort by a few academics from other schools. What’s more, 
Columbia Law students jumped at the opportunity to participate.   
 
Mindful of the need to match the fast-moving impact of the virus, our professors worked at 
record speed to turn their analyses and insights into the essays that make up this collection. 
After just one month, we present, “Law in the Time of COVID-19”.  Covering a host of timely 
topics, including prisoners’ rights, elections, privacy, public health law, force majeure in 
contracts, bankruptcy, and more, we believe this reference guide may be the first of its kind 
produced by a law school.  
 
Columbia Law School offers these insights to the legal community and the public as our 
contribution to understanding and confronting the profound disruption to our society and our 




I am grateful to my colleague, Katharina Pistor, for her foresight and fortitude in launching this 
e-book project, and deeply appreciative of all those who contributed to this important 
undertaking. We hope you will find it valuable. 
 
Gillian Lester 
Dean and the Lucy G. Moses Professor of Law 
Columbia Law School 







Katharina Pistor, Edwin B. Parker Professor of Comparative Law; 
Director, Center on Global Legal Transformation, Columbia Law School 
 
 
The COVID-19 crisis has ended and upended lives around the globe. As of April 20, 2020, the virus 
has killed more than 160,000 people, more than 35,000 in the United States alone. The secondary 
effects have also been devastating. Borders have been closed, impeding the flow of goods, 
people, and services. Entire countries have been placed under lockdown, bringing economic life 
almost to a standstill; challenging electoral, legislative, and judicial processes; and limiting direct 
social interactions to the nuclear family. Electronic trading technology has allowed financial 
markets to remain open;  without the lifelines from central banks, they would have crashed.  
 
The pandemic’s secondary effects pose fundamental challenges to the rules that govern our 
social, political, and economic lives. These rules are the domain of lawyers. Law in the Time of 
COVID-19 is the product of a joint effort by members of the faculty of Columbia Law School and 
several law professors from other schools. As academic lawyers we wanted to share our 
knowledge and insights about how law shapes responses to—and is itself shaped by—the 
unfolding crisis.  
 
This volume offers guidance for thinking about some the most pressing legal issues the pandemic 
has raised, especially (though not exclusively) for law in the United States: from the rights of 
prison inmates who live under conditions that make them exceptionally vulnerable to the highly 
contagious virus to the options for contracting parties who now face circumstances that make it 
impossible for them to live up to their past commitments. The book does not give legal advice. 
Instead, it identifies critical legal issues that affect many peoples’ lives, offers fresh perspectives 
for thinking about those issues, and provides guidance to legislatures and policy makers about 




Although written by professors, this volume is meant to be a reference book, not an academic 
treatise. The topics range widely and include issues related to human rights, public life and social 
welfare, private life, and the economy. The authors focused their knowledge on specific areas of 
the law. Many were joined by their students, who either helped draft a chapter or compiled 
further resources that are referenced in the chapters. The Appendices to the volume include links 
to additional resources including guidance about workers’ rights that the Lawyers Coordinating 
Committee of the AFL-CIO has put together1 as well as links to memoranda that law firms have 
written to their clients on COVID-19 relevant issues.2  
 
This volume was put together quickly; it is a response to what we perceived to be an urgent need 
for more legal information and analysis in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many helped 
bring it to the finish line: The authors who volunteered to write individual chapters on short 
notice and with tight deadlines; my colleagues, Bert Huang and Lance Liebman, who copy-edited 
the contributions; Dana Neacsu, reference librarian and lecturer-in-law, together with faculty 
coordinator Michael McParlane, who compiled the additional resources in the Appendices and 
formatted the book; the team at Columbia Creative who produced the cover; Carole Steinfield, 
who ensured online publication on the law school’s research repository and Columbia 
University’s academic commons; and Dean Gillian Lester, who enthusiastically supported this 
endeavor. 
 
I owe all of them a big thank you—and hope that more lawyers in the United States and 
elsewhere will follow suit and share their thoughts and insights widely in these difficult times. 
 
 
New York City, April 20, 2020.  
  
                                               
1 See https://lcc-aflcio.org/covid-19-legal-issues-webinar-materials/. We thank our colleague Mark Barenberg for 
alerting us to these materials. 
2 See also http://covidmemo.law.stanford.edu/ for a related effort to make law firm memoranda more widely 
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Gregory Bernstein, JD ’21, Stephanie Guzman, JD ’22, Maggie Hadley, JD ’22, Rosalyn M. Huff, 
CC ’20, Alison Hung, JD ’22, and Anita N.H. Yandle, JD ’21, Columbia Law School 
Alexis Hoag, Lecturer in Law; Practitioner-in-Residence, Eric Holder Initiative for Civil & 
Political Rights, Columbia Law School 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School 
 
Abstract 
As COVID-19 continues to spread rapidly across the country, the crowded and unsanitary 
conditions in prisons, jails, juvenile detention, and immigration detention centers leave 
incarcerated individuals especially vulnerable. This chapter will discuss potential avenues for 
detained persons and their lawyers seeking to use the legal system to obtain relief, including 
potential release, during this extraordinary, unprecedented crisis.  
 
I. Background: Overview of COVID-19 situation in jails and prisons 
In the wake of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
have emphasized social distancing and increased sanitization as the best practices to slow the 
transmission of the virus and keep communities as safe and healthy as possible. Among the 
most vulnerable are people in jails, prisons, juvenile detention, and immigration detention 
facilities, who must face the threat of this highly contagious disease while being held in an 
environment that makes basic measures of personal protection impossible.  
In the United States, many correctional facilities operate through the use of communal and 
shared spaces. Incarcerated individuals are often held in shared cells, sleeping only a few feet 
away from each other. Bathrooms, cafeterias, and recreational areas are all communal. These 
conditions make social distancing—which the CDC considers the single most effective measure 
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in preventing the spread of COVID-19—extremely difficult, if not impossible. Many facilities also 
lack the conditions necessary to maintain a sanitary environment. For example, incarcerated 
individuals have reported being held in facilities with no soap, sanitation supplies, or even 
working sinks. In fact, in most prison systems, hand sanitizer is considered contraband. Without 
the ability to avoid crowded areas, wash their hands on a regular basis, and maintain sanitary 
living conditions, incarcerated individuals will remain at high risk of contracting and 
transmitting COVID-19. 
As of April 6, 2020, over 230 detained people at New York City jails have tested positive for 
COVID-19. The transmission rate within that population is eight times the transmission rate in 
the general population of New York City, which is the current epicenter. The medical building at 
Rikers Island, which houses the jail’s only contagious disease unit, showcases the egregious 
inability of jails in New York City to adequately treat individuals infected with the coronavirus. 
The building contains 88 beds, meaning that treating the more than 800 men quarantined on 
Rikers Island because someone in their building tested positive would be impossible, likely 
resulting in suffering and death. 
In California, a state caught in the early wave of the pandemic, dozens of incarcerated persons 
and detention center employees have tested positive. The state ordered early release of 
thousands of individuals from jails and prisons in order to slow the spread of the disease.  
Facilities in many other states have also reported positive tests, including Pennsylvania, Illinois, 
and Ohio. Like California, some of these states have released large numbers of detainees. In 
early April, the death toll in state and federal facilities around the country has continued to rise, 
with multiple deaths at the Oakdale facility in Louisiana. This is unsurprising given that 
individuals incarcerated at the prison, which is located 200 miles west of New Orleans, reported 
that coughing or feverish men were not always separated from their healthy cellmates, and 
cells continued to hold six men at a time. Some men tried to fashion masks from their own 
clothing because they were not provided masks by prison officials. Stories and testimonies of 
prisons’ shortcomings in the face of a deadly pandemic and the desperate attempts of 
incarcerated people to protect themselves are commonplace. 
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II. Prisoners’ Rights in the Time of COVID-19 
Even as the pandemic unfolds and COVID-19 spreads throughout detention facilities, 
incarcerated people retain their constitutional rights, including the right to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment. To vindicate this right, prisoners may bring suits challenging the 
conditions of their confinement. To prevail in such suits, prisoners must show that prison 
officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed prisoners to a substantial risk of serious 
harm. If such a showing is made, courts have the responsibility of fashioning appropriate relief 
to remedy the serious risk of harm.  
In order to challenge conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners and 
their attorneys must show that “prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a 
prisoner to a sufficiently substantial ‘risk of serious damage to his future health[.]’” Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). To 
prevail on a conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective element, 
that the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” and a subjective element, that prison 
officials have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” such as that of deliberate indifference to 
the detainee’s health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 
A.  What Harms Are Sufficiently Serious? 
To be sufficiently serious, the act or omission by an official “must result in the denial of the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Most circuits have held 
that a serious medical need can be either a condition for which a physician has mandated 
treatment or a need that is “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the 
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” See, e.g., Leite v. Bergeron, 911 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2018); 
Al-Turki v. Robinson, 762 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2014); Kuhne v. Dep’t of Corr., 745 F.3d 
1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2014); Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014); Santiago v. 
Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013); King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012). 
Outside of the realm of infectious diseases, circuit courts have found sufficient seriousness in 
conditions such as appendicitis, an infected cyst, and a tooth cavity, some of which could be 
life-threatening and some of which could result in severe pain. See Blackmore v. Kalamazoo 
4 
 
Cty., 390 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 2004); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364 (7th Cir. 1997); Harrison v. 
Barkley, 219 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2000). 
a.  Predicting Future Harms  
A prisoner concerned about contracting COVID-19 in prison may satisfy the “sufficiently 
serious” prong by showing that they face a substantial risk of serious harm in the future, even if 
they are not currently infected or suffering. A plaintiff can obtain preventative relief even 
without the threatened injury. Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S., 825, 845 (quoting Pennsylvania v. 
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1922)).  
In order to demonstrate sufficient seriousness with respect to exposure to future harm, a 
prisoner “must show that he himself is being exposed” to an unreasonable risk of serious harm. 
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. at 35. Once this showing is made, the court must inquire into both 
the seriousness and likelihood of the potential harm, considering whether the risk is “so grave 
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” 
Id. at 36 (emphasis in original). Similarly, while courts have generally recognized that the finding 
of a serious risk is tied to an individual’s health conditions, the Supreme Court has held that it is 
not relevant “whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of [harm] for reasons personal to him 
or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. 
Mere exposure to infectious diseases can constitute a sufficiently serious deprivation and 
officials cannot be deliberately indifferent to such a risk, even if someone does not show 
serious symptoms. See Hutto v. Finney, 427 U.S. 678 (1978); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. at 35 
(1993). In Helling, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that prison officials “may ignore 
a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness” in the future. 509 
U.S. 25, 33.  
Lower courts have recognized that a wide array of communicable diseases can present a 
substantial risk of serious harm to inmates. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Block, 940 F. Supp. 1509, 1514 
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (recognizing that “tuberculosis presents a substantial risk of serious harm” to 
inmates, and that tuberculosis “is particularly dangerous in a prison environment, where 
5 
 
overcrowding and poor ventilation can hasten the spread of this airborne disease.”); Kimble v. 
Tennis, No. CIV. 4:CV-05-1871, 2006 WL 1548950, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 5, 2006) (concluding that 
"an inmate infected with MRSA and with open sores could constitute a serious health risk[.]”). 
Applying the standard articulated in Helling, a district court in the Third Circuit concluded that 
the infectious skin disease scabies clearly constituted an unreasonable risk to the plaintiff 
where over 100 prisoners and guards had already contracted the disease. Hemphill v. Rogers, 
No. CIV.A.07-2162JAG, 2008 WL 2668952, at *11 (D.N.J. June 27, 2008). However, prisoners 
should not need to show that other incidents of harm have occurred at prison. The Fifth Circuit 
held in Ball v. LeBlanc that, especially in cases where the harm can have a sudden onset, a 
showing of prior death or injury was not necessary. 792 F.3d 584, 593 (5th Cir. 2015). In Ball, 
which concerned the risk of heat-related illnesses, the Fifth Circuit made clear that the lack of 
any prior heat-related incidents at a prison did not preclude the court from concluding that the 
prisoners were at substantial risk of serious harm. Id.  
At least one court has found that plaintiffs who alleged they were exposed to valley fever had a 
cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment. Beagle v. Schwarzenegger, 107 F. Supp. 3d 
1056, 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2014); see also Allen v. Kramer, No. 115CV01609DADMJSPC, 2016 WL 
4613360, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016) (finding that the plaintiff had stated an Eighth 
Amendment claim based on the defendants’ failure to implement adequate measures to limit 
exposure to valley fever.) In Beagle, the court underscored that plaintiffs “need not 
demonstrate that they are at a higher risk of contracting Valley Fever or a more severe form of 
the disease to state an Eighth Amendment claim.” Beagle, 107 F. Supp. 3d. at 1069.  Even 
plaintiffs who are relatively less susceptible to contracting the disease or developing a serious 
illness as a result of infection may nonetheless experience a “constitutionally unacceptable 
level of risk” and need not show that they have an increased risk of infection or severity. Id. 
Both the level of communicability of the disease and the infection rate in the detention facility 
may factor into a court’s application of the Helling test. One court found in a motion for 
summary judgment that while Methicillin–Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) was a 
sufficiently serious condition, the plaintiff had not been exposed to a substantial risk of 
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contracting it from his infected cellmate. See Lopez v. McGrath, No. C 04-4782 MHP (N.D. Cal. 
May 30, 2007). Due to MRSA’s relatively low infectiousness and the hygiene precautions taken 
by the facility, the court determined that no additional measures were needed to reduce 
plaintiff’s risk “to a constitutionally permissible level.” Lopez, No. C 04-4782 MHP at 24. In 
regard to Farmer’s subjective prong, the Sixth Circuit relied on a jail’s comparatively low 
infection rate (0.19% of the jail population) to find that prison officials had no reason to infer 
that conditions in the jail posed an unreasonable risk that inmates would contract MRSA. 
Bowers v. Livingston Cty., 426 F. App’x 371, 373 (6th Cir. 2011); Cf. Duvall v. Dallas Cty., 631 
F.3d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding “serious, extensive and extended” violations of a pre-trial 
detainee’s Fifth Amendment rights in a case where the jail’s MRSA infection rate was close to 
20%). As of April 11th, 2020, the infection rate in the jail on Rikers Island is 7.7% and climbing 
daily.  
b. Risk of Exposure to COVID-19 in Detention Facilities  
Courts have already begun to recognize COVID-19 as a substantial health risk in Fifth 
Amendment claims for civil detainees. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York found that the chance of exposure to COVID-19 in an Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) facility where detainees or staff had tested positive for the virus posed an 
unreasonable health risk to detainees. Basank v. Decker, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53191 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 26, 2020) (quoting Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2002). In the case, which 
Plaintiffs brought as a Fifth Amendment Due Process habeas claim, the court observed, “the 
risk of contracting COVID-19 in tightly-confined spaces, especially jails, is now exceedingly 
obvious… It can no longer be denied that Petitioners, who suffer from underlying illnesses, are 
caught in the midst of a rapidly-unfolding public health crisis.” Id. at *16. 
A day later, in Castillo v. Barr, another court ruled in favor of an ICE detainee’s Fifth 
Amendment claim due to COVID-19 risk. See Castillo v. Barr, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54425 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 27, 2020). The court concluded that detainees faced a serious risk of harm, noting, 
“the science is well established—infected, asymptomatic carriers of the coronavirus are highly 
contagious. Moreover, the Petitioners presently before the Court are suffering from a condition 
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of confinement that takes away, inter alia, their ability to socially distance.” Castillo v. Barr, 
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54425 at 13.  
B.  What Is “Deliberate Indifference”? 
The second prong of a conditions of confinement claim brought under the Eighth Amendment 
asks whether prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, such as that of 
deliberate indifference. The Supreme Court has held that a prison official acts with deliberate 
indifference when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 
safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To act with deliberate indifference, the 
official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.  
a.  Prison Officials’ Knowledge of Excessive Risks to Inmate Health  
To act with deliberate indifference, officials must have knowledge of the risks to inmate health 
or of the circumstances pointing to the existence of such risks. In determining whether prison 
officials acted with deliberate indifference, courts tend to look at whether those officials had 
actual knowledge of the asserted serious needs of inmates or of circumstances clearly 
indicating the existence of such needs. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 895–96 (6th 
Cir. 2004).  
Prisoners can prove an official’s “actual knowledge of a substantial risk to his safety” through 
inference from circumstantial evidence. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012). In 
cases where the prison officials fail to provide treatment, there is often little or no evidence 
about what inferences the defendant in fact drew. Nonetheless, “in those cases, a genuine 
issue of material fact as to deliberate indifference can be based on a strong showing on the 
objective component.” Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 313 (6th Cir. 2005). This 
principle is based on the Farmer court’s statement that a prison official cannot escape liability 
by choosing not to learn more about the situation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843, n.6 (1994). 
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b. Prison Officials’ Denial of Medical Treatment or Failure to Comply With 
Accepted Medical Protocols  
Prison officials disregard an excessive risk to inmate health and safety when they deny, delay, 
or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or fail to follow accepted medical standards 
and protocols. See, e.g. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Hernandez v. County of 
Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that known noncompliance with 
generally accepted guidelines for inmate health strongly indicates deliberate indifference to a 
substantial risk of serious harm); Holland v. Hanks, No. 97-3660, 1998 WL 93974, at *4 (7th Cir. 
1998) (suggesting that a failure to comply with treatment protocols for tuberculosis would be 
sufficient to show deliberate indifference). 
While an inadvertent failure to take action, standing alone, does not constitute deliberate 
indifference, a consistent pattern of reckless or negligent conduct is sufficient to establish 
deliberate indifference. See DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 533 (8th Cir. 1990). To prove 
deliberate indifference, a prisoner need not show a complete failure on the part of prison 
officials to respond or provide even minimal medical care. Id.  In DeGidio, the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s finding that the prison officials’ response to a tuberculosis 
outbreak, considered as a whole, constituted deliberate indifference to the safety and medical 
needs of the inmates, pointing to the prison officials’ failure to test all inmates for tuberculosis 
after an inmate was diagnosed with tuberculosis, to develop written infection-control policies, 
to keep adequate medical records and charts, and to provide a full-time doctor and medical 
director. Id. at 531. 
One court has found that failure to provide inmates with their preferred method of treatment 
may not constitute deliberate indifference. In Forbes v. Edgar, the Seventh Circuit held that 
prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs despite 
her claims that prison officials allowed tuberculosis to spread throughout the prison and that 
officials denied her a preferred medical treatment. 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). 
Importantly, however, the tuberculosis control procedures implemented by the Forbes 
defendants were consistent with the protocols recommended by the Center for Disease Control 
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(CDC) and the American Thoracic Society, and the treatment provided to the petitioner was 
approved by the CDC. Forbes, 112 F.3d at 267. The Seventh Circuit held that while prisoners are 
not entitled to demand specific care, they are “entitled to reasonable measures to meet a 
substantial risk of serious harm to [the prisoner].” Id. 
With regard to COVID-19, courts have found deliberate indifference in a Fifth Amendment claim 
when ICE detention facilities failed to adequately protect prisoners by following the CDC’s 
recommended preventative measures. In Basank v. Decker, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York held that the officials in that case were deliberately indifferent in their 
response to COVID-19 because, though they did take some measures, including providing soap 
and hand sanitizer to inmates and increasing the frequency and intensity of cleaning, they could 
not show that detainees could not remain the CDC-recommended six feet apart from each 
other in the facilities. Basank v. Decker, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53191 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 
2020). 
III. Conditions of Confinement for Pretrial Detainees 
Pretrial detainees are also protected from unconstitutional conditions of confinement. 
Conditions of confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees are governed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court has 
recognized that a detainee’s rights are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections 
available to a convicted prisoner.” City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, (1983). 
The test for whether a detainee’s conditions of confinement are unconstitutional relies on the 
same two prongs as those articulated in Farmer—substantial risk of serious harm and 
deliberate indifference. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. Importantly, however, the deliberate 
indifference prong can be satisfied if a pretrial detainee shows that prison officials knew or 
should have known that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety. Darnell, 849 
F.3d at 35; see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) (adopting an objective 
standard for determining whether use of force against a pretrial detainee was excessive under 
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In other words, Farmer’s “subjective” 
prong is measured objectively for detainees. 
IV. Remedies 
Prisoners seeking release due to the risk of COVID-19 will have to comply with guidelines set by 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (PLRA). Courts normally only order release as 
a last resort as a remedy for medical risks, and some district courts have declined to recognize 
an independent right of action under the prevailing Supreme Court case on prisoner release, 
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011). 
A. When Can A Court Order Prisoner Release? 
A court will require special circumstances to order prisoner release as a remedy for an Eighth 
Amendment violation. The PLRA outlines the requirements that must be satisfied for a court to 
grant relief in a civil action regarding prison conditions. First, only a three-judge district court 
may enter a prisoner release order. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B). A three-judge district court may 
be convened once (1) a court has previously entered an order for “less intrusive relief” that has 
failed to remedy the deprivation at issue and (2) the defendant has had a “reasonable amount 
of time” to comply with previous orders. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A). Once convened, the three-
judge court can impose a population limit if it finds that (1) crowding is the primary cause of the 
constitutional violation, and (2) no other relief will remedy the violation. 18 U.S.C. § 
3626(a)(3)(E).  
In Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court held that a remedial order imposing a population limit on 
the California prison system was consistent with the requirements of the PLRA. See Brown v. 
Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011). The Court cited the exceptional degree of overcrowding in 
California prisons, which had operated at around 200% of capacity for at least 11 years; the 
unsanitary and unsafe prison conditions resulted in an increased risk for the transmission of 
serious infectious diseases, approximately one suicide per week, and the failure of prisons to 
provide adequate medical and mental health care to prisoners. Id. at 502–504. After years of 
ongoing but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to solve the crisis through construction, hiring, and 
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procedural reforms, the Court found that it was appropriate to convene a three-judge court and 
for that court to order the release of some prisoners to address the problem of overcrowding. 
Id. at 514–515. 
Brown v. Plata limited federal district court management of state prisons, making it clear that 
prison caps—and prisoner release orders—must be “the remedy of last resort.” Id. at 526. 
While a federal court retains the authority to order release when it is truly necessary to remedy 
a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights, state prison administrators are entitled to a 
certain amount of deference in the adoption of practices that, in their judgment, are needed to 
accomplish the legitimate goals of a prison system. See, e.g., Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10, 20 
(9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a district court’s order requiring the state to release an inmate 
from the security housing unit was an abuse of discretion and that the court had improperly 
impeded state prison management). But see Huerta v. Ewing, No. 216CV00397JMSMJD, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174120, at *26-28 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 10, 2018) (recognizing that a district court must 
exercise restraint in granting relief, but that county jail officials’ failure to take the ordered 
measures may entitle prisoners to petition the court for additional relief, including the 
convening of a three-judge panel to issue a prisoner release order). 
a.  18 U.S.C. § 3626’s Three-Judge Court Requirement 
A three-judge district court may enter a prisoner-release order to remedy overcrowding under 
18 U.S.C. § 3626. Once a court has entered an order for “less intrusive relief” that has failed to 
remedy the deprivation at issue and the defendant has had an undefined “reasonable amount 
of time” to comply with the previous orders, a three-judge district court may convene to order 
release of prisoners as a remedy to cure an Eighth Amendment violation. Plata, 563 U.S. at 512. 
See also Butler v. Kelso, No. 11CV02684 CAB RBB, 2013 WL 1883233, at *10 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 
2013) (denying plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint alleging that California state prison 
officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs to include a request for 
prison release order); Nagast v. Dep't of Corr., No. ED CV 09-1044-CJC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
59309, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2012) (holding that a California prison inmate could not bring a § 
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3626 claim because he did not satisfy the requirements needed to convene a three-judge 
court). 
Additionally, the defendant must have had a reasonable amount of time to comply with the 
previous orders for less intrusive relief. In Gillette v. Prosper, a plaintiff seeking reforms to his 
facility, which had been mandated by a court order two and a half years earlier, was not 
granted relief because the facility was entitled to more time to comply with the order. Gillette 
v. Prosper, Civil Action No. 2014-00110, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27776 (D.V.I. Mar. 4, 2016) 
(distinguishing the timeline from Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 889 (E.D. 
Cal. 2009) where there were 12 years for compliance, and from Brown v. Plata’s five years for 
compliance).  
b. Plata’s Limits 
District courts in California maintain that Plata by itself does not provide any substantive right 
on which a prisoner can rely for an independent cause of action. In Shafer v. Avenal State 
Prison, the Eastern District Court expressed that Plata does not “provide any substantive right” 
for plaintiffs nor does it “stand for the proposition that federal district courts can order state 
officials to release specific prisoners.” 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95630 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2014). 
The next year, in Thomas v. Alameda County, the Northern District Court in California denied a 
prisoner’s request for injunctive relief in which he cited Plata; the court ruled that the plaintiff’s 
claim of general prison overcrowding failed because Plata does not provide a substantive right. 
Thomas v. Alameda County, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32182, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015). The 
decision cited a case before the court three years earlier that stated a remedial § 1983 court 
order could not, standing alone, serve as a basis for liability because “such orders do not create 
‘rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Id. 
Finally, the Southern District Court took the same stance in 2018. Gomez v. Paramo, No. 17-cv-





c.  Release in Habeas Proceedings  
Release is typically unavailable as a remedy for Eighth Amendment violations in habeas 
proceedings. Courts have thus far refused to consider Eighth Amendment medical claims as 
grounds for release of individual prisoners in habeas proceedings. In Glaus v. Anderson, a 
prisoner who claimed that his facility failed to treat his Hepatitis C could not appropriately seek 
release as a remedy. The court noted, “If an inmate established that his medical treatment 
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, the appropriate remedy would be to call for proper 
treatment, or to award him damages; release from custody is not an option.” Glaus v. 
Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2005). 
In Seifert v. Spaulding, similarly, a plaintiff claimed that the physicians at his facility denied his 
diagnosis and refused to treat him could not gain release. The court concluded, “Even where a 
prisoner claims that his only hope of obtaining adequate medical treatment is through release, 
a court cannot order release as a remedy for conditions of confinement that violate the Eighth 
Amendment violation.” Seifert v. Spaulding, No. 18-11600-MGM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221340, 
3 (D. Mass. Sep. 11, 2018). 
B.         Release of Detainees During COVID-19 Pandemic 
Recently, courts have granted remedy in the form of release to civil detainees as a remedy for 
Eighth or Fifth Amendment violations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. See Coronel v. Decker, 
No. 20-cv-2472 (AJN), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53954 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020); Hernandez v. 
Decker, No. 20-CV-1589 (JPO), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57122 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2020). Notably, 
however, the Prison Litigation Reform Act does not apply to civil detainees. 
On April 4th, the original three-judge panel in Plata v. Brown dismissed an emergency motion 
for release filed by plaintiffs in the California prison system. Coleman v. Newsom, Case No. 2:90-
cv-0520 KJM DB P, (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2020); Plata v. Newsom, Case No. 01-cv-01351-JST (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 4, 2020). The plaintiffs claimed that the threat of COVID-19 in prisons called for a 
modification of the population reduction order in Plata v. Brown. Id. at 2. The three-judge panel 
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ruled that “because Plaintiffs’ motion seeks a release order to redress a different constitutional 
injury than those previously found in the Coleman and Plata proceedings, that relief cannot be 
granted through a modification to our prior remedial order.” Id. at 9. Plaintiffs were instructed 
to bring a claim before a single judge. Id. at 12. If this single-judge court found a constitutional 
violation, the panel continued, it would only be authorized to order defendants “to take steps 
short of release necessary to remedy that violation.” Id. at 13. Only if such steps proved 
inadequate could a three-judge panel be convened. Id. at 12–13. 
  C.       Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 
Another potential remedy is compassionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3852 allows a court to reduce a 
federal inmate’s sentence if the court finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” 
warrant a reduction, and that a reduction would be “consistent with any applicable policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A)(i). A court must 
also consider the applicable factors set forth in § 3553(a). This provision provides courts with 
the statutory authority to grant the compassionate release of certain prisoners. A growing 
number of courts have used § 3852 to order the release of federal prisoners who, due to their 
age and/or health status, are at high risk of developing serious illness or death if they contract 
COVID-19. See, e.g. United State v. Rodriguez, No. 2:03-CR-00271-AB-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
58718 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2020); United States v. Resnick, No. 14 CR 810 (CM), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
59091 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020); United States v. Colvin, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57962 (D. Conn., Apr. 
2, 2020); United States v. McCarthy, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61759 (D. Conn., Apr. 8, 2020); United 
States v. Daly, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61804 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2020). 
The recently enacted First Step Act amended § 3852 to remove the Bureau of Prisons’ exclusive 
gatekeeping function over motions seeking compassionate relief. As amended, § 3852 allows 
prisoners to request that the BOP file a motion seeking compassionate release. If the BOP does 
not file such a motion, the prisoner may then (1) file a motion after fully exhausting 
administrative appeals of the BOP’s decision not to file a motion, or (2) file a motion after “the 
lapse of 30 days from the receipt ... of such a request” by the warden of the defendant's facility, 
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“whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A); see also Rodriguez, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58718 
at *3. 
Congress tasked the U.S. Sentencing Commission with determining what constitutes 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons.” In an application note to the sentencing guidelines, 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission listed three specific categories of extraordinary and compelling 
reasons and created a catch-all provision that allows the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to 
determine when extraordinary and compelling reasons other than those explicitly included in 
the application note exist. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D). A majority of district courts that have 
considered the meaning of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” since the enactment of the 
First Step Act have concluded that “the most natural reading of the amended § 3582(c) ... is 
that the district court assumes the same discretion as the BOP Director when it considers a 
compassionate release motion properly before it.” United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 
451 (S.D. Iowa 2019); see also United States v. Young, No. 2:00-CR-00002-1, 2020 WL 1047815, 
at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2020) (concluding that “district courts themselves have the power to 
determine what constitute[s] extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate 
release.”); United States v. Redd, No. 1:97-CR-00006-AJT, 2020 WL 1248493, at *8 (E.D. Va. 
Mar. 16, 2020) (concluding that a court may find that "compelling reasons exist based on facts 
and circumstances other than those set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(C)[.]”). 
Courts have used the authority conferred by § 3852 to grant compassionate release sought by 
prisoners who are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania granted a sentence reduction and ordered the immediate release of a 
prisoner who has diabetes, high blood pressure, and liver abnormalities, and was in the 
seventeenth year of a twenty-year sentence. United State v. Rodriguez, No. 2:03-CR-00271-AB-
1, 2020 WL 1627331 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2020) The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York granted a sentence reduction and ordered the immediate release of a prisoner who 
suffers from diabetes and related end-stage liver disease, and has served three years and nine 
months of his six-year sentence. United States v. Resnick, No. 14 CR 810 (CM), 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 59091 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020). Both courts recognized that the petitioners’ medical 
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conditions, in combination with the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, constituted extraordinary 
and compelling reasons. In both instances, the petitioners filed motions in federal court 
pursuant to § 3852’s 30-day lapse provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A).  
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted compassionate release to a 
prisoner who had requested relief and exhausted his administrative remedies prior to the 
outbreak of COVID-19. Miller v. United States., No. CR 16-20222-1, 2020 WL 1814084 (E.D. 
Mich. Apr. 9, 2020). In that instance, the prisoner suffered from a number of underlying 
medical conditions and the court found that it would be futile to require “him to submit yet 




The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment preserves prisoners’ 
right to basic safety. Prison officials violate this right when they fail to adequately protect 
prisoners from an unreasonable risk of serious harm, either by denying needed medical care or 
failing to comply with accepted protocols. Meanwhile, pre-trial and civil detainees, and 
prisoners awaiting sentencing or appeal, have a greater ability to seek release. Despite the fact 
that prisoners may face significant barriers in attempting to secure release through the courts, 
some federal prisoners—those who are elderly and/or have pre-existing conditions that place 
them at a higher risk of developing serious illness due to COVID-19—may be more likely to 
secure relief by asking a court for compassionate release. 
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The concept of “linked fate” has taken on new meaning in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 
People all over the world—from every walk of life, spanning class, race, gender, and nationality—
face a potentially deadly threat requiring cooperation and sacrifice. The plight of the most 
vulnerable among us affects the capacity of the larger community to cope with, recover, and 
learn from COVID-19’s devastating impact. COVID-19 makes visible and urgent the need to 
embrace our linked fate, “develop a sense of commonality and shared circumstances,”2 and 
unstick dysfunctional and inequitable political and legal systems.  
 
Nowhere is the hazard of failing to recognize linked fate more urgent than in the criminal legal 
system. COVID-19 pandemic has hit people who live and work in correctional institutions 
particularly hard. The government bears legal and moral responsibility for people incarcerated in 
prisons, jails, and juvenile detention facilities, who cannot leave and must depend for their 
survival of the pandemic on the state. The movement in and out of correctional facilities by those 
employed to fulfill government’s responsibility also ensures the spread of infection. One study, 
                                                        
1 Michael C. Dawson, Behind the Mule: Race, Class and African American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 




for example, found that “increases in a county’s jail incarceration rate were associated with 
significant increases in county rates of infectious disease deaths.3 The collective failure to attend 
to the circumstances that enmesh people in the criminal legal system—poverty, racial 
discrimination, poor health and mental health care—also make prisons and jails a ground zero of 
the pandemic’s spread.  
 
COVID-19’s spread shows the futility of efforts to treat incarceration as affecting only those 
behind the prison walls, or to avoid the government’s responsibility for failure to take action. The 
imminent public health catastrophe—and the undeniable relationship between the health of 
incarcerated individuals and public health—has produced unlikely alliances and collective 
mobilization of community members, advocates, public health experts, academics, lawyers, and 
artists. These advocacy efforts have included some currently in public office, such as the Brooklyn 
and Manhattan District Attorneys and the Board of Correction of the City of New York.  They have 
focused attention on convincing less responsive public officials to exercise their existing power 
to release people from institutions wherever possible, and to provide adequate safety 
precautions and treatment for those who will not be released. They also create the potential for 
learning from the pandemic about how to address the systemic failures that have contributed to 
mass incarceration.  
 
These coalitions face the daunting challenge of garnering public and governmental support for a 
stigmatized group at a time of universal fear and seemingly scarce resources. Flawed and 
inequitable definitions of risk, sometimes based on discriminatory measures and offenses 
occurring decades ago, have fueled resistance to compassionate release from a subset of 
government officials. The punitive and dehumanizing impulse that produced mass incarceration 
is showing up in some public responses to the crisis. Some public officials have yet to respond to 
pleas for action to forestall disaster. Some have taken the position that supporting the health of 
people in prison and jail should take a back seat to the health concerns of more “worthy” 
                                                        
3 Sandhya Kajeepeta & Seth J. Prins, Why Coronavirus in Jails Should Concern All of Us, The Appeal (March 24, 
2020), at https://theappeal.org/coronavirus-jails-public-health/ 
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citizens.4 Some public responses have taken a more punitive tone, such as President Trump’s 
refusal to allow people with a criminal record to receive benefits for their small businesses under 
the CARE act.5 Given our linked fates, the larger community will pay the price along with the 
communities more directly tied to those who are incarcerated, if we continue this deliberate 
indifference. 
 
Deliberate indifference is not the only obstacle to stepping up to the challenges accompanying 
COVID 19 in an era of mass incarceration. Byzantine, politically deadlocked, and fragmented 
bureaucracies have also hampered the governmental response. Reports suggest that some public 
officials have responded only after a death or spread of COVID-19 in their facilities. There is 
evidence that public officials have erected cumbersome processes for releasing people at high 
risk of serious illness or death, and that crucial health and safety measures within corrections 
institutions have not been implemented. There is also a dearth of information provided to 
incarcerated individuals and their family members, making it harder for them to take steps to 
minimize harm that might be within their control. There is much to be learned about the need to 
reimagine the criminal justice system from the government’s inability to react nimbly and 
humanely when people’s lives are so clearly on the line.   
 
In the wake of governments’ limited response, community based organizations, mutual aid 
societies, foundations, and other parts of civic society have stepped up their efforts to support 
communities affected by mass incarceration. This response has underscored the wisdom of the 
idea that “those closest to the problem are closest to the solution.” Coalitions and community-
based organizations populated by those who have experienced incarceration have emerged as 
                                                        
4 Jacob Meisner, Federal judge orders testing measures at Cook County Jail, but rejects request to order immediate 
releases due to coronavirus, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, April 10, 2020,  available at 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-cook-county-jail-coronavirus-lawsuit-ruling-20200409-
sjwieu2sujhwhacvulsuzwhc54-story.html 





the bulwark of efforts to support people inside prisons and jails.  These efforts, heroic though 
they may be, cannot substitute for an effective, humane, and just governmental response.   
 
These perspectives about the paradox of linked fate alongside deliberate indifference emerged 
as part of the process of assembling the legal and social resources available to support 
incarcerated individuals and their families and communities during the COVID-19 crisis. The 
authors of this essay—faculty and students at Columbia Law School—undertook to gather and 
update the resources available online, in an effort to fill a perceived need for a resource targeting 
current and formerly incarcerated people with urgent and immediate needs, along with those in 
a position to advocate for them. That complete resource is available on the website of the Center 
for Institutional and Social Change: https://change-center.law.columbia.edu/content/covid-19-
legal-and-social-resources-people-affected-incarceration.   
 
The remainder of this essay shares highlights from that Report, which includes legal and social 
resources concerning: (1) release of people currently incarcerated or threatened with 
incarceration, (2) health and safety resources for people in and after incarceration, (3) benefits 
and the social safety net, and (4) domestic violence.  
 
We quickly learned that, to be concretely useful, the resource would have to focus on the local 
community—the legal and social resources available in New York City—and at the same time, 
convey information linking those local actors with statewide and national mobilization.  We also 
learned that, to be effective in stemming the impact of the pandemic, efforts to support the 
community affected by incarceration had to extend beyond the remedy of release.  People 
coming home required a place to live, health and mental health resources, means to support 
themselves, and protection from domestic violence. Our hope is that the information provided 
here will increase understanding of how the fate of the larger community is bound up with how 





Understanding the extent of the public health crisis in corrections institutions 
 
A growing group of individuals and organizations have been compiling information and resources 
related to the impact of COVID-19 on incarcerated individuals. Much of that information has 
focused on efforts to influence public officials to release people from prisons and jails, and avoid 
incarceration in the first place. That information, summarized below and more fully in the 
companion online Report, builds the case for demanding that public officials take necessary 
action to avoid a public health disaster. It will also lay the foundation for longer term efforts to 
build a more humane, equitable, and just criminal legal system. 
 
The COVID-19 crisis poses an imminent risk of serious illness or death for people incarcerated or 
working in correctional facilities. According to data gathered by the Legal Aid Society, “the 
infection rate at local jails is more than seven times higher than the rate citywide and 87 times 
higher than the country at large.” Based on this analysis, “New York City's jails have become the 
epicenter of COVID-19.” Federal prisons and prisons across the country are reporting exponential 
increases in rates of infection among incarcerated individuals and employees working in these 
institutions. High rates of infection in New York City’s jails are a bellwether for other corrections 
facilities. 
  
Prisons and jails “contain high concentrations of people in close proximity and are breeding 
grounds for uncontrolled transmission [of infection.” This situation puts anyone who is currently 
incarcerated at a heightened risk of exposure. Moreover, many incarcerated people are elderly 
and have chronic health conditions that put them at an increased risk of serious illness or death 
from COVID-19. Inadequate health care in jails and prisons compounds these risks even further. 
According to a report issued by the Osborne Association, New York alone has 10,337 incarcerated 
older people and is among five states in the union with an incarcerated older population in excess 
of 10,000 people, including Texas (28,502), California (27,806), Florida (21,620), and Pennsylvania 
(10,214). According to data from the Marshall Project, in 2016 nearly 150,000 people 
incarcerated in state facilities were 55 or older. Similarly, 11 percent of the federal prison 
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population—more than 20,000 people—is 56 or older. A letter on behalf of Federal Defenders 
reports approximately 10,000 individuals over the age of 60 presently in federal custody, with 
one third of all individuals in federal custody exhibiting preexisting conditions. Additionally, jails 
and prisons often have a higher prevalence of underlying health conditions than the non-
incarcerated population, as shown by the chart below:  
 
 
Source: Prison Policy Initiative 
 
 
While there are ways to reduce the risk of COVID-19 exposure, much of the recommended 
hygienic and protective equipment is unavailable or difficult to obtain for those who are currently 
incarcerated. Reports indicate a shortage of toilet paper as well as a lack of alcohol wipes, hand 
sanitizer, and soap in jails and prisons. According to the CDC, “many facilities restrict access to 
soap and paper towels and prohibit alcohol-based hand sanitizer and many disinfectants.” 
Additionally, protective measures like social distancing and self-quarantining are difficult or 
impossible to follow while incarcerated.  
 
The public health crisis in corrections institutions is both predictable and lethal, leading the Board 
of Corrections and chief medical officers to beg city and state officials to release as many 
vulnerable inmates as possible. Prominent public officials have called prisons and jails “death 
traps,” “petri dishes,” “ticking time bombs” and “death sentences.” March 28, 2020, marked a 
grim milestone. Patrick Estell Jones, 49, became the first individual in BOP custody to die of 
COVID-19. He was serving a sentence in a low-security facility for a non-violent crack cocaine 
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offense. April 5 marked the first COVID-19 related death of a person incarcerated in a New York 
City jail––a person who was held on a parole violation for which the Legal Aid Society had 
requested immediate release.  
  
Advocacy and avenues for redress 
 
The exigencies of this situation require public officials to respond with uncharacteristic speed, 
decisiveness, and humanity under conditions of uncertainty. Correctional institutions, public 
officials, advocates, and community based organizations must respond quickly and courageously 
if they are to minimize the devastating impact of COVID-19 on individuals, families, and 
communities affected by incarceration.  
 
A remarkable coalition of advocates, public health experts, religious leaders, academics, artists, 
and public officials has emerged. They are marshaling data, scientific evidence, and personal 
stories to pressure public officials to head off a disaster of catastrophic proportion. Public 
defender offices, prosecutors, and other legal service and advocacy groups have been pushing 
for the release of large numbers of incarcerated individuals, especially those who are older and 
have pre-existing medical conditions. They are also advocating for immediate action to provide 
greater protection and access to health care for those who contract COVID-19 while incarcerated.   
  
Advocates, community leaders, public health experts, and many public officials have called for 
immediate action to reduce the spread of the virus to those who are incarcerated and their  
families, to those who work in correctional and detention facilities, and to the community at 
large. Vendors, staff, corrections health care workers, and corrections officers coming into and 
leaving the facilities face considerable risks of infection themselves, and of spreading the 
infection to others they come in contact with outside the facilities. People released from 
incarceration are more likely to be homeless or housed in shelters or transitional facilities that 




Legal remedies for reducing incarceration are key, many falling within the discretion of executive 
officials and judges. The United States Attorney General has the authority, under the CARES Act, 
to allow the Bureau of Prisons “to transfer many more people to the relative safety of home 
confinement.”6 Corrections Commissioners have the power to remove incarcerated individuals 
from their place of confinement in case of contagious disease.7 Courts have the power to (1) 
order the release of anyone who does not present a greater danger to themselves or others than 
they would if they were infected,8 and (2) radically decrease the number of people being sent 
into incarceration who don’t require immediate confinement. They can also intervene by 
enforcing the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.9  
Prosecutors can exercise their power by not seeking incarceration of people who do not present 
an imminent threat. Governors and mayors can exercise their power to grant release or 
clemency.10  
 
Although some public officials have taken steps to respond to the crisis in time to minimize these 
extreme harms, many have yet to take the steps necessary to avoid irreparable harm to 
individuals and families, including death. 
                                                        
6 The United States Attorney General has the authority, under the CARES Act, See H.R. 748 § 6002 at Div. B, Tit. II, 
Sec. 12003(b)(2), to allow the Bureau of Prisons “to transfer many more people to the relative safety of home 
confinement.” 
7 N.Y. Correct. Law § 141 provides the Commissioner of DOCCS with the authority to temporarily remove 
incarcerated persons from their place of confinement "[i]n case any pestilence or contagious disease shall break 
out among the inmates in any of the correctional facilities, or in the vicinity of such facilities.” 
8A federal court may modify a person’s sentence because of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” under a 
statutory provision known colloquially as “compassionate release.” 18 U.S.C. sec. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 
9 For an overview of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence relating to the failure to provide medical care or release 
people in imminent danger, see Gregory Bernstein et al, COVID-19 and Prisoners’ Rights, this volume.  
 
10 The Constitution of the State of New York vests the governor with authority “to grant reprieves, commutations 
and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and 
with such restrictions and limitations, as he or she may think proper, subject to such regulations as may be 







Social and economic supports during and after incarceration 
 
In addition to those legal remedies, services and supports are necessary for people when they do 
get released from prison. People impacted by the criminal justice system—including individuals 
who have experienced incarceration and their families—require tailored support to meet their 
unique challenges.  
 
Coming home after decades behind bars is always disorienting. But for the people being released 
in the time of coronavirus, the experience is particularly jarring—trading the fear of getting sick 
in captivity for a curtailed, isolated kind of freedom. Nonprofits and social service agencies that 
support them are overwhelmed, short-staffed or moving most of their programs online. Family 
members they’ve waited years to reunite with are huddled at home. Food service and other 
industries that might hire a formerly incarcerated applicant have been decimated. And many 
small, everyday liberties are now a public health risk. 
 
Non-profit organizations supporting people upon reentry now play a critical role in providing this 
kind of assistance. After release, individuals need access to information that they trust about 
COVID-19 and the protective measures minimizing its spread. They need a safe place where they 
can be sheltered, consistent with the requirements of their release. They need medical support, 
benefits, and services to sustain themselves, and to avoid spread of the infection. They need 
resources enabling them to survive.  
 
Many nonprofit organizations continue providing services despite the COVID-19 interruption, 
sometimes as the only organizations in a position to provide any direct support in the 
community. Community re-entry and support organizations operate on the frontlines of 
supporting the formerly incarcerated population transition back into society. These organizations 
serve as a lifeline to services and information for people after release, and have been hard at 
work during the pandemic to continue serving both current and new clients. Although many are 
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struggling with limited resources and mobility, they continue to provide crucial day-to-day 
support for people who have experienced incarceration, as well as leadership in advocating for 
policy change.  
 
The crisis has led government agencies to substitute online or telephone interactions for in-
person interactions. To cope with the crisis, agencies are using methods to maintain access to 
benefits or meet community supervision requirements that do not require people to come into 
the office, and that could hold promise as a way to minimize the negative impact of bureaucratic 
requirements on people’s ability to pursue employment and education. Reentry organizations, 
advocacy groups, public health sources, law schools, public agencies, and other sources also must 
rely on on-line communication, counseling, and provision of public resources.  As a result, those 
who do not have access to the internet are likely to struggle even further to obtain the resources 
they need to survive.  
 
Institutions charged with providing the social safety net, both public and private, are straining to 
respond to the increased demand.  The current patchwork of legal and social responses and the 
reliance on an under-funded network of nonprofit advocacy groups and service providers. In 
addition, some social supports provided to help people cope with the financial hardships of 
COVID-19 have specifically excluded people with criminal records. 
 
The COVID-19 crisis thus highlights the inadequacy of the social safety net, the need for greater 
levels of funding and support for these services, and better coordination between government, 
communities, and the public and private sector. Organizations and coalitions with “inside-out” 
leadership by people who have experienced incarceration play a crucial role in providing 
information, knowledge, and ability to respond quickly and effectively to urgent needs. Hopefully 
the mobilization of concern and response needed to address the COVID-19 crisis will be sustained 
after the direct crisis has subsided, and will lay the foundation for more fundamental systemic 
change needed to address the inequities and injustices that are contributing to the devastating 
impact of COVID-19.  
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Immigration in the Time of COVID-19 
 
 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar & Clinical Professor of Law; 
Founding Director, Center for Immigrants' Rights Clinic, Penn State Law in University Park 1 
 
Current as of April 8 
 
The Coronavirus outbreak has impacted the U.S. legal system in profound ways and immigration 
is no exception. Congress wrote a statute called the Immigration and Nationality Act, which 
outlines the primary categories in which a person can seek admission to the United States, the 
reasons a person might be deported, or the bases for applying for relief from the government. 
Congress delegated much of the administration of immigration law to federal agencies. Three 
federal agencies that play a significant role in making decisions affecting immigration are the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of State 
(DOS).2 These same agencies have played a pivotal role in making or revising immigration policy 
in the time of COVID-19. 
 
DHS. DHS is an agency created in the wake of September 11, 2001, and effective March 1, 2003. 
DHS houses important immigration agencies in the realms of services and enforcement. In the 
wake of COVID-19, DHS has used social media or electronic means to communicate office 
closures and changes for the immigrants they serve and the attorneys who represent them. In 
the time of COVID-19, it is crucial that DHS maximize its use of prosecutorial discretion for 
vulnerable immigrants. Prosecutorial discretion is a powerful sword and a vital part of the 
immigration system. Because of limited resources, DHS has historically set priorities for whom it 
                                                             
1∗ Mother of two kids going to remote school with little supervision. Author of ‘Beyond Deportation: The Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases’ (NYU Press) and ‘Banned: Immigration Enforcement in the Time of 
Trump’ (NYU Press). This contribution builds upon piece that appeared in the blog of NYU Press: Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, The Trump Administration Has Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Matters During COVID-19, They 
Should Use it, NYU PRESS BLOG (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.fromthesquare.org/prosecutorial-discretion-during-
covid-19/#.XoZATIhKhPY. The author thanks Kaitlyn Box (’20) for her research assistance for this paper.  
2 Megan Davy, Deborah W. Meyers, and Jeanne Batalova, Who Does What in U.S. Immigration, MIGRATION POL’Y 
INST. (Dec. 1, 2005), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/who-does-what-us-immigration. 
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will target for immigration enforcement and whom it will leave alone.3 Humanitarian factors and 
events that include long term residence in the United States, natural disasters, seriously ill 
children, and survivors of sexual assault are among the reasons DHS has used discretion to 
protect people without an immigration status.4 
 
USCIS. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is a hub in DHS handling immigration 
benefits and applications that include asylum, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and 
green cards. Due to COVID-19, USCIS suspended in-person services like marriage-based green 
card interviews and affirmative asylum interviews, with current plans to reopen offices on May 
4, 2020.5  
 
USCIS also announced that it would extend the deadlines by 60 days for attorneys and immigrants 
to provide responses to requests for more evidence or notices to deny, revoke, or terminate a 
benefit for requests dated March 1, 2020, through May 1, 2020.6 In the wake of COVID-19, USCIS 
also announced that it would use previously submitted “biometrics” (fingerprints) for people who 
applied to extend their work authorization but are unable to go to a regularly scheduled 
fingerprint appointment due to office closures. This will make a huge difference for noncitizens 
who are employed in the United States and dependent on having work authorization.7 Notably, 
27,000 people with DACA work in the healthcare industry, are in the frontlines during this 
pandemic, and are dependent on these work permits.8 USCIS has made steps in the right 
direction, but there is so much more it can do. 
                                                             
3 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of the Dep’t. Homeland Security to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting 
Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., and Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant 
Sec’y for Pol’y (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf.  
4 SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015).  
5 USCIS Response to Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/uscis-response-coronavirus-2019-covid-19.  
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Adam Liptak, Dreamers’ Tell Supreme Court Ending DACA During Pandemic Would Be ‘Catastrophic’, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/us/dreamers-supreme-court-daca.html.  
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On April 3, 2020, the immigration bar association known as the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association (AILA) filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia 
challenging the inaction by USCIS as a violation of administrative law and procedural due 
process.9 The complaint argues in part: “Defendants’ decision not to toll deadlines, expiration 
dates, and otherwise hold time-sensitive applications and communication in abeyance during the 
COVID-19 national emergency is wholly irrational and damaging to the safety of Plaintiff’s 
members, their staff, and their clients, and possibly USCIS employees as well.”10 In the lawsuit, 
AILA requested that the Court order USCIS to recognize the global pandemic as an “extraordinary 
circumstance” and to toll the deadlines for immigration benefits and requests in its jurisdiction.11  
 
Now is the most critical time for USCIS to use their discretion to automatically extend status, 
postpone deadlines, or automatically renew benefits. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, this 
author has interacted with dozens of people residing in the United States with a temporary 
immigration status who are afraid of the future and of their ability to preserve their legal status. 
Meanwhile, DACA recipients with pending renewals are unsure about receiving a timely decision 
or losing the jobs that support them or their families. USCIS should also renew or grant those 
requesting deferred action protection outside of DACA. Last September, this author testified 
before Congress, along with several brave patients and advocates to highlight the history of 
deferred action and the way it serves as a life-saving form of protection.12 
 
ICE. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is an arm of DHS with the responsibility to 
arrest, detain, and deport immigrants from the United States. Early memos from the Trump 
administration created the possibility that any person with a criminal history, arrest, plausible 
crime, or removal order would be a priority for removal.13 In the wake of COVID-19, ICE scaled 
                                                             
9 AILA Files Complaint Seeking Maintenance of Status, Extended Deadlines from USCIS, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW. ASS’N 
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.aila.org/infonet/aila-files-complaint-seeking-maintenance-of-status.  
10 Id.  
11 Id., at 28. 
12 Hearing on The Administration’s Apparent Revocation of Medical Deferred Action for Critically Ill Children, 116th 
Cong. (2019) (testimony of Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Center for 
Immigrants’ Rights Clinic, Penn State Law).  
13 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).  
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back by issuing a directive that ICE will refrain from taking immigration enforcement actions again 
noncitizens except for those who are a risk to public safety or are subject to mandatory detention 
for criminal reasons.14 ICE has also stated that it will not conduct enforcement at medical 
facilities, including hospitals, except under “extraordinary circumstances.”15 So much more will 
be needed to ensure that immigrants feel safe to come forward to request medical help or be 
confident that ICE will in fact implement this new enforcement directive. How will the immigrant 
community and in particular those living in undocumented or mixed status families shift their 
perspective from one that fears ICE to one that trusts them? This kind of shift will require 
something more than a website publication announcing policy changes.  
 
ICE also has prosecutorial discretion about whether to release or detain immigrants who are 
incarcerated. Yet ICE continues to keep immigrants in detention even when health and safety are 
at risk. Further, the continued detention of immigrants appears to violate ICE’s own recent policy 
to limit immigration enforcement to only those who pose a public safety risk or subject to 
mandatory detention on criminal grounds. The most recently available data indicates that in 
March 2020, 61.2% of the roughly 35,000 immigrants in detention had no criminal conviction.16 
In pointing out this contradiction, the author does not suggest (or support) incarcerating 
immigrants with criminal convictions during a global pandemic.  
 
As of April 8, 2020, ICE has reported 74 confirmed cases of COVID-19 among ICE employees and 
32 confirmed cases of COVID-19 among immigration detainees, five of whom include  immigrants 
held in Pike County Jail.17 Pike County Jail is one of several facilities in Pennsylvania (where I am 
based) that contracts with ICE to incarcerate immigrants. The discovery of ICE staff and detainees 
testing positive for the novel COVID-19 virus should be more than a wake-up call that ICE must 
                                                             
14 ICE Guidance on COVID-19, U.S. CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus.  
15 Id.  
16 TRAC Immigration. Decline in ICE Detainees with Criminal Records Could Shape Agency’s Response to COVID-19 
Pandemic, (Apr. 3, 2020) https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/601/ 
17 Id.  
31 
 
use its discretion to release, especially in cases where individuals and families do not pose public 
safety risks.18 
 
In addition to the continued detention of adult immigrants in Pennsylvania and across the 
country is the choice by ICE to continue detaining families. Berks County Residential Center 
(Berks) is a family detention center based in Leesport, PA, and one of three in the country. Despite 
the issuance of a “stay at home” order by Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf, Berks continues to 
detain babies, children, and parents who should be released. Keeping immigrants in detention 
even when their health and safety are at risk is an abuse of discretion and, according to several 
lawsuits filed around the country demanding release of individuals, violates federal statutes and 
the U.S. Constitution. 
 
Though several immigration detainees have been released as a result of these lawsuits, there has  
not been uniform effort by the administration to release immigration detainees despite ICE’s 
discretionary authority to release.19 Said Bridget Cambria, immigration attorney and Executive 
Director of ALDEA- The People’s Justice Center in Reading, PA whose organization is in the 
trenches representing detained immigrants in Pennsylvania, “Anything short of immediately 
releasing every person detained in ICE custody at this point is irresponsible and will result in the 
deaths of people who are in civil custody.”20 
 
CBP. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is another leg of DHS. They are responsible for arrests 
at the border, “short term” detentions, and decisions on admission along with other 
responsibilities. CBP plays a role in facilitating a new policy to shut down non-essential travel at 
                                                             
18 Id.  
19 Kim Langona, Ongoing Litigation Over Migrants’ Release Amid COVID-19, CRIMMIGRATION (Apr. 3, 2020, 11:40 
AM), http://crimmigration.com/2020/04/03/ongoing-litigation-over-migrants-release-amid-covid-19/; See also, 
Thakker, et al., v Doll, et al. https://www.aclupa.org/en/cases/thakker-et-al-v-doll-et-al; Hope, et al., v. Doll, et al. 
https://www.aclupa.org/en/cases/hope-et-al-v-doll-et-al 
20 Jeff Gammage, Five migrants test positive for COVID-19 in ICE detention centers in Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 
Inquirer (Apr. 4, 2020)  
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the southern and northern borders of the United States.21 These changes have been 
compounded by new rules issued by the Center for Disease Control to return any person who 
“introduces” themselves at the border without permission or valid documents. The implications 
are significant and may in fact violate other statutes such as the Refugee Act of 1980. Beyond the 
statutes, CBP has the prosecutorial discretion to allow the entry of individuals on the micro level 
or implement policies at the macro level that protect immigrants and public health.22 CBP can 
choose to place people in regular removal proceedings without subjecting them to speedy 
removal such as “expedited removal” or dangerous new inventions (a discretionary choice) like 
“Migration Protection Protocols” (MPP), where asylum seekers are forced to wait in Mexico 
pending their removal hearings.   
 
DOJ. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an agency with an important role in immigration matters. 
A hub in DOJ called the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) houses more than 60 
courts and employs nearly 400 immigration judges across the country.23 Immigration judges hold 
a variety of hearings, the most common of which are called “removal proceedings.”24 For 
example a person charged under the immigration statute for overstaying a tourist visa or 
committing certain crimes might be placed in removal proceedings and be scheduled to go before 
an immigration judge in the EOIR. In the wake of COVID-19, EOIR has delayed non-detained 
hearings as well as MPP hearings through May 1, 2020.25 Further, EOIR has set up temporary 
email accounts for the immigration courts nationwide and the appellate unit known as the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to facilitate electronic filing due to COVID-19.26   
                                                             
21 Fact Sheet: DHS Measures on the Border to Limit the Further Spread of Coronavirus, U.S. DEP’T. HOMELAND SECURITY 
(Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/03/23/fact-sheet-dhs-measures-border-limit-further-spread-
coronavirus.  
22 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. L. J. 243 (2010). 
23 Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T. JUST. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-
the-chief-immigration-judge.  
24 I.N.A. § 240; see also Statistics Yearbook: Fiscal Year 2018, U.S. DEP’T. JUST, EXEC. OFF. IMMIGRATION REV., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download.  
25 Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T. JUST. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-
the-chief-immigration-judge. 





Many immigration detainees are scheduled for hearings before immigration judges. As of this 
writing, DOJ has continued to hold these hearings, placing a variety of players at risk: immigration 
judges, court staff, detained immigrants, ICE trial attorneys (who represent the government in 
removal proceedings), and immigration attorneys. Immigration attorneys, prosecutors and 
immigration judges have been unified in their demand that DOJ close the immigration courts.27 
Said one immigration judge “I don’t say this lightly, but EOIR has demonstrated that they need to 
be gutted and rebuilt from the ashes. I’ve never witnessed an utter lack of concern for people 
like I have here. In my former life, we treated captured Taliban and ISIS with more humanity. 
Moreover, I’ve never seen worse leadership. A crisis usually brings good and bad to the light. We 
have seen nothing but darkness.”28 On April 7, 2020, immigration advocacy organizations filed 
an emergency motion demanding that DOJ pause in-person hearings for immigration detainees 
and allow hearings to proceed remotely.29   
 
DOS. Department of State is responsible for issuing visas to foreign nationals seeking admission 
into the United States. DOS officers work at U.S. embassies and consulates around the world.30 
On March 20, 2020, DOS suspended routine visa services around the world.31 This suspension 
will have profound effects on the ability of green card holders to obtain a visa and enter the 
United States based on a qualifying relationship to a family member or employer. The visa 
suspension also affects the ability of scores of foreign nationals to enter the United States 
temporarily.  This applies to students, scholars, exchange visitors, tourists, and those traveling 
for business reasons. Of note, DOS has carved out an exception for medical professionals seeking 
                                                             
27 Immigration Judges, Prosecutors, and Attorneys Call for the Nationwide Closure of All Immigration Courts, AM. 
IMMIGRATION LAW. ASS’N (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-correspondence/2020/ijs-
prosecutors-and-attorneys-call-for-nationwid.  
28 Communication to NAIJ [National Association of Immigration Judges] from Immigration Judge (Name Withheld), 
(March. 30, 2020) 
29 Temporary Restraining Order Requested to Stop Dangerous EOIR and ICE Policies During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT ET AL., (Apr. 8, 2020), https://nipnlg.org/pr/2020_08Apr_nipnlg-v-eoir-tro.html 
30 About Us – Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. DEP’T. ST., https://www.state.gov/about-us-bureau-of-consular-
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admission to the United States based on approved immigration petitions, advising such foreign 
nationals to check with their closest embassy or consulate to request an emergency visa 
appointment.32 
 
DOS has also delivered information about presidential proclamations33 restricting entry to certain 
individuals who were physically present in China, Iran, the Schengen Area, the United Kingdom,  
or Ireland.34 U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (green card holders) are among those 
exempt from the entry restrictions.  
 
Conclusion. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a huge impact on the immigration system. Many of 
the changes have been implemented by agencies in the executive branch. Moving forward, 
agencies must make decisions that prioritize the health and safety of government employees, 
noncitizens, and immigration attorneys while preserving fairness and due process. 
 
                                                             
32 Update for Visas for Medical Professionals, U.S. DEP’T. ST., U.S. Visas News, (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/visas-news/update-on-h-and-j-visas-for-medical-
professionals.html 
33 Proclamation No. 9984, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,709 (Jan. 31, 2020); Proclamation No. 9992, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,855 (Feb. 29, 
2020); Proclamation No. 9993 (Mar. 11, 2020); Proclamation No. 9996, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,341 (Mar. 14, 2020); see 
also Presidential Proclamation on Novel Coronavirus, U.S. DEP’T. ST., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/ea/Presidential-Proclamation-Coronavirus.html.  




COVID-19 and the Law: Elections 
 
Richard Briffault, Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School 
 
I. Introduction 
With one Supreme Court decision, lower federal and state court decisions, pending 
litigation, and proposals around the country for major changes in how elections are conducted, 
COVID-19 has already had and likely will continue to have a significant impact on election law.  
The discussion that follows proceeds in two parts. The first addresses the initial 
consequences of COVID-19 as an electoral emergency. Voters were due to go to the polls in states 
around the country just as the pandemic was gathering force and governors and mayors were 
calling on people to stay at home and avoid large gatherings – which, of course, often occur at 
crowded polling places during contested elections. Although many states managed to move their 
late March and April elections to May, June, or later without incident, heated political and legal 
battles broke out in Ohio and Wisconsin over changing election dates and formats, with the 
Wisconsin dispute winding up in both the state and United States Supreme Courts the day before 
the election, and Wisconsin conducting an in-person election in the middle of a pandemic. 
The second part looks beyond the immediate effects of COVID-19 to the middle term, that 
is, to the host of changes to election laws that will be needed for the November 2020 election if, 
due to the pandemic, large gatherings remain a public health threat. Some form of primarily vote-
by-mail system will be needed, but such a system is currently in place only in five states, and 
those states took several election cycles to make the transition from traditional polling-place 
voting. Indeed, right now, one-third of the states permit only voters with one of a limited number 
of excuses specified in the states’ statutes to obtain a mail-in ballot. Widespread changes in 
voting laws will be necessary if the November elections are to be safe, fair, and secure. Yet, 
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partisan opposition encouraged by President Trump’s error-filled misstatements about voting-
by-mail1 makes it unclear whether these changes will be made.   
 
II. COVID-19 as Election Emergency 
COVID-19 first became a factor in the 2020 elections on March 17, when four major states – 
Arizona, Florida, Illinois, and Ohio – were set to hold their presidential primaries and other 
elections.  Voting went ahead in the first three states, although the process was troubled in many 
places by the failure of poll workers – many of whom are over sixty – to report for duty, the 
resulting last-minute closure of some polling places, and the shortage of hand sanitizer and wipes 
for the voting machines.2 In Arizona and Florida – states with previously high levels of voting by 
mail and early in-person voting – overall turnout was strong even though there were fewer in-
person voters than in the 2016 primaries. Turnout was considerably lower in Illinois, where most 
voters vote in person on election day and, due to COVID-19 anxieties, many were unable or 
unwilling to do so. 
The situation in Ohio was more complicated. On March 16, Governor DeWine announced at 
a press conference that it was unsafe to hold the election scheduled for the following day. 
Although he said he lacked the authority to reschedule the election, he anticipated (and would 
not contest) a private lawsuit claiming that requiring voters at risk of coronavirus to come to the 
polls is unconstitutional and seeking a postponement of the election. However, later that day, 
the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas rejected the suit, finding that it would set a “terrible 
precedent” to postpone an election 12 hours before polling places were scheduled to open.3 
Then, just when it looked like the election would be held as scheduled, the Director of the Ohio 
Department of Health, presumably acting at the behest of the governor, issued an order closing 









all polling places on health grounds. The Secretary of State – the state’s chief elections officer – 
followed up with another order rescheduling in-person voting for the 2020 primaries for June 2, 
2020; allowing absentee balloting to continue until then; and extending the deadlines for 
requesting absentee ballots, counting them, canvassing them, and certifying election results.  
The secretary most likely lacked the statutory authority to do any of this, and suits were filed 
challenging his action. On March 21, he sent a letter to the legislature requesting that it set a 
June 2 primary, allow in-person voting on that day, but also facilitate vote-by-mail by providing 
that every registered voter be mailed a postage-paid absentee ballot application. He explained 
that under current public health conditions it would be logistically impossible for election officials 
to handle the anticipated surge in requests for mail-in ballots any earlier. The Ohio legislature, 
however, ignored the Secretary’s request – which had been supported by Ohio’s local election 
officials -- and on March 25 voted to re-set the primary as a nearly all vote-by-mail election for 
April 28. The governor signed the new law into effect on March 27, but a collection of civil and 
voting rights groups immediately brought suit challenging the new law. The plaintiffs contended 
that the law’s “cumbersome, multi-step process for voting by mail” – which requires millions of 
voters to obtain an absentee ballot application, and then complete and submit it; election 
officials to review and approve the application, and mail the ballot to the voter; and have the 
voter receive, complete and return the ballot within a month – would inevitably result in many 
voters being denied the ability to participate in the election.  
On April 3, the federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio rejected the suit. Judge 
Watson acknowledged that “the compressed timeframe for the completion of absentee voting 
does pose a burden on voters,” but concluded that the state’s interest in making sure the voting 
process was resolved in time to have delegates selected for the national party conventions 
justified the earlier deadline. Nor did the state have to simplify the vote-by-mail process to make 
it easier for voters to use. “Given the upheaval that the change to the voting process has already 
created, the Court agrees that the State has a strong interest in minimizing disorder and easing 
the burdens on county boards of elections. By permitting the boards of elections to continue to 
use the absentee-balloting system already in place and changing only the deadline for accepting 
those ballots, H.B. 197 furthers that interest..” In short, Judge Watson concluded “the 
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Constitution does not require the best plan, just a lawful one,” and the legislature’s plan crossed 
that low bar.4 
If Ohio’s response to COVID-19 was messy, Wisconsin’s was a train-wreck. On April 7, 
Wisconsin was scheduled to hold its spring election, which included a presidential primary, a 
hotly-contested partisan race for the state supreme court, elections for three seats on the state 
court of appeals, one statewide and more than one hundred local referenda, and close to three 
thousand elections for lower court, county, town, village, and school district board positions. On 
March 12, Governor Evers declared a public health emergency in the state; on March 25 he issued 
a stay-at-home order, and on April 4, FEMA issued a major disaster declaration for the entire 
State of Wisconsin as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The governor, however, initially 
declined to postpone the election, explaining that he lacked the authority to do so, and called on 
the legislature to adopt universal vote-by-mail. At that point, there had already been an 
unprecedented level of requests for mail-in ballots – nearly five times the level in 2016, and state 
election officials were having difficulty coping with the demand.  
On April 2, a federal judge in the Western District of Wisconsin responded to suits brought by 
the national and state Democratic parties, voting rights groups, and individual voters by issuing 
an order modifying Wisconsin’s election law to deal with the surge in demand for mail-in ballots. 
Specifically, Judge Conley found that due to the backlog in processing ballot requests, it was likely 
that thousands of voters would not get their ballots in time to have them returned to election 
offices by 8 pm on Election Day, and so he ordered that ballots be accepted if received up to six 
days later. In addition, he declined to add a requirement that the ballots be postmarked on 
Election Day; a ballot would be counted if received by the new deadline, April 13, even if mailed 
after Election Day. He also extended by one day the deadline for the receipt of absentee ballot 
applications, and eased the requirement that the ballot be witnessed. The court, however, 
                                                             




declined to postpone the election, or to modify the state’s photo ID requirement.5 The national 
and state Republican parties immediately moved to block the court’s order. 
On Friday, April 3, the governor called the legislature into special session to adopt universal 
vote-by-mail for the election. The legislature met on Saturday, April 4, and without debate or 
discussion immediately adjourned.6 On Monday, April 6, with conditions in Wisconsin worsening 
– due to a lack of poll workers, Milwaukee had reduced the number of polling places from 181 to 
5, and Green Bay had consolidated its polling places from 31 to 2 – the governor, relying on his 
constitutional authority as chief executive and a statute authorizing him to take such action in an 
emergency as "he or she deems necessary for the security of persons and property,” issued an 
executive order suspending the April 7 election until June 9, authorizing voters to continue to 
apply for and return absentee ballots until the election, and calling the legislature back into 
session.7 The Republican-led state legislature promptly sued in the state supreme court to block 
the governor’s action. 
On April 6, the two Supreme Courts – Wisconsin and United States – dividing on party lines8 
blocked the key emergency actions of, respectively, the governor and the federal district court. 
The state supreme court, by a 4-2 vote, held that none of the state constitutional provisions the 
governor invoked gave him the power to suspend or rewrite the state’s election laws. As for his 
statutory claim, the majority determined that the broad grant in the quoted provision was limited 
by another subsection of the same law which specifically authorized the governor to “suspend 
the provisions of any administrative rule” in emergencies. If the broad power to act in an 
emergency that the governor claimed included the power to suspend statutes, the specific grant 
of power to suspend administrative rules would have been “pure surplusage.” In other words, by 
                                                             





8 Justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court are elected. The election is technically nonpartisan, but the candidates 
run as partisans with party support. The four judges in the majority were elected with Republican support; the two 




granting the power to suspend rules the law implicitly denied the power to suspend statutes. The 
dissenters unsuccessfully argued that as a matter of textual interpretation the statutory grant of 
authority to protect the “security of persons” included the power to protect voters from the 
danger of exposure to COVID-19; they also contended that the statutory authority of the state 
health department to “forbid public gatherings” in order to control the spread of communicable 
diseases surely meant that the governor could for the same reason bar public gatherings at 
polling places.9 
The issue before the United States Supreme Court in the aptly named Republican National 
Committee v. Democratic National Committee10 was whether to stay the portion of Judge 
Conley’s order directing Wisconsin election officials to accept absentee ballots through April 13, 
the new deadline for the receipt of such ballots, even if they were mailed or postmarked after 
April 7, the original Wisconsin election day. (The portion of the order directing acceptance of 
ballots arriving after April 7 was not challenged). Like the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the United 
States Supreme Court also divided along partisan lines, with the five-member majority 
determining that the district court’s order violated the so-called Purcell principle – the rule, based 
on the Court’s decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006), “that lower federal courts should 
ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.”  As the per curiam opinion 
explained, the Purcell principle is intended to prevent the “kind of judicially created confusion” 
that can result from election law changes on the eve of an election.11 Without acknowledging 
that the Wisconsin election was probably far more disrupted by the pandemic itself than by the 
district court’s order, the Court emphasized that allowing voters to mail ballots after election day 
“is extraordinary relief and would fundamentally alter the nature of the election.”12 Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the four dissenters, emphasized how the unprecedented surge in absentee 
ballot requests had overwhelmed election administrators, so that tens of thousands of voters 
                                                             
9 Wisconsin Legislature v. Evers, Wisconsin Sup. Ct., No. 2020AP608-OA, April 6, 2020, 
https://www.wicourts.gov/news/docs/2020AP608_2.pdf. 
10 589 U.S. ____ (2020), No. 19A1016, April 6, 2020 (granting stay of district court order granting preliminary 
injunction). 
11 Id. at 2-3. 
12 Id. at 4. 
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were unlikely to receive their ballots in time to return them by the April 7 deadline.13 As a result, 
“they will have to brave the polls, endangering their own and others’ safety. Or they will lose 
their right to vote, through no fault of their own.”14 
The Ohio and Wisconsin experiences with their COVID-19-impacted elections were, 
fortunately, atypical. At least nineteen states managed to reschedule their primaries or other 
elections to later dates or to shift from in-person to all-mail elections without the Sturm und 
Drang that marked these two Midwestern states.15 Nonetheless, the Ohio and Wisconsin cases 
do provide some important lessons. First, in our federal system it is the states that write the 
election laws. State election laws also govern elections to federal offices, unless changed by 
Congress. Many states lack clear rules for delaying or rescheduling an election in the event an 
emergency makes holding the election as originally scheduled dangerous or impossible.16 There 
are certainly reasons to be extremely cautious about enabling a partisan official to postpone an 
election or rewrite the election laws at the last minute on his or her own. And as the Purcell 
principle confirms, those concerns are not limited to actions by officials elected on partisan lines. 
Last-minute changes are disruptive and may be seen as having partisan consequences whatever 
the intention. All states should have rules in place to deal with emergencies, but as the Ohio and 
Wisconsin experiences indicate, many states do not.  
Second, in the absence of clear rules, decisions dealing with an electoral emergency as it 
unfolds can take on a partisan cast. That was less true in Ohio, where all the major actors – the 
governor who postponed the election and the secretary of state who sought a long delay, and 
the legislature which moved up the date for the new election – were Republican, but the partisan 
divide was evident in Wisconsin between the Democratic governor and the Republican legislature 
and Republican-dominated state supreme court. Surely the legislature resisted and the state and 
national Republican parties sued to block the election delay and the liberalization of the rules 
                                                             
13 According to one press account published shortly after the election, at least 9,000 ballots were never mailed to 
voters, and thousands more not returned or nullified because returned too late to count. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/us/politics/wisconsin-election-absentee-coronavirus.html. 





governing voting-by-mail ballots at least in part because they assumed they would benefit 
electorally from the depressed turnout in urban centers like Milwaukee that were particularly 
hard-hit by COVID-19.17 This seems to be a national Republican strategy as well.18  
Finally, as Ohio and Wisconsin illustrate, any shift from a predominantly vote-in-person to a 
predominantly vote-by-mail system will require significant legal and administrative adaptations 
of the processes by which voters obtain and submit – and administrators transmit and review – 
mailed-in ballots. The questions that need to be resolved in order to make vote-by-mail widely 
available this November are the focus of the next section. 
 
III. Moving to Voting-by-Mail  
Traditionally, Americans voted by going to a designated neighborhood polling place on a 
specific date and casting their ballots at that place. Over time, new forms of voting were 
authorized. Absentee voting enables voters who cannot make it to the polls, such as because of 
illness or disability or absence from home, to obtain a ballot and mail it in. Over time, the rules 
governing absentee voting have been liberalized and today twenty-eight states and the District 
of Columbia provide for so-called “no-excuses” absentee voting, in which anyone can request 
that a ballot be mailed to them without having to give a reason. In an additional five states – 
Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Utah, and Washington – elections are conducted entirely by mail; 
ballots are simply mailed to all registered voters at their home addresses several weeks before 
the election. Seventeen states continue to require the voter to have one of the statutorily 
determined excuses in order to vote absentee.19 Many states have also implemented procedures 
for “early in-person voting” which enables the voter to vote at central locations during a 
designated period before Election Day. Currently, forty-one states and the District of Columbia 
authorize early in-person voting. 
                                                             
17 That strategy appeared to fail in the election for the most important state office on the April 7 ballot, justice on 






In the last three election cycles, approximately one-quarter of all ballots were cast by mail, 
with particularly heavy usage in a handful of western states, including the all-mail voting states.20 
In 2018, another one-fifth of voters voted at early in-person voting sites. That, however, means 
that roughly 55% of voters voted at a polling place on Election Day. In most states that fraction is 
far higher; in 2018, in 31 states fewer than 15% of ballots were cast by mail.21 
If the pandemic persists into the fall, it will be impossible for the November elections to be 
held in a fair and safe manner unless early in-person voting and especially voting-by-mail are 
available to all Americans. Fifty-eight percent of poll workers are 61 or older – 27% are over 70 – 
the group at greatest risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19. And of course millions of 
Americans will reasonably be reluctant to risk their health and that of their families by coming to 
a crowded polling place. Widespread revision of voting laws to facilitate voting-by-mail is 
essential. 
Among the multiple legislative or regulatory changes many states will need to make are: (i) 
making it easier for voters to obtain mail-in ballots; (ii) setting reasonable deadlines for voters to 
request and return ballots; and (iii) adopting procedures for resolving disputes over whether the 
signature on the voter’s application or returned ballot matches the signature on file and for giving 
voters an opportunity to challenge the rejection of ballots on signature mismatch grounds; and 
(iv) modifying burdensome voter ID and witnessing requirements, as well as restrictions on the 
ability of community groups to collect and submit ballots. 
On the first point, in many states, the voter has to take the first step of requesting a mail-in 
ballot. Although in some places this can be done by filing an online application, that option may 
not be available to voters without internet access; other states require that the voter first request 
an application, which must be mailed in. One way to deal with this would be for the state to mail 
a ballot, or at least a ballot application, to all registered voters. The all vote-by-mail States use 
the former process. Election law specialists concerned about the prospect of ballots being sent 
                                                             
20 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Election Administration and Voting Survey 2018 Comprehensive Report, 





to addresses from which the voters have moved or to voters who have died, so that the ballots 
could be subject to fraudulent misuse, object to such mass mailing of ballots (although there is 
little evidence of fraud in the all-mail states). Mass mailing of applications (ideally with a postage-
paid self-sealing envelope) would still place a burden on the voter to apply, but it would at least 
eliminate one step in the process. Moreover, as long as in-person voting remains an option, it 
has the advantage of avoiding mailing an unnecessary ballot to a voter who intends to vote in 
person. 
As the Wisconsin litigation indicates, the return date for mail-in ballots is a critical question. 
Some states require that the ballot be received by Election Day; others only that it be mailed by 
Election Day, and received within a defined number of days after Election Day. Giving the voter 
more time is surely more consistent with protecting the right to vote, especially given the 
likelihood of delays in postal deliveries of ballots to and returns by voters; it may give election 
administrators more time to handle a flood of mailed-in ballots. And many voters are likely to fix 
on Election Day as the day to vote; others may be hesitating between voting in person or by mail. 
The main downside of the Election Day mailing deadline is that means that the results of some 
elections may not be known until days after Election Day. 
Other new administrative rules or laws are likely to be necessary to standardize the 
procedures by which election officials check signatures on applications or ballot envelopes to see 
if they match those on file, and to give voters the opportunity to challenge rejections. Signature-
match laws that fail to give voters an adequate opportunity to challenge rejections were already 
subject to litigation before COVID-19.22 Similarly, at a time when, due to social distancing 
requirements and the closure of public libraries and similar facilities, it may be difficult for voters 
to obtain the signatures of witnesses or submit copies of their photo IDs as some states require. 
One component of the district court preliminary injunction in the Wisconsin litigation, not at issue 
in the Supreme Court, was the court’s order lifting the witnessing requirement for voters 
attesting that a witness was unavailable. Similarly, restrictions on the ability of community groups 
to collect and submit absentee ballots – justified by an asserted need to prevent fraud – may 




need to be modified because of the burdens on some voters, such as Native Americans who live 
in rural areas without adequate mail service. Rules such as these had been challenged by voting 
rights groups even before COVID-19 became a factor.  
At least as important as legal changes will be the significant costs that will have to be incurred 
in order to switch to a primarily vote-by-mail election. “The equipment that states have to 
conduct in-person elections won’t work for mail-in elections. The scanners many states have to 
count ballots in each polling place can’t handle counting ballots en masse from the whole county 
or state. The kind of scanner that can do that heavy work costs $500,000 to $1 million . . . . Also, 
states can’t just mail out the ballots they already have printed. They have to design ballots that 
can be folded into an envelope. They also need to print instructions for how to fill it out and send 
it back. And they need to design the ballot to work with the Postal Service.”23 As one state 
election official contemplating the switch to vote-by-mail also noted, “part of that calculation is 
figuring out how to pay for postage for those ballots, so no one has to go out and buy stamps.”24 
And, moving rapidly to a primarily vote-by-mail system will require mass retraining of poll 
workers and education of voters. 
All this will cost money. The Brennan Center for Justice estimates that the cost of moving to 
a primarily vote-by-mail election this year will be between $1 billion and $1.4 billion – with most 
of the expenditure going to ballot processing, secure ballot storage, additional staffing, public 
education, and, especially, postage costs.25 The Brennan Center study also emphasizes that an 
estimated $270 million will need to be spent to assure that in-person voting – which will remain 
the preferred form of voting for many Americans – is safe and secure, with the money going to 
make sure polling places comply with public health standards, hire poll workers, and increase 
access to early in-person voting.26  
                                                             
23 https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/03/vote-by-mail-difficulties/. 






Responding to COVID-19 will also likely require legal changes and new resources to improve 
voter registration systems. Typically, in the run-up to a presidential election, millions of people 
update their voter registration information or register to vote for the first time. COVID-19 could 
severely disrupt this process, making it difficult for Americans to submit timely registration 
applications or for elections officials to process those applications. The outbreak will certainly 
reduce access to government offices that provide voter registration services. Although thirty-
nine states and the District of Columbia have either fully implemented online voter registration 
or are in the process of doing so, the other eleven states need to do so before the fall. And all 
states with online voter registration systems will need to test and bolster their capacity to ensure 
they can handle the likely surge in usage.  
With the states already incurring significant costs in addressing the health crisis posed by 
COVID-19 while sustaining massive losses in revenues from sales and income taxes due to the 
pandemic’s impact on commerce and employment, some of the funding for addressing COVID-
19’s impact on our electoral system ought to come from the federal government. Senators 
Wyden and Klobuchar have introduced legislation that would require all states to offer voting-
by-mail and early in-person voting if twenty-five percent of the states have declared a state of 
emergency due to COVID-19, and would provide federal funds to cover the cost.27  
In the negotiations over the development of the CARES Act – the $2.1 trillion COVID-19 
response law enacted in late March – the House of Representatives proposed to appropriate $4 
billion for election safety and security measures that would require all states to institute vote-
by-mail, early-in-person voting, and online voter registration. The Senate initially offered only 
$140 million. The final bill provided $400 million but with no requirements for improved access 
to the ballot or voter registration. That was a step in the right direction but likely inadequate to 
the full task of conducting fair and secure elections in the face of a pandemic.  
 The prospects that our election laws will be made COVID-19-ready are uncertain. 
President Trump has slammed mail-in voting, tweeting that it “doesn’t work out well for 






Republicans,”28 and other Republican leaders have followed suit, with House Republican leader 
Kevin McCarthy calling the continued push by Democrats to include more funding for voting-by-
mail in the next COVID-19 relief bill “disgusting.”29 In recent decades, election laws have 
frequently been assessed in partisan terms, and the response to COVID-19 seems to already be 
caught up in the partisan divide. If that remains the case, then COVID-19 may turn out to be an 
even greater disaster for American democracy than it has been for public health. 
 
  











The New “Essential” 
Rethinking Social Goods in the Wake of Covid-19 
 
 




The Covid-19 crisis has laid bare the fragility of social insurance systems in the United States and 
the lack of income security and basic benefits for many workers and residents.   The United States 
has long had weaker protections for workers compared to other liberal democracies, and the 
pandemic makes plain the health, economic, and moral consequences of these arrangements.  In 
recent weeks, the United States has seen dramatic economic dislocation, food insecurity, and the 
dire effects of an inadequate health care system. There is already evidence of racial and economic 
disparities among those most affected by these dislocations (analyses are hampered by a paucity 
of demographic data).  Those who were socially and economically vulnerable before the 
pandemic (for example due to homelessness, immigration status, or incarceration) are likely to 
suffer the most harm.   Changes in workplace conditions as a result of the pandemic are borne 
disproportionality by low-income workers and workers of color.  For instance, lower-income 
workers are more likely to be employed in jobs that increase their risk of exposure to the virus 
such as working in sanitation and janitorial services, food services and grocery stores, and in 
delivery.   Yet the pandemic also eschews the imagined categories of who is deemed vulnerable 
or not.   Its effects cannot be so easily contained, extending broadly into society – affecting a 
wide array of “gig” and service workers, health care workers, tenants, and students –  and 
revealing our inevitable connections to one other.  
 
One consequence for law and policy is that addressing the effects of the pandemic might lead to 
profound changes in what Americans consider essential goods for a sustainable society.  Most 
clearly, the Covid-19 pandemic exposes the weaknesses in the United States’ health care 
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infrastructure, including the continuing problem of underinsurance, the problems raised by 
tethering health care to work, and the underfunding of the public health delivery system.   The 
pandemic also reveals the limitations of a set of other structures that sustain workers and families 
and that allow individuals and families to access necessary benefits.    Declining unionization and 
the rise of contract work and the “gig” economy mean that many workers lack the ability to 
bargain for their work conditions or sometimes even to obtain the legal status of ‘employee’.  
The United States also lacks social benefits that might help mitigate both the effects of sickness 
on individuals and families as well as the spread of infection and disease.   For instance, the United 
States lacks guarantees for housing for those who cannot afford it (and was in the midst of an 
affordable housing crisis before the pandemic), lacks federally mandated permanent paid sick 
and family leave, and lacks entitlements to key utilities such as water.     
 
The current crisis has led to government efforts to buttress the social infrastructure.  To respond 
to the virus, the federal government enacted, in March 2020, two significant responsive 
measures—the  Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security Act (CARES) – including for the first time federally mandated paid sick 
leave  (the new program expires on December 31st, 2020). Some state and local jurisdictions are 
now requiring forms of paid family, medical, and sick leave; placing moratoriums on housing 
evictions and foreclosure; and, limiting the ability of service providers to cut off essential utilities 
such as water.  As the pandemic leads to orders that Americans stay in their houses, the crisis is 
also broadening notions of what constitutes an essential good as regulators have pressed private 
companies to expand broadband, and as advocates and municipalities are advancing strategies 
to expand quality broadband access to underserved communities even beyond the current crisis.  
Some of the responsive initiatives take a universalist approach, increasing benefits and providing 
direct payments to a wide swath of workers and taxpayers. 
 
Whether this emergent response will be sufficient to sustain workers and families during the 
outbreak and in the recession that will likely follow remains to be seen.  Some limitations of the 
response are already apparent.  First, there is a patchwork of protections across levels of 
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government and jurisdictions, leaving many individuals uncovered.  The federal government has 
stepped in to provide important protections such as direct payments to households, protections 
for renters and households in homes backed by federal mortgages, and temporary, limited sick 
leave protections.   
 
Some remain unprotected by these changes.   For instance, workers from companies with more 
than 500 employees are exempted from the obligation to provide family and medical leave, 
leaving out many workers whose workplaces do not provide such leave voluntarily. States and 
localities differ in the amount of protection and benefits provided to workers and households.  
Even some of the most significant provisions adopted during the pandemic operate more as a 
“pause”– preventing additional forms of displacement, but not affirmatively creating safe or 
healthy spaces for those who lacked them in the first place.   For instance, state moratoria on 
evictions are an important intervention, even though they do not extend to providing housing 
for those who are homeless or in overcrowded/substandard housing. (Some important new 
federal money expands homelessness prevention programs and emergency shelter for the 
crisis.)   In addition, the main providers of social services—state and local governments—are 
already suffering financially from the crisis and are likely to be strained for some time, even with 
additional federal payments. 
 
Second, many of these provisions depend on voluntary compliance by employers or housing 
providers, or on the ability of workers and others to understand their rights and enforce 
them.   Lawyers, service providers, and others are mobilizing education and advocacy efforts, but 
that infrastructure of legal service and advocacy was strained even before the crisis.  In addition, 
the most vulnerable groups (undocumented workers, homeless populations) often lack 
knowledge of their rights and also face barriers in accessing advocates or other service providers.    
Where goods are controlled by private actors (such as lenders and broadband service providers), 
changes are often precatory, and municipalities have not always stepped up regulation or 




Lastly, it is unclear how enduring these reforms will be.  Families, tenants, workers, and others 
most affected are likely to endure long-term effects, and many of the new benefits adopted as a 
result of Covid-19 are time-limited.   Advocates had encouraged provisions like paid sick leave 
long before the current crisis, and a growing number of jurisdictions have required this protection 
in recent years.  These new efforts could simply be a short term bandage or they could represent 
a more fundamental shift in how governments, markets, and private actors understand and 
secure “essential” social goods.  Some signs of the latter include the New York State legislature’s 






What follows is a guide to key legal changes relevant to tenants, workers, low-income individuals, 
families, and those with disabilities.1  This Part omits health which is addressed in a separate 
chapter of this e-book.   This guide also does not cover the important category of education.  
Information regarding K-12 equity concerns raised by Covid-19 can be found here. 
 
Employment 
Paid Sick, Medical, & Family Leave.   In response to Covid-19, the federal government enacted in 
March 2020 the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA)  and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security Act (CARES Act).   As a result, federal law as of April 1, 2020, provides for 
coverage for paid sick leave related to Covid-19 for approximately 50% of US workers and 
extended paid family and medical leave for some parents with children who are no longer in 
school due to the virus.   The FFCRA exempts companies employing more than 500 workers from 
complying with the emergency paid sick days requirement (this includes many food service, retail 
                                                             
1 Compiled by  Margaret Gould, CLS ‘21, Chizoba Ukairo, CLS ‘21, and Olatunde Johnson, Columbia Law School.  
Note that the information is not comprehensive and some of the information is evolving.  Many of the links are to 
live, updating sources.   We thank Christopher Dinkel, CLS’22, Nicandro Iannacci, CLS ‘20, Columbia Law Visiting 
Associate Clinical Professor Emily Benfer, and Columbia Law Professor Mark Barenberg for their assistance. 
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and hospitality workers, grocery workers, delivery workers, and pharmacy workers). The Labor 
Department contends that 89% of workers employed at companies with more than 500 
employees may access some paid sick leave, with an average offering of eight days covered — 
falling short of the 14-day quarantine prescribed for those who may have the coronavirus. 
Coverage extends until December 31, 2020.  
 
The Labor Department has issued guidance on the Act specifying coverage and exemptions 
(including important exemptions for businesses with less than 50 employees where the leave 
requirements would "jeopardize the viability of the business as a going concern"). Other 
limitations of the federal legislation include the fact that FFCRA does not apply retroactively, does 
not cover any employee who has been furloughed, and does not cover employees whose 
worksites have been closed. Prior to the crisis, federal law only allowed 12 weeks of unpaid family 
and medical leave. A set of proposals in Congress including the PAID Leave Act  propose a 
permanent leave system that would create a system of paid sick days and 12 weeks of paid family 
and medical leave.   
   
The pandemic has placed a particular focus on the lack of a uniform system of paid sick leave in 
the United States. Twelve states and the District of Columbia had some forms of paid sick leave 
before the pandemic, some of which expansively define ‘employee’ to include independent 
contractors.  Several municipalities also provided paid sick leave coverage.  In response to the 
pandemic, some states and localities have begun to create emergency sick leave provisions or 
make clear that their existing provisions apply to independent contractors.   Some large 
employers – including Walmart, Kroger, Home Depot, Target, UPS, Amazon, and others – have 
revised their policies by offering some form of paid sick leave for Covid-19-related illness or 
quarantine.  
  
Anti-Discrimination & Safety. The pandemic places employees at risk of sickness or other injuries 
in their workplaces due to the virus or the demands placed on their conditions in the wake of the 
virus.   Low-wage workers and those who are not unionized bear greater risks as higher-income 
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workers find it more possible to work remotely from home. The pandemic has also increased 
demand in certain industries that often lack employment safeguards or have poor conditions 
including the warehouse and delivery workers employed in the burgeoning delivery economy.   
The federal Department of Labor has issued advisory guidance on protecting workers from 
contracting or spreading the virus in the workplace.   In addition, workers are vulnerable to 
discrimination in the workplace.  The federal Families First Coronavirus Response Act prohibits  
retaliation against employees who exercise their rights to paid sick leave under the statute.   The  
EEOC updated its pandemic guidance on how to protect employees and others from the virus 
while accommodating and avoiding discrimination against those with disabilities. 
Unemployment Insurance/Income Security. The CARES Act expands the current federal-state 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) program by providing an additional 13 weeks of unemployment 
insurance after an individual exhausts their current UI.   The Act also creates a new Pandemic 
Unemployment Assistance (PUA) program,  in effect through December 31, 2020, for those who 
are not eligible for their state’s existing UI program.   Significantly, the PUA covers self-employed 
workers, part-time workers, freelancers, and independent contractors.  The Act also provides 
another $600 a week of emergency unemployment insurance through July 31st, 2020, for which 
regular UI claimants as well as PUA claimants are eligible.  
The CARES Act also provides “recovery rebates” --income assistance to low- and moderate- 
income families.  The amount is up to $1,200 per adult ($2,400 for a married couple) and $500 
for each dependent child under 17.    As noted by poverty analysts, the Act has important new 
benefits but the rebate program excludes a significant number of immigrant families, and by only 
providing automatic payments to those who filed income tax returns in 2019 or 2018, creates 
administrative hurdles for some very low-income households.   
Housing & Utilities 
 
Housing. Federal, state, and local governments have initiated temporary relief efforts to protect 
renters and homeowners from eviction or foreclosure due to the health and economic impacts 
of Covid-19.   The federal government has temporarily suspended foreclosure and evictions in 
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federally backed housing loan programs  and instituted a deferral program for mortgage 
payments.    The federal government has also provided $4 billion in increased funding to the 
states for emergency shelter and homelessness prevention programs. Multiple states and 
localities have taken actions with respect to evictions and foreclosure, ranging from temporary 
suspension of all evictions and foreclosures to suspending them on proof that non-payment is 
due to Covid-19.   Some jurisdictions have also provided new funding for direct housing assistance 
payments to low-income families and increased funding to serve homeless persons or prevent 
homelessness.    At the time of writing, the City of Los Angeles had instituted a temporary freeze 
on rent increases in apartments subject to local rent stabilization. Several private banks and 
lenders have initiated hardship or deferral programs.      
  
Utilities: Electricity, Gas & Water.   Gas and electricity companies across many states are 
temporarily suspending disconnections and late fees or requiring reconnections.  Some have 
been ordered by governors or regulators to do so.  Many state and local governments have issued 
orders forbidding water shut-offs during the emergency and requiring the restoration of 
services.   Significantly, the Governor of Michigan  – the state that prominently failed to 
guarantee Flint residents safe drinking water  – has issued an executive order to restore water 
service to occupied residences in the midst of COVID-19.  
  
Broadband & Connectivity.   In the wake of stay-at-home orders and the closure of schools, 
broadband service has become more crucial in allowing individuals to access work and schooling. 
There are long-standing racial, economic, and geographic disparities in access to high-speed 
internet, with attendant impact on the ability to obtain on-line information, conduct job 
searches, or do  homework. With the crisis the Federal Communications Commission’s Chairman 
has asked broadband and telephone service providers to take the Keep Americans Connected 
Pledge. More than 50 companies have pledged to limit service termination and late fees during 
the pandemic and to open up additional Wi-Fi hotspots.  States are providing information to the 
public and consumers about positive actions taken by private broadband providers as well as 
public wifi hotspots. Even before the crisis, dozens of  municipalities had created public hotspots 
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or low-cost internet access.  However,  nineteen states preempt localities from providing 
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Public Health Law Tools: A Brief Guide 
 
Kristen Underhill, Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School 
  
The COVID-19 pandemic offers a threat with few precedents in modern times and tests  the tools 
of modern surveillance and public health law.  The goal of this chapter is to provide a brief 
overview of the types of measures that state and federal governments can invoke to treat and 
prevent the spread of infectious disease.  The following sections will provide an orientation to 
domestic public health law followed by the types of measures available to state and federal public 
health authorities.   
Although this chapter does not consider international institutions, treaties, or norms that affect 
public health, these are also essential to the overall pandemic response.  (See here for a helpful 
overview of the structure of global health law.)  
 
Old and New Public Health Law  
Public health law is sometimes divided into “old public health” and “new public health.”  Old 
public health law refers to the classic functions of government to limit the transmission of 
infectious disease and environmental hazards: these are measures like quarantines, vaccination, 
public sanitation, and food safety.  These government policies pose “tragedy of the commons” 
issues: they require collective action or infrastructure that is unlikely or impossible without 
central coordination.  COVID-19 and the person-to-person spread of the virus that causes it 
(SARS-Cov-2) meet this definition precisely. For any given individual, the costs of protective 
measures (like quarantine or self-isolation) may be greater than the risks posed by continuing 
ordinary life.  But for the population as a whole, continuing life as usual will result in a large 
number of infections and/or deaths.  As we have learned from past epidemics, these infections 
and deaths are often more concentrated in groups with preexisting vulnerabilities, including 
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people who are poor, ill, disabled, elderly, experiencing discrimination, or living in communities 
with poor infrastructure.   
By contrast, “new” public health refers to governmental efforts to reduce risk factors leading to 
morbidity and mortality that are not infectious or transmitted by environmental hazards.  Those 
risk factors include mental health problems, substance use disorders, and chronic 
noncommunicable conditions such as heart disease and cancer.  These human problems may also 
benefit from centralized coordination, particularly in addressing social determinants of health 
(e.g., socioeconomic inequality).  But “new” public health problems have more complex causes, 
and although government action can influence predictors of chronic and noncommunicable 
disease, these efforts are different in kind from efforts to limit agents of infectious or 
environmental disease.  
Government policies that address “old” public health threats can be broad and sometimes 
coercive, including invasive interventions into daily life.  But these actions rest on a solid 
foundation of case law that recognizes the unique capacity of government—particularly state 
government—to play a coordinating role in times when individual actions pose society-wide risks.  
Where there is a visceral threat to society as a whole, governments have wide latitude to protect 
the population.  By contrast, efforts to address “new” public health problems tend to be 
perceived as less urgent and therefore draw greater opposition on the basis of personal 
autonomy.  In the US context, some people also perceive new public health problems to be 
caused by irresponsible individual behaviors (e.g., lack of exercise or alcohol use) instead of being 
driven social determinants.  This view tends to characterize government actions as paternalistic 
and detrimental to personal responsibility, and so appeals to solidarity may be less effective than 
in the infectious disease context. 
 
Public Health Law Interventions in the US 
In the US legal system, states have primary authority to address infectious public health threats 
as part of what is known as the “police power”—plenary authority to provide for the well-being 
of state citizens.  The federal government can also address infectious disease but within a more 
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limited remit of actions that affect interstate commerce and/or the spread to the United States 
of infections transferred from other nations.  The federal government, for example, can 
quarantine and test international travelers (including US citizens; see here for a sample 
quarantine order) and goods, limit entry by sea at US ports, bar air travel by infected people, and 
bar noncitizens from entering the country.  The federal government has authority, through the 
Surgeon General, to “make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary” to 
prevent the interstate spread of infectious diseases (including testing people “reasonably 
believed to be infected” and isolating people actually infected).  An executive order specifies the 
infections that qualify for federal quarantine; these include “severe acute respiratory 
syndromes” and the virus causing COVID-19.  Federal quarantine authority has been used rarely, 
however, as the threat of infectious disease declined and as the federal government invested 
fewer resources in enforcement throughout the 20th century.  The most recent use of widespread 
federal isolation and quarantine measures was during the Spanish flu pandemic a century ago.  
Restrictions at the federal level are more tenuous when applied to activities and corporations 
that act only in one state.  In modern practice, the federal government assumes broad 
responsibility for limiting the risks of infection spread by the international movement of goods 
and people while states take the lead in responding to threats internal to the US.  
This division of responsibility explains why infectious disease responses like vaccination and 
quarantine mandates are set by states (and, in some states, county or municipal governments), 
and why the US response to COVID-19 has varied so much across state lines.  There are 
nonetheless many actions available to the federal government in pandemic times.  These include 
providing services, funds, expertise, equipment, and resources (including, for example, 
compulsory licensing of patented drugs or requiring businesses to accept contracts to produce 
goods such as masks and ventilators); purchasing and distributing essential goods; enforcing laws 
that prohibit epidemic responses that discriminate against protected groups; enforcing statutes 
that bar hoarding or price gouging of designated goods; supporting surveillance and research; 
supporting the enforcement of state-ordered quarantines; coordinating state actions; providing 
direct messaging to the public; and taking actions that affect national markets and the social 
safety net.  Federal actions that respond to COVID-19 are collated here. 
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State governments have a number of tools to reduce the transmission of infectious disease and 
they have used many of these during the COVID-19 epidemic.  State power is at its strongest in 
laws that seek to protect public health against serious contagious disease. When state authorities 
reasonably believe that there is a threat of disease, courts tend to uphold state actions that are 
not shown to be abusive, in bad faith, or a pretext for discrimination.  This is true even when 
state actions are later found to be erroneous.  Individual health officers, members of state and 
local boards of health, and municipalities themselves are not liable for errors of judgment as long 
as they act in good faith and take only the actions within their authority. 
In some states, state legislation has delegated authority to local governments to take some or all 
of these actions—culminating in a national response that involves the participation of more than 
2,600 state, local, and tribal authorities.  The need to coordinate these governmental units can 
severely complicate the rapid response needed to contain a fast-moving epidemic, as COVID-19 
has illustrated.   
The following public health measures are available at the state level for an infectious disease 
response, and many are used continuously for the monitoring and control of endemic infectious 
diseases. 
State Spending and Legislation.  States can (and must) spend funds or forgo income to support 
the response to an epidemic, including direct financing of public insurance, public health 
surveillance activities, grants to public and private hospitals and clinics, and the purchase of 
equipment (e.g., ventilators and masks).  State efforts to shore up public safety nets, including 
health insurance coverage, nutritional assistance, unemployment benefits, and housing 
assistance also require public spending and may be an essential part of enabling people to comply 
safely with more restrictive measures such as quarantines.  State legislation can also reduce 
individuals’ exposure to the financial costs of the epidemic by requiring health insurance 
coverage for infection-related expense.  These actions apply to insurance plans that are not 
subject to federal regulation under the Affordable Care Act.  Lifting sanctions for criminal laws 
can also enable fuller compliance by populations who may fear contact with governmental 
institutions.   
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State Public Health Activities.  State and municipal departments of public health conduct 
essential activities directly.  These include providing centralized counts of infections and tracking 
of infection spread, engaging in contact tracing, notifying people who may have been exposed, 
and enforcing more invasive measures such as vaccination requirements and quarantines.  These 
activities demand increased resources during pandemics, requiring further spending, borrowing, 
and perhaps taxing by states and cities. 
State Speech and Regulation of Speech.  States always have authority to warn and educate the 
public directly about infectious disease, modes of transmission, and preventive measures.  States 
in pandemic times may also consider measures such as restricting erroneous or dangerous 
speech (e.g., prosecuting hoaxes and fraudulent claims about possible cures), or requiring speech 
by private parties (e.g., mandating posted warnings in hospitals or grocery stores).  Any speech 
restrictions or compulsory speech are subject to constitutional limitations.   
State Regulation and Control of the Built Environment.  States can use the levers of licenses, 
permits, zoning laws, and building codes to require structural changes that may be needed to 
reduce infectious disease.  States and cities can also make some changes to the environment 
directly, such as practices for cleaning, opening, and maintaining public facilities (e.g., transit 
systems, schools, parks, and public buildings). 
State Courts.  State court systems can also shape some areas of pandemic response such as by 
providing a functioning tort system that shapes medical practice (e.g., through medical 
malpractice claims that recognize standards of care), consumer protection (e.g., through 
products liability law and penalties for fraud and misrepresentation), and sometimes the direct 
transmission of infection (e.g., through tort penalties for people who negligently or purposely 
expose others to infectious disease).  The tort system is slow-moving and relies on litigation by 
private parties, making it a cumbersome tool for the rapid response needed in a pandemic.  
Courts also provide a forum for individuals or groups to challenge public health regulations that 
are burdensome to individuals or corporations or that may be designed or implemented in a way 
that discriminates against protected classes.  Lawsuits alleging that states have overstepped in 
their response to COVID-19 are already underway.  Under some state laws, courts must issue 
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emergency orders to allow other uses of state power, such as quarantines.  Courts are also central 
to modifying terms or conditions of imprisonment in order to lessen the threats of infectious 
disease in detention settings.   
State Regulation of Individuals.  In pandemic times, state and local actions that exert direct 
control over individuals and corporations are highly visible.  States continuously and quietly 
engage in many of these actions in non-epidemic times, including the surveillance of infectious 
and chronic disease rates, enforcing mandates for screening and testing (e.g., mandatory testing 
in detention facilities), providing for (or sometimes mandating) the treatment of infectious 
diseases (e.g., tuberculosis), setting and enforcing vaccine schedules, tracing contacts and 
notifying possibly exposed persons, inspecting premises (e.g., restaurants), and enforcing other 
criminal and civil laws intended to minimize the spread of infectious disease (e.g., public nuisance 
laws).  But in pandemic times, the use of more coercive measures can escalate, including business 
closures, social distancing and travel restrictions, limitations on gatherings (as long as such bans 
are content-neutral), curfews, quarantines for people visiting from out of state, isolation orders 
for infected individuals, and vaccination mandates.  With the exception of vaccination (as no 
vaccine is yet available), a majority of states have now enacted some or all of these measures to 
respond to COVID-19.  Although states may retain authority to create sanitary cordons—isolated 
geographic zones with bars on entry and exit—states have not yet taken this measure in the 
current pandemic.   
All of these state approaches are bounded by the limits of the federal constitution as well as by 
the constitutions of individual states.  Where states reasonably believe that there is a serious 
public health threat, however, courts tend to be deferential, as the state’s interest in public 
health tends to outweigh individual freedoms.  Penalties for individual violations of these 
mandates may include civil fines, criminal fines, or jail time, as long as these penalties are 
permitted under state legislation and set in advance.  But notably, criminalization of infectious 
disease exposure (even intentional exposure) may undermine other state efforts to control 
infection (e.g., contact tracing, testing, and treatment), which may be illustrated by state efforts 
since the 1980s to criminalize HIV exposure.  Several federal and state efforts to prosecute 
individuals for intentional coronavirus exposure are underway using charges such as assault, and 
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the federal government may prosecute these offenses under anti-terrorism laws (e.g., use of 
weapons of mass destruction). 
 
Quarantine, Isolation, and Social Distancing 
State laws enabling quarantines, isolation, and social distancing measures have been significant 
in the COVID-19 response.  State quarantine laws vary greatly along lines such as the duration 
and location of quarantine, enforcement penalties, application to individuals and/or groups, 
additional authorities available after emergency declarations, and availability of administrative 
review.  State quarantine laws are collated and searchable here. 
Although quarantines, isolation, and other social distancing measures can interfere with many 
rights—including freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of contract, and the right 
to travel—courts usually find that states’ interest in public health outweighs these freedoms.  As 
a result, social distancing orders are usually upheld as long as they are reasonable in relation to 
the threat to public health.   Judicial decisions in New Jersey and Maine pertaining to the same 
individual during the 2014 Ebola epidemic illustrate the court approaches.  Although quarantines 
must not be a pretext for discrimination against any protected class, religious exemptions are not 
required.  In order for quarantine regulations to survive judicial review, authorities must 
reasonably believe that the public is in danger of an epidemic and that quarantined people have 
been exposed; mere suspicion of infection or exposure is insufficient.  Courts also agree that 
some procedural due process is needed; hearings, however, are usually limited to the question 
of whether authorities were reasonable in their belief that a quarantine was needed.  State 
statutes structure the ways in which quarantines are enforced and federal law specifies that state 
and federal governments may (and should) support each other in quarantine enforcement.   
 
Vaccination Laws 
Although no vaccine is yet available for SARS-CoV-2, states’ authority to mandate vaccination 
may apply to the COVID-19 response in the future.  Should a vaccine be developed, states could 
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permissibly require individuals to receive the vaccine (enforceable by fines or even compulsorily 
required), as long as there are exemptions for people who are medically unable to be vaccinated.  
Multiple courts have found that Religious exemptions from state vaccination mandates are not 
required by the 14th Amendment.  Courts are also wary of second-guessing state legislatures’ 
belief that vaccination is sufficiently safe and needed as part of a pandemic response.   
 
Emergency Declarations  
Emergency declarations at the state and federal levels can allow states to access additional 
resources.  Those declarations also expand the powers granted to the executive branch in times 
of a pandemic.  The goal of such declarations—enabled by more than 100 federal laws—is to 
enable a nimbler and faster response to changing conditions without requiring the more 
cumbersome machinery of the legislature and courts.  The White House and all 50 state 
governors have now declared COVID-19 to be a public health emergency and the White House 
has deemed it both a public health emergency under the Public Health Service Act and a “major 
disaster” qualifying under the terms of the Stafford Act.   
Federal emergency preparations (see here and here for overviews) changed dramatically in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax exposures in 2001 and subsequent legislation included 
the Federal Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
(which established the National Disaster Medical System and the Strategic National Stockpile of 
medical supplies); the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (which allows the FDA to issue emergency 
use authorizations for drugs and devices); amendments to the Stafford Act; the National 
Emergencies Act; the Public Health Service Act, and the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 
Act (PAHPA).  The Stafford Act declaration enables the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
to coordinate the national response to COVID-19 in affected states that request support and to 
certify that the emergency has overwhelmed state capacity.  Each of these declarations enables 
federal executive actions that ease constraints on public health insurance (e.g., Medicaid § 1135 
waivers or waivers of obligations under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
or HIPA), allow additional expenditures, grant increased authority to enact quarantines, alleviate 
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tort liability for products and persons involved in the response, and provide for the reallocation 
of resources and personnel.  Federal emergency powers under the Defense Production Act also 
give the executive branch the authority to take control of industries and to require contractors 
to prioritize federal contracts.  The federal government response to the COVID-19 epidemic has 
lagged but is increasingly scaling up to use these authorities.  Congress can also grant agencies 
more powers in times of crisis (see, for example, the request by the Department of Justice for 
authority to extend statutes of limitation and detention periods for defendants with delayed 
trials).   
States have their own emergency statutes, and a number of states adopted versions of the Model 
State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) after its drafting in 2001.  State definitions of 
emergency vary, with many states leaving the term undefined, but most states require an exigent 
situation, potential calamitous harm, and an inability to avoid the harm through ordinary 
measures.  At the state level, declarations of a state emergency expand the powers of governors, 
health officers, and boards of health.  These powers vary, but generally include the power to 
quarantine exposed people, isolate or treat infected people, vaccinate against infectious disease, 
institute distancing measures, ease licensure restrictions on clinicians from other states, educate 
the public, spend state funds, and engage in takings.  (For a useful overview of state and federal 
emergency powers, see here.)   
The expansive grants of federal and state executive power during emergencies can raise concerns 
that agencies, governors, or the President will misuse these temporary authorities to enact policy 
changes that were impermissible in normal times.  But as the Congressional response to COVID-
19 has shown, legislative action can also be too slow and unwieldy in times of crisis.  Federal 
coordination is essential for responding to epidemics that cross domestic and international 
borders and that outmatch states’ resources to respond.  The COVID-19 emergency is one such 
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Child Welfare and COVID-19: An Unexpected Opportunity for Systemic Change 
 
 




 A couple of weeks into “shelter in place” orders, my husband forwarded to me a photo 
posted online. A young mother, her blond hair swept up into a messy bun, stares intently at her 
desktop screen. She sits at an antique wood table in her sweats and slippers, headphones in 
place, working while the sun streams in through sliding porch doors. Behind her, her five or six 
year old son is bound and gagged and duct taped to the floor. The joke is clear; staying at home 
with children during a pandemic while trying to get your work done, making sure they are keeping 
up with their school assignments, and remaining sane requires immense patience and fortitude 
or drastic measures. No black family would ever post such an image. 
 Posting an image of abusing your young child and knowing that it will be seen as a joke is 
a luxury most parents of color would never believe they have, especially parents living in poverty 
who are under the constant surveillance of the government. These parents live in heavily policed 
but underserved neighborhoods; they live in public housing, receive food stamps or cash 
assistance, and use public hospitals and clinics, head start programs, and food pantries; they have 
two or three jobs that until very recently were considered inconsequential and now are being 
touted as “essential” for the rest of us. Every decision they make has outsized consequences: pay 
rent or pay the dentist; leave the ten-year-old watching the three-year-old for fifteen minutes to 
buy groceries or put the laundry in the dryer at the laundromat down the street, or risk having 
no food in the fridge or clean clothes in the house when the visiting nurse comes to check on the 
asthmatic baby. In many of these neighborhoods, the consequences are called “catching a case,” 
which means being investigated by child protective services for neglecting or abusing your child, 
frequently leading to a proceeding in family court that can result in your children being removed 
from your care, participation in mandated services or treatment, court and agency supervision, 
and months or years of family disruption and surveillance. No joking around. 
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 The COVID-19 pandemic has already wrecked greater havoc in poor neighborhoods of 
color, where pre-existing conditions exacerbate the disease’s spread. Crowded housing and 
homelessness, less access to health care and insurance, and underlying health conditions are all 
factors that worsen the chances of remaining healthy.1 Workers desperate for income continue 
to work without sufficient protective measures, moving in and out of these neighborhoods, 
putting themselves and their families at risk. During periods of  greater disruption, tensions are 
heightened and violence more prevalent. Already some experts are warning of an onslaught of 
child maltreatment cases, citing earlier examples of spikes in foster care during drug epidemics 
and economic recessions.2 Instead of panicking, thinking creatively and thoughtfully about 
appropriate responses and using the information and resources we already have may help to 
diminish such fears and improve the safeguards that are needed to protect the integrity of 
families and keep children safe.   
 Thoughtful guidance on moving forward has come from an unlikely source: the federal 
government. The Children’s Bureau (CB) released a letter on March 27, 2020, informing state and 
local governments and courts that the federal statutory funding mandates pursuant to title IV-E 
of the Social Security Act for the provision of specified judicial hearings and determinations must 
be followed, balancing child-safety with public health directives. Child welfare agencies and 
courts can’t just throw up their hands or close down in the face of disruption. “Prolonged or 
indefinite delays in delivering services and postponements of judicial oversight place children’s 
safety and well-being in jeopardy; may lead to unnecessarily long stays in foster care; and are 
inconsistent with statutory and regulatory requirements.”3 Sweeping orders ceasing, suspending,  
                                               
1 Sam Baker, Alison Snyder, Coronavirus Hits Poor, Minority Communities Harder,   
https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-cases-deaths-race-income-disparities-unequal-f6fb6977-56a1-4be9-8fdd-
844604c677ec.html; Rate of Deaths, Illness Among Black Residents Alarms Cities, 
https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/04/06/us/ap-us-virus-outbreak-illinois-1st-ld-
writethru.html?searchResultPosition=7  
2 Fred Wulczyn, Looking Ahead: The Nation’s Child Welfare Systems after Coronavirus  
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/child-welfare-2/looking-ahead-the-nations-child-welfare-systems-after-
coronavirus/41738; Nina Agrawal, The Coronavirus Could Cause a Child Abuse Epidemic, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/opinion/coronavirus-child-abuse.html?referringSource=articleShare  





or delaying court proceedings, the provision of essential preventive and rehabilitative services, 
or family time (visitation) between children in foster care and their parents and siblings should 
be avoided to diminish the likelihood that progress will be halted in preventing family disruption, 
reunifying families, or securing other permanency goals. Several of the CB’s specific 
recommendations – access to counsel for parents and children, access to technological assistance 
without costs, creative approaches for visiting and services, and maintaining court processes – 
will be discussed at points throughout this chapter. What is worth noting overall is the CB’s high 
expectations for child welfare agencies and the courts that monitor these agency actions to 
protect not just child safety but also family integrity.  
Three R’s Worth Reconsidering under COVID-19: Reporting, Reasonable Efforts, and Reunification 
 The complex system of child welfare and foster care has key points where life-altering 
decisions are made and where COVID-19 will have an impact now and for a long time to come. 
Looking at three of them sequentially provides a roadmap for how child welfare decisions are 
made and how the pandemic will affect them now and into the future. They also provide 
opportunities to rethink the ways in which child welfare and family court systems have 
continuously failed families and children.  
 
1. Reporting 
 Every state has some form of registry for reporting potential abuse and neglect and 
maintaining records of those reports. Most states maintain a central registry that accepts reports 
by “mandatory” reporters, like doctors and teachers, or voluntary reporters, who may be allowed 
to report anonymously. The reports are used not only in child protection investigations but also 
later to screen individuals on the registry for jobs that involve children or other vulnerable 
populations.4  In 2018, over 4.3 million children were reported, though almost 1.9 million of those 
reports were “screened out” and not subject to further investigation. Of the reports left, after 
further investigation, sufficient evidence of risk of or actual maltreatment existed to 
“substantiate” the report or provide an alternative response of assistance to approximately 
                                               




678,000 children.5 Even these numbers do not provide an accurate assessment of actual 
maltreatment. Some states require almost no evidence to substantiate a report and others have 
a very high standard. The percentage of these cases that will eventually be brought to court also 
varies tremendously, meaning that even with a substantiated report a parent may not be found 
to have maltreated their child by a court. Only about a quarter of the victims with “substantiated” 
reports resulted in any court action.6  
 How can these numbers help us think about the risk to children of greater maltreatment 
during the COVID-19 period and the likelihood that there will be less reporting during the 
widespread “shelter in place” practices being instituted?  First, it is clear that the vast majority of 
reports do not result in state action because a child has been mistreated; there is a lot of noise 
in reporting. Hunches, vague suspicions, better-safe-than-sorry beliefs, passing the buck to 
someone else instead of figuring out how to be helpful, anonymous calls and instances of 
malicious false reporting still require state investigations that cost time and money. Reducing 
those types of reports because children are not as casually observed will reduce unnecessary 
family disruption and trauma and will give investigators more time to scrutinize when children 
are actually in danger, usually of serious physical or sexual abuse. Fewer reports based on 
unsubstantiated feelings and just passing the buck will also mean workers will have to do fewer 
in-person investigations, leaving them and the families they are investigating less exposed to 
COVID-19. Finally, and in particular in those states that have a very low threshold for 
substantiation, fewer parents will find themselves with records that prevent them from securing 
jobs in caretaking positions, often the only jobs available for low-income workers, especially 
women. When we come to the other side of the pandemic, if we’ve reduced unnecessary 
reporting and investigations, we can incorporate what we’ve learned to disrupt fewer families 




                                               
5  Child Maltreatment 2018, Chapter 2,  https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2018.pdf  
6 Child Maltreatment 2018, Table 6-5 https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2018.pdf  
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2. Reasonable Efforts 
Federal funding mandates require that before children can be separated from their 
families, except in clear emergencies, child protective services must make reasonable efforts to 
keep children safely at home. If a child is removed from a parent, reasonable efforts to reunify a 
family or, if this is not possible, to find another permanency option other than extended foster 
care, is also required.7 Since neglect is by far the most common form of maltreatment alleged 
(rather than physical or sexual abuse) and “no single fact about child abuse and neglect…has been 
better documented and established than their strong relationship to poverty and low income,”8 
it would be a fair assumption that financial assistance and services would be the most reasonable 
of reasonable efforts. That, unfortunately is not the case. Instead, casework counseling, referrals 
to mental health and substance use services, and parenting classes are standard fare. Any of 
these may be necessary but the primary prevention of adequate income along with decent 
shelter, child care, and health care would do far more to reduce the relationship of poverty to 
child maltreatment. As COVID-19 sweeps through the poorest and least healthy neighborhoods, 
primary prevention is in even greater need. Some of the stopgap measures being adopted – one-
time stimulus checks to low income families, loosened health insurance requirements for 
treatment, moratoriums on evictions and some debt, greater flexibility for unemployment 
insurance – could assist vulnerable families now and provide a template for greater government 
and societal financial responsibility going forward.  
In the meantime, the secondary prevention measures that are often crucial to keeping 
children safely at home still need to be employed effectively. The CB letter urges all government 
authorities to be proactive in monitoring the availability of services and treatment, to utilize 
technology at no or reduced cost to enable greater participation in treatment and services, and 
to help facilitate resources for parents to access virtual arrangements. Of even greater 
importance are reasonable efforts to maintain family connections. In 1978, Drs. David Fanshel 
                                               
7 Child Welfare Information Gateway. (2017). Child Maltreatment Prevention: Past, Present, and Future, at  
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cm_prevention.pdf#page=6&view=Prevention%20today  
8Pelton, L. H. (1994). The Role of Material Factors in Child Abuse and Neglect. In G. B. Melton et al. (eds.), 
Protecting Children from Abuse and Neglect: Foundations for a New Strategy (pp. 131-181). New York: Guilford. 
See also, Slack et al., Understanding the Risks of Child Neglect: An Exploration of Poverty and Parenting 
Characteristics, at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1077559504269193  
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and Eugene Shinn of the Columbia School of Social Work published a ground-breaking study of 
children in foster care, concluding that the important determinant of how well children fare in 
foster care and how likely they were to return home was parental visitation.9 Visitation, or what 
is now more appropriately being called family time, is ordinarily challenging to accomplish. Busy 
parents work, participate in programs or treatment, may have other family responsibilities, and 
often travel long distances to see their children. Children have school and afterschool activities, 
their foster parents or caseworkers may be unavailable to facilitate visits, visits can often trigger 
conflicting emotions and trauma for adults and children that require special attention, and 
coordinating outside of business hours is often impossible. Recognizing the crucial importance of 
family time – especially during times of crisis – the CB is encouraging creative solutions: figuring 
out which families may still be able to meet in person (including outdoors); whether there are 
relatives rather than staff who can facilitate contact; and maximizing the use of technological 
tools to connect families face-to-face.10 
To reinforce the CB’s position on family time, on April 6, 2020, the Commissioner of the 
CB, Jerry Milner, and his top aide, David Kelly, published a remarkable editorial on family 
integrity. Any discussion of child welfare during this pandemic period must include an 
acknowledgement of this editorial. In the forty years that I have practiced and taught in the child 
welfare realm, I cannot ever remember federal officials declaring unequivocally the importance 
of protecting the relationship of parents and children who have been separated by child welfare 
authorities and the destructive impact of even necessary separations.  
When children are removed from their parents, even when necessary for their 
safety, and artificial visiting arrangements are imposed that prevent parents from being 
parents and children from being children, they become distanced and that can be harmful 
to parents and children alike. The effects of such distancing shows up in trauma 
responses, in hopelessness, in destructive behaviors, in increasing needs for clinical 
interventions, and in repeated cycles of difficulty within families…Further, it is not merely 
                                               
9 Fanshel, D. and Shinn, E. Children in Foster Care: A Longitudinal Investigation. New York: Columbia University 
Press (1978) 
10 March 27, 2020 Letter of Commissioner Jerry Milner to Child Welfare Legal and Judicial Leaders  
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FJw04Hi795BodPcZ-EOKSGEbjBmJ9ICD/view at 2-3 
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a matter of longing for contact, it is a matter of healthy brain development, maintaining 
critical bonds, and prevention of trauma that can persist for generations.11  
 
 The March 27 CB letter identifies lawyers – for agencies, for parents and for children – as 
central to ensuring that reasonable efforts to receive services and to maintain contact are 
enforced. They are expected not only to stay in close contact with their clients but to guarantee 
that family courts hear and determine cases. While neither parents nor children have a 
constitutional right to counsel in child protective proceedings,12 many states have statutory 
mandates for the provision of counsel to both. In the last two decades, there has been a 
burgeoning movement to develop high quality institutional parent representation – now called 
family defense – that has begun to hold family court proceedings to high standards of due process 
as well as to safeguard the provision of reasonable efforts before, during, and after these 
proceedings. Many of these offices staff interdisciplinary teams of lawyer, social workers, and 
parent peer advocates to provide holistic representation. Family defense practitioners, as well as 
child advocates who are not “child savers” but “family savers”, have mobilized swiftly to follow 
the CB’s letter. They are challenging blanket court closures or suspensions of hearings, filing 
emergency writs and motions, pressuring for increased virtual access to courts, and demanding 
statewide adherence to the CB’s letter.13 This pressure has begun to have significant results: New 
York City Family Court has recently increased the number of virtual courtrooms available for 
essential and emergency matters and has increased the availability of reviewing on submission 
                                               
11 Jerry Milner and David Kelly, Top Federal Child Welfare Officials: Family is a Compelling Reason, The Chronicle of 
Social Change (April 6, 2020) https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/child-welfare-2/family-is-a-compelling-
reason/42119  
12 See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 US 18 (1981) 
13 Homepage of the Center for Family Representation at https://www.cfrny.org/; 
Systemhttps://citylimits.org/2020/03/30/covid-19-creates-deep-uncertainty-in-nycs-child-welfare-system/; Rachel 
Blaustein, COVID-19 Creates Deep Uncertainty in NYC’s Child-Welfare (March 30, 2020); Texas Public Policy 
Foundation Letter to Jaime Masters, Commissioner Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (March 27, 
2020) 
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/TPPF-Family-Advocates-Letter-to-DFPS-re-
COVID-19.pdf; Office of the Maryland Public Defender Parental Defense Division to Ms. Lourdes R. Padilla, 




orders to show cause requesting emergency relief and stipulations.14 The California Judicial 
Council approved on April 7, 2020, new rules that certain dependency court proceedings must 
be held on their normal timeline to ensure the safety of children, including hearings on removals 
of children from their families; medical and medication-use requests; some motions to reunify 
families or terminate parental rights; and requests by former foster youth to re-enter care. 
Decisions about in-person family time must be made on a case-by-case basis, not by blanket 
order.15  
3. Reunification 
 The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) was enacted in 1997, the Clinton 
Administration’s response to children experiencing multiple placements and remaining far too 
long in foster care. The mandate was first and foremost to improve the permanency outcomes 
of children.16 And while reunification with parents nominally remained the primary goal of 
permanency, the time frames for reunification before considering termination of parental rights 
(TPRs) and potential adoption were accelerated dramatically, resulting in fewer reunifications of 
families and far more adoptions. ASFA’s requirements that TPRs be instituted if a child has been 
in foster care 15 of the most recent 22 months  were adopted with only some states instituting 
exceptions permitted by the law.17 In the decades since, the arbitrariness of these deadlines has 
precluded sufficient time for services and treatment to support successful family reunification 
and resulted in an entire generation of legal orphans, children neither returned home nor 
adopted as well as thousands of broken adoptions. Dr. Mark Testa has called this permanency 
focus on favoring adoption over other permanency goals as mistaking legally binding connections 
with psychologically lasting ones.18  
                                               
14 New York State Courts Remain Open for Essential Business (April 6, 2020) http://nycourts.gov/ 
15 John Kelly, California Courts Must Hold Some Child Welfare Hearings, Try to Continue In-Person Family Visits, 
The Chronicle of Social Change (April 7, 2020) https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/child-welfare-2/california-
courts-must-hold-some-child-welfare-hearings-try-to-continue-in-person-family-visits/42135 
16 Public Law 105-89, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,  
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/pi9802.pdf 
17 Intentions and Results A Look Back at the Adoption and Safe Families Act,   
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/30016/1001351-Intentions-and-Results-A-Look-Back-at-
the-Adoption-and-Safe-Families-Act.PDF 
18 Post and Zimmerman, The Revolving Doors of Family Court, Confronting Broken Adoptions, 
https://www.clcny.org/files/118689205.pdf; Mark F. Testa, The Quality of Permanence--Lasting or Binding? 
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 The COVID-19 emergency allows us to reconsider permanency priorities. It is easy to 
imagine many child welfare agencies and courts suspending some of the time frames for ASFA’s 
permanency goals because of the lack of access to services and treatment or the inability to 
reboot suspended court calendars. But if, as Milner and Kelly say in their editorial, that the ASFA 
timelines do not “reflect what we know about treatment and recovery and do not reflect the 
contextual factors that are directly relevant to successful reunification…and the research 
lessons…that have revealed the timelines as lacking alignment with what many children and 
families need,” then this is not about interim solutions before returning to old practices. Instead 
it is an opportunity to acknowledge the ways in which ASFA has failed to serve the needs of 
vulnerable children and families for almost a quarter of a century and to radically reconsider the 
ways child welfare systems surveil, supervise, and separate families.  
Milner and Kelly’s message is clear. Child welfare systems are not to stay calm and carry 
on. Instead, “This is a defining moment for us as a system; it has laid threadbare our lack of agility 
to meet family needs. We cannot allow our shortcomings to be held against families — to do so 
is the height of injustice and compromises the legitimacy of our system in our own eyes and those 
of the families we are privileged to serve.”  
  
                                               










Emergency Exemptions From Environmental Laws 
 
Michael B. Gerrard1, Andrew Sabin Professor of Professional Practice; 
Faculty Director, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law School 
 
The national response to the coronavirus crisis may face several impediments but federal and 
state environmental laws should not be among them. Most of these laws have emergency 
exemptions that allow the usual (and sometimes lengthy) procedures to be bypassed, and some 
substantive requirements to be waived, in instances of true urgency.  However, there is concern 
that some agencies and corporations will use this as an excuse to bypass environmental laws that 
aren’t actually getting in the way of responses to the crisis. 
 
Statutes and Regulations 
 
It is too early to know all that must be done to cope with this crisis but some that can be 
imagined would ordinarily be subject to environmental regulation. 
 
To pick one example that is already apparent, if some of the more dire predictions of the virus’s 
spread come true, the nation’s supply of hospital beds will be overwhelmed and it will be 
necessary to build many new medical treatment facilities. If this was to be done with federal 
money, it could ordinarily be deemed to be a major federal action (or perhaps many actions – 
one for each facility) requiring environmental impact statements (EISs) under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
 
                                                   
1 Senior Counsel in the New York office of Arnold & Porter.  




However, President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency on March 13 invoked the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. In addition to giving many 
powers to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Stafford Act provides an exemption 
from NEPA for immediate response actions. (The legal citation for this exemption, and for most 
of the other laws and regulations cited in this chapter, can be found here) 
Many of these facilities might be built in existing hospital parking lots or on other open land. 
However it is possible that some will require demolishing existing buildings. The Stafford Act also 
authorizes the President to clear debris and wreckage resulting from major disasters.  
 
The text of NEPA contains no emergency exemptions. However the implementing regulations 
issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (an office in the White House) authorize lead 
agencies to make “alternative arrangements” in emergency situations. For disasters and other 
emergencies abroad, a presidential executive order provides for exemptions from environmental 
review requirements for relief action. 
 
Several states have laws comparable to NEPA that govern actions requiring discretionary state or 
local approval. These might otherwise require environmental review of new construction but 
these too tend to have emergency exemptions.  
 
One example is New York’s State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The regulations 
under it exempt from the EIS requirement “emergency actions that are immediately necessary 
on a limited and temporary basis for the protection or preservation of life, health, property or 
natural resources, provided that such actions are directly related to the emergency and are 
performed to cause the least change or disturbance, practicable under the circumstances, to the 
environment.” The courts have interpreted this provision broadly to encompass events that at 
first glance do not look much like emergencies (such as prison overcrowding and homelessness), 




Likewise, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) exempts from the environmental 
impact report (EIR) requirement “emergency repairs to public service facilities necessary to 
maintain service” as well as “specific actions necessary to prevent or mitigate an emergency.” 
CEQA defines an emergency as a “sudden, unexpected occurrence, involving a clear and 
imminent danger, demanding immediate action to prevent or mitigate loss of, or damage to, life, 
health, property, or essential public services.” The CEQA Guidelines elaborate that “emergency 
projects . . . exempt from the requirements of CEQA” include “emergency repairs to public or 
privately owned service facilities necessary to maintain service essential to the public health, 
safety or welfare” including those “that require a reasonable amount of planning to address an 
anticipated emergency.” As in New York, California state courts have interpreted the emergency 
exemptions broadly to encompass events that at first glance do not seem like emergencies (such 
as prison overcrowding and beach erosion), but the response to the coronavirus would clearly 
qualify. 
 
The Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) provides for a more limited emergency 
exemption in the “rare cases” when it is “essential to avoid or eliminate an imminent threat to 
environmental resources or quality or public health or safety[.]”  However the project proponent 
must “limit any emergency action taken without due compliance with MEPA . . .to the minimum 
action necessary to avoid or eliminate the eminent threat.” Additionally, the proponent must file 
an initial environmental notification form within 10 days of commencing the action and must 
later file an EIR after the emergency action is taken.  
 
By comparison, the Washington State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) does not include any 
relevant statutory or regulatory provisions that would exempt emergency actions. However the 
Washington Department of Ecology guidance on SEPA provides that a lead agency can grant an 
emergency exemption if an action meets two conditions:  First, the action must be “needed to 
avoid an imminent threat to public health or safety” and second, there must not be “adequate 




Many states have laws that provide for broad exemptions from a wide variety of laws in the event 
of emergency. For example a New York statute provides that: 
Subject to the state constitution, the federal constitution and 
federal statutes and regulations . . . the governor may by executive 
order temporarily suspend specific provisions of any statute, local 
law, ordinance, or orders, rules or regulations, or parts thereof, of 
any agency during a state disaster emergency, if compliance with 
such provisions would prevent, hinder, or delay action necessary to 
cope with the disaster.  
 
After the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, Governor George Pataki 
used this law on September 12 to suspend many statutes of limitations and on October 9 he used 
it to suspend certain regulations regarding transportation and handling of solid wastes in order 
to facilitate the WTC removal operation. It became clear, however, that the SEQRA process was 
about to delay the start of replacement of 7 World Trade Center, one of the buildings that had 
collapsed. This was a serious matter because that building had been built atop a Consolidated 
Edison Co. electrical substation that provided electricity to much of Lower Manhattan. Until that 
substation could be rebuilt, electricity service was provided through a jerry-rigged system of 
cables running on the surface of the streets. This was an intrinsically unstable situation. Thus the 
state invoked SEQRA’s emergency provision and allowed site preparation activities to go forward 
before the completion of the SEQRA process. Ultimately the state decided that no EIS was 
necessary because the new 7 WTC, though taller than the original, had less square footage and 
therefore generated less traffic and sewage, used less water and energy, and otherwise had 
fewer impacts. Thus SEQRA did not delay the reconstruction of 7 World Trade Center. 
 
Additionally, after 9/11 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used its enforcement 
discretion and issued “no action assurances” to allow certain actions that would otherwise violate 
the Clean Air Act. This included, for example, rules regarding vapor recovery at gasoline pumps 
and certification rules for tank truck carriers. 
 
Similarly, after major disasters, states issue many waivers. For example, after Hurricane Katrina 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality granted relief from the rules applicable to 
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wastewater discharges; air emissions relating to repair activities and temporary power sources; 
on-site solid and hazardous waste management; inspection and rehabilitation of underground 
storage tanks; and numerous inspection, monitoring, and discharge reporting requirements. 
 
The emergency exemptions in environmental law fall into two broad categories—the generic and 
the case-specific. The generic exemptions, in turn, come in four types: exemptions from 
permitting requirements; relaxation of substantive standards; exemptions from, or acceleration 
of, certain processes; and releases from liability. The case-specific exemptions are aimed at 
specific projects or geographic areas. Examples included congressional declarations of non-
navigability that shielded certain areas from Corps of Engineers permitting requirements and 
congressional and state legislative declarations that certain projects did not need to go through 
the standard environmental review process. 
 
Few of these exemptions are self-executing. Most require a declaration or finding of the 
administrator of EPA (either acting on her own authority, or under a delegation from the 
President or from another high federal official. In the absence of such a federal action, regulated 
entities generally cannot simply plead that the environmental laws do not apply to them. A 
notable exception is the Act of God or war defense that is found in most of the federal statutes 
that confer environmental liability. 
 
The National Historic Preservation Act applies to a broad array of federal actions. The regulations 
of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation provide for emergency procedures. 
 
Most of the substantive environmental laws and their implementing regulations contain 
emergency exemptions of various sorts. Many of them have been used after disasters like 
hurricanes and earthquakes. 
Under the Clean Air Act, the available waivers include: 
● from national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants from stationary sources 
when in the interests of national security,  
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● for federal emission sources where “in the paramount interest of the United States,”  
● from certain of the requirements under the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants for the demolition of asbestos-containing buildings when the building has 
been ordered torn down because it “is structurally unsound and in danger of imminent 
collapse.”  
● for federal procurement when in the paramount national interest. 
The Clean Water Act and its regulations have several exemptions. Among them are: 
● Act of God or war. 
● emergencies that require expedited procedures for the processing of permit applications 
by the Corps of Engineers. 
● emergencies requiring expedited direct action by the Corps of Engineers. 
● exigent discharges of oil and hazardous substances. 
 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, which governs the 
cleanup of the most contaminated sites and dictates who pays for the cleanup, also has an Act of 
God or war defense.  It also allows emergency removal actions – i.e. fast actions to address an 
immediate threat. 
 
The Coastal Zone Management Act allows the President to authorize federal actions that are 
inconsistent with state coastal plans if the President finds it is in the paramount interest of the 
country or the Secretary of Commerce determines it is a matter of national security.  
 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) allows EPA to exempt federal and 
state agencies from any requirement of the statute if EPA determines that emergency conditions 
exist that require such exemption. On March 13, EPA announced that it had used expedited 
procedures under FIFRA to expand the list of approved disinfectant products for use in combating 





The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act allows the President to determine it to be in the 
“paramount interest” of the nation to exempt any federal solid waste management facility. This 
authority also extends to federal underground storage tanks. EPA may issue temporary 
emergency permits to allow treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous wastes where there is 
imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the environment. The standards 
applicable to treatment, storage, and disposal facilities may also give way in time of emergency.  
 
The Safe Drinking Water Act allows states to exempt public water supply systems from maximum 




Even where there is no explicit exemption, the environmental authorities have generally made it 
clear that they will take no enforcement action that could impede the immediate response to a 
major disaster.  However EPA took that a step further on March 26, 2020, when it issued a 
memorandum saying it will exercise “enforcement discretion” in connection with violations of 
otherwise applicable laws during the pandemic.  This covered civil violations; routine compliance 
monitoring and reporting by regulated entities; reporting obligations and milestones imposed by 
settlement agreements and consent decrees; failure of air emission controls or wastewater or 
waste treatment systems or other equipment; hazardous waste storage rules; and many other 
requirements. 
 
The EPA memorandum stated that it will exercise its discretion not to enforce the environmental 
laws only if the COVID-19 crisis was really the reason for the violation and that regulated 
companies should do the best they can under the circumstances.  It also said that criminal 
penalties would still apply if applicable.  However the memorandum was met with protests and 
petitions by many groups that do not trust today’s EPA and that feared that companies had been 




Companies may also use the crisis to avoid local requirements.  One example of how this can play 
out came in Georgia. A medical sterilizer company wanted to use ethylene oxide, a toxic 
substance, to clean medical equipment for use in COVID-19 treatment. The county where the 
plant is located limited the plant's operations until it installed upgraded emissions controls to 
prevent fugitive releases of ethylene oxide from drifting into the nearby residential community. 
On March 30 the U.S. District Court in Georgia issued a temporary restraining order against the 
county, preventing it from enforcing this limitation and allowing the plant "to sterilize medical 
products without interference" from the county. 
 
Past experience lends credence to the concern that some will abuse these exemptions. For 
example, in August 2017, Governor Greg Abbott of Texas declared a state of emergency as 
Hurricane Harvey approached, suspending dozens of environmental rules.  However, this 
suspension was still in effect months after the hurricane had left, the area had dried out, and 
electricity had been restored. Later investigations discovered more than 100 toxic releases.  Some 
of them may well have occurred after the hurricane and many were in the sorts of low-income 
communities that have long  been disproportionately exposed to toxic hazards and other forms 
of pollution. 
 
It may not require excessive cynicism to be concerned that the Trump Administration, which has 
shown little enthusiasm either for environmental enforcement or for minority communities, may 
look the other way as companies take advantage of the emergency to save the money that 
environmental compliance requires, with negative health impacts on their neighbors.  Some 
states may similarly relax their environmental vigilance to a greater extent than the crisis 





Privacy and Pandemics 
 
 
Clarisa Long, Max Mendel Shaye Professor of Intellectual Property Law,  Columbia Law 
School; 
Editor, Genetic Testing and the Use of Information 
 
 
The current COVID-19 pandemic has created an unprecedented opportunity for governments to 
justify post-pandemic expansion of their surveillance and collection of data on citizens and 
noncitizens alike.  The data collected could take multiple forms, but I will focus on two specific 
types of data collection. 
 
The first is governmental mass collection of nonanonymized cell phone location data showing the 
physical location of people in a community without the consent of the surveilled, who are not 
suspected of any crime.  The second is state-collected nonanonymized data on people's health 
or immunity status.  Both of these raise fundamental information privacy and health privacy 
concerns.  Both would require amendments of existing laws and regulations, or passage of 
sweeping new laws, in order to pass legal muster.  Post-pandemic, governments may try to do 
exactly this. 
 
In the information privacy community the relevant unit of data is "personally identifiable 
information," or PII.1  In the health context, the relevant unit of data is called "protected health 
information," or PHI.2  In times of national or global emergency, such as a pandemic, 
governmental collection of PII or PHI that in normal times would be either prohibited by law or 
questionable under social norms may become normalized and desirable to combat the spread of 
disease. 
                                               
1 See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable 
Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1814 (2011) (stating that "PII is one of the most central concepts in privacy regulation. 
It defines the scope and boundaries of a large range of privacy statutes and regulations."). 
2 See HIPAA Guidelines, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 ("Protected health information means individually identifiable health 




In times of pandemic, extensive data collection, either of individuals' physical location or health 
status, may be desirable from a public health perspective. 
 
Evidence is emerging that countries that tested for COVID-19 early and monitored the 
movements of their citizens had better outcomes, both as to infection rates and as to death rates, 
than countries like the U.S. that did not engage in early testing and monitoring.  In the New York 
Times, Anna Sauerbrey says, "Early and persistent testing helps. And so does tracking people."3  
The Atlantic magazine argues, "More transmissible and fatal than seasonal influenza, the new 
coronavirus is also stealthier, spreading from one host to another for several days before 
triggering obvious symptoms.  To contain such a pathogen, nations must develop a test and use 
it to identify infected people, isolate them, and trace those they’ve had contact with.  That is 
what South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong did to tremendous effect.  It is what the United 
States did not."4 
 
Governments around the world are collecting location and tracking data on people in order to 
stem the spread of COVID-19. 
 
Contact tracing of infected individuals can be done by using cellphone location data.  For 
example, government agencies in South Korea used "surveillance-camera footage, smartphone 
location data and credit card purchase records to help trace the recent movements of 
coronavirus patients and establish virus transmission chains," according to the New York Times, 
whereas Israel is looking to use previously-collected cell phone location data5 to attempt contact 
                                               
3 Anna Sauerbrey, "Germany Has Relatively Few Deaths From Coronavirus. Why?," New York Times, March 28, 2020, 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/opinion/germany-coronavirus.html (arguing that aggressive 
early testing and tracking individuals' locations was responsible for the relatively death rate from COVID-19 infection 
in Germany). 
4 Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Will End, The Atlantic (March 25, 2020), available at https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
health/archive/2020/03/how-will-coronavirus-end/608719/. 
5 See David M. Halbfinger, Isabel Kershner & Ronen Bergman, "To Track Coronavirus, Israel Moves to Tap Secret 




tracing of individuals potentially infected with COVID-19.6  Local governmental authorities in Italy 
are reported to be using citizens cellphone location data to analyze the degree of compliance 
with official lockdown orders.7  The government of Delhi has started tracking cellphone location 
data of people who are thought to be infected with COVID-19 and who have been quarantined 
at home.8  More governments may choose to do the same. 
 
In the U.S., Google -- a private sector entity, not the government -- says it will be publishing cell 
phone location data, but this data is not tied to any one single person.  According to CNN, Google 
has "said the findings are 'created with aggregated, anonymized sets of data from users who have 
turned on the location history setting, which is off by default' in Google's services."9 
 
Such monitoring and tracking of individuals' movements, especially in the early stage of a 
pandemic, can be effective, even dramatically effective in slowing the spread of the virus.  It is 
even more effective and can be targeted when nonanonymized.  In such public health 
emergencies, data collection of PII can have enormous social benefits.  But under existing U.S. 
law, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that nonanonymized collection of cell phone 
location data by governmental entities is a search protected by the Fourth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, and as such, requires a warrant supported by probable cause.10 
 
                                               
6 Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Will End, The Atlantic (March 25, 2020), available at https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
health/archive/2020/03/how-will-coronavirus-end/608719/. 
7 Id. (citing https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/20_marzo_17/coronavirus-gallera-in-lombardia-1640-
decessi- 16620-positivi-e3875744-686d-11ea-9725-c592292e4a85.shtml?refresh_ce-cp). 
8 See Swati Gupta, "At Least One Indian Territory is Tracking the Phones of Suspected Coronavirus Patients," CNN, 
April 1, 2020, available at https://us.cnn.com/world/live-news/coronavirus-pandemic-04-01-20-intl/index. html 
(quoting Delhi chief minister Arvind Kejriwal as saying "We have made a decision and with help from the police, 
people who have been asked to quarantine themselves at home, we will track their phones over the past few days 
to ensure that they were staying at home."). 
9 Amy Woodyatt, Google to release your location data to help fight coronavirus pandemic, CNN Business, April 3, 
2020, available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/03/tech/coronavirus-google-data-sharing-intl-scli/index.html. 
10 See Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding that "The Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records 
was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."). 
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In the lengthy and usually-unread terms of service that cell phone customers have to sign, cell 
phone users give wireless companies the ability to collect and sell their location data.11  Private 
sector firms that currently collect cell phone location data generally take the position that the 
data are anonymized,12 although some privacy experts believe that even anonymized cellphone 
location data, because it is often collected with a high degree of granularity, can be used to 
identify individuals.13  But app creators could write clauses into their Terms of Service saying that 
users consent to their nonanonymized cell location data being shared with federal and state 
authorities, law enforcement or otherwise, in the absence of a warrant.  (The degree to which 
clauses that require individuals to consent in advance to waive their Fourth Amendment rights, 
in exchange for receiving cellphone services, are themselves enforceable is another matter.) 
 
Once surveillance and data collection mechanisms become established, however, they could 
become permanent. 
 
The threats to information privacy, whether in the collection of nonanonymized cellphone 
location data or of health status, arise after the pandemic is over.  Once the mechanisms to gather 
and use PII and PHI have been established to meet a public health emergency, they may well 
prove difficult if not impossible to dismantle.  And governments face every temptation to leave 
surveillance protocols in place.  History teaches us that once established, governmental powers 
of surveillance of, and data collection on, its citizens and residents is unlikely to be voluntarily 
scaled back.14  And history has also taught us that once data is collected for one purpose it is 
difficult to prevent it from being used for other unrelated purposes. 
                                               
11 Shannon Liao, "New York City Might Ban Wireless Companies From Selling Your Location Data," CNN Business, 
July 24, 2019, available at https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/24/tech/nyc-cellphone-location-data-sale-ban/index. 
html. 
12 See, e.g., Donie O'Sullivan, "How the Cell Phones of Spring Breakers Who Flouted Coronavirus Warnings Were 
Tracked," CNN, April 4, 2020, available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/04/tech/location-tracking-florida- 
coronavirus/index.html. 
13 See, e.g., Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Natasha Singer, Michael H. Keller & Aaron Krolik, "Your Apps Know Where 
You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret," New York Times, Dec. 10, 2018, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html. 
14 See, e.g., the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments of 2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881-81g (2020), which have 




In addition to collecting PII in the form of cell phone location data, governments might also 
collect PHI in the form of COVID-19 test results or immunity results. 
 
An idea that is increasingly gaining traction, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, is that of creating a 
nonanonymized database of names of individuals who have recovered from the virus and are 
thus presumably immune.  Dr. Anthony Fauci, the Director of the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) at the National Institute of Health and the U.S. government's top 
infectious-disease official, has said he believes that such "conferred immunity" protects against 
reinfection.15 
 
Germany, for example, is contemplating a proposal to issue "immunity certificates" that would 
allow individuals who had tested positive for antibodies to the virus to leave lockdown.16  
According to the German newspaper Der Spiegel,17 researchers at the Helmholtz Centre for 
Infection Research in Braunschweig, Germany "want to send out hundreds of thousands of 
antibody tests over the coming weeks that could allow people to break free of the lockdowns."18  
Italy is reported to be considering a similar strategy.19 
 
For such health care measures to work and to avoid fraud, however, governmental authorities 
would need to keep a database, similar to driver's license databases, on who holds an immunity 
                                               
15 See Joshua M. Epstein, Are We Already Missing the Next Epidemic?, Politico Magazine, March 31, 2020, available 
at https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/31/coronavirus-americafear-contagion-can-we-handle-it- 
157711. 
16 See Daniel Wighton & David Chazan, "Germany Will Issue Coronavirus Antibody Certificates to Allow Quarantined 
to Re-Enter Society: Researchers to Test Thousands for Immunity As Berlin Plans Exit Strategy for Pandemic Lock 
Down," The Telegraph, March 29, 2020, available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/03/29/ germany-will- 
issue-coronavirus-antibody-certificates-allow-quarantined/. 
17 See Sauerbrey, note 3 supra. 
18 See Adam Bienkov, "Germany Could Issue Thousands of People Coronavirus 'Immunity Certificates' So They Can 
Leave the Lockdown Early," Business Insider (March 30, 2020), available at https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
coronavirus-germany-covid-19-immunity-certificates-testing-social-distancing-lockdown-2020-3. 
19 See Jason Horowitz, "In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right Antibodies, New York Times," 




certificate and who does not.  That means collecting and recording, in non-anonymized form, the 
PHI of individuals and their antibody status regarding COVID-19.  This is necessary in order to 
minimize the opportunity for fraud by people eager to return to work.  (Another concern that has 
been raised surrounding immunity certificates is "whether people might deliberately seek to get 
infected in order to -- hopefully -- recover and go back to work," which could undermine the 
flattening of the infection curve that governments and health experts are trying to achieve by 
requiring social distancing.20)  And such a database would provide a juicy target for hackers and 
trolls. 
 
Immunity databases in times of pandemic -- and even post-pandemic -- could provide public 
health officials with a powerful tool to fine-tune quarantine efforts.  Large scale quarantines can 
be disastrous for the economy even as they are necessary from a public health perspective.  
Premature lifting of quarantines and stay-at-home orders could allow COVID-19 to return with a 
vengeance. Yet at the same time, the longer people are out of work and non-essential businesses 
are shut down, the harder it will be for them to recover financially and for the economy to turn 
around.  Allowing people who have obtained immunity to COVID-19 to return to work would 
allow economies around the world to recover faster, and at least as importantly, would allow 
individuals to regain their own financial equilibria. 
 
This raises important issues and challenges to information privacy and health privacy law. 
 
Post-pandemic, how can federal, state, and local governments thread the needle of mounting 
effective and timely responses to a fast-moving public health crisis, while simultaneously 
protecting (or at least not worsening) existing legal protection for PHI?  Existing state-level 
models may provide a template for further exploration. 
 
                                               
20 Laura Smith-Spark, "Is an 'Immunity Certificate' the Way to Get Out of Coronavirus Lockdown?," CNN, April 3, 




Several states have laws requiring medical professionals to provide health risk information to 
potentially affected individuals through contact tracing.21  For instance, New York State's HIV 
Reporting and Partner Notification law (HIVRPN) law allows for contact tracing of cases of AIDS, 
HIV related illness or HIV infection.22  It requires that "[d]octors and labs must report to the 
Health Department the names of persons with HIV infection, HIV illness and AIDS" and "must also 
report the names of sex and needle-sharing partners of people who test HIV positive that are 
known to the doctor."23  The HIVRPN has been described as "one of the most aggressive statutes 
to protect the public . . . [o]n a spectrum that puts individual patient confidentiality on one end 
and public health protection on the other."24  Although not without controversy, the HIVRPN has 
been lauded in the affected communities as a public health success,25 and the New York State 
Department of Health takes the information privacy requirements of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) into account when enforcing state public health laws.26 
 
Post-pandemic, one key issue that must be addressed head on, should governmental database(s) 
of immunity status be created at the federal or state level, is obtaining informed consent from 
each of the individuals in such a database to share their nonanonymized testing results with state 
authorities.  This might seem like a no-brainer -- who would not mind the state knowing their 
antibody status if it meant they could return to work earlier and be released from stay-at-home 
                                               
21 See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2130: Communicable diseases;  control of dangerous and careless patients; 
 commitment. 
22 See N.Y. Pub Health § 2133: Contact tracing of cases of AIDS, HIV related illness or HIV infection. 
23 N.Y. State: Dep't of Pub. Health, What Is Partner Notification?, available at https://www.health.ny.gov/ diseases/ 
aids/providers/regulations/reporting_and_notification/about_the_law.htm#quest2 (stating that "[d]octors and labs 
must report to the Health Department the names of persons with HIV infection, HIV illness and AIDS" and "must also 
report the names of sex and needle-sharing partners of people who test HIV positive that are known to the doctor"). 
24 Jacquelyn Burke, Discretion to Warn: Balancing Privacy Rights with the Need to Warn Unaware Partners of Likely 
HIV/AIDS Exposure, 35 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 89, 105 (2015). 
25 See N.Y. State Dep't of Health Aids Inst., The Impact Of New York's HIV Reporting And Partner Notification (Hivrpn) 
Law: General Findings Report 5 (2006), available at https://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/aids/providers/ 
regulations/reporting_and_notification/docs/impactreport.pdf (showing that "[a] study of 132 partners of HIV-
positive individuals located through health department notification found that 87% thought the Health Department 
did the right thing in telling them about their exposure, and 92% thought that the Health Department should 
continue to notify persons exposed to HIV."). 




orders? -- but the underlying issues and implications are not so simple.  Given how little the 
scientific community knows about COVID-19, it is not clear that even a positive test for antibodies 
is a guarantee of immunity.  Similarly, false positive tests -- in which a person inaccurately tests 
positive for the antibody, and therefore appears immune when in fact they are not -- could 
undermine the effectiveness of an immunity database. And because all viruses mutate, 
individuals' immunity status would have to be updated periodically as the virus mutates over 
time, so reporting immunity status would likely not be a one-time event. 
 
Like HIV, COVID-19 is a transmissible virus that can be readily diagnosed, and for which early 
detection and treatment are clearly beneficial.  Because immunity, whether from vaccination or 
from successful recovering from a COVID-19 infection, would be viewed as a desirable status, this 
does not present some of the concerns of social or economic discrimination that a database of 
results like HIV-positive status present.  Even so, such a database of non-anonymized PHI, 
available to an array of government actors, represent a departure from existing laws and norms 
regarding the treatment of PHI. 
 
The least controversial route, from a privacy perspective, would be to create a voluntary opt-in 
government database of people with immunity status, with no penalties for declining to opt in.  
But as a public health response to monitoring seropositive status after the current pandemic, 
voluntary self-reporting of non-anonymized immunity status would be only a partial solution.  
Public health responses that rely on voluntary cooperation of mass numbers of people, some of 
whom may not have cellphones or even internet access, will not be as effective as mass 
mandatory self-reporting.27 
 
Legal rules and social norms regarding state collection of nonanonymized PHI might not 
necessarily stop with COVID-19.  COVID-19 is not the only transmissible virus.  The slope from 
non-anonymized COVID-19 immunity databases, to governmental collection of non-anonymized 
                                               
27 The Associated Press, School Shutdowns Raise Stakes of Digital Divide for Students, New York Times, March 30, 
2020, available at https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/03/30/us/ap-us-virus-outbreak-digital-divide.html. 
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information about individuals' immunity status to other viruses, then to their vaccination records, 
then to their public health wellness generally, is a slippery one indeed. 
 
 
These issues will not be going away. 
 
There will always be a next pandemic at some point in the future, if not of COVID-19 then of some 
other infectious agent.  The challenges that pandemics present to information privacy are not 
going to go away or lessen any time soon.  After the current pandemic is over, lawmakers, public 
health experts, and information privacy advocates need to address these issues and balance 
privacy protection with public health concerns so that the U.S. can be better prepared for the 
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 Even in the best of times, LGBT individuals have legal vulnerabilities in employment, 
housing, healthcare and other domains resulting from a combination of persistent bias and 
uneven protection against discrimination.1  In this time of COVID-19, these vulnerabilities 
combine to amplify both the legal and health risks that LGBT people face. 
 
 This essay focuses on several risks that are particularly linked to being lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, or transgender, with the recognition that these vulnerabilities are often intensified by 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, age, disability, immigration status and other aspects of 
identity.  Topics include:  1) federal withdrawal of antidiscrimination protections; 2) heightened 
health risks and vulnerabilities seeking healthcare; 3) family recognition and COVID-19; 4) 
employment discrimination; and 5) populations at special risk. 
 
 It also bears noting at the outset that LGBT people already have close and long-lasting 
experience with HIV/AIDS, which has been described by many as a pandemic2 and which brought 
with it enduring stigma and many forms of discrimination and other harms.3   Even Dr. Anthony 
                                               
1 Although this chapter generally refers to LGBT people, some of the organizations referred to use an extended 
acronym with additional letters, including Q (queer and questioning), I (intersex), 2S (two-spirit), and “+” to 
indicate these and other related aspects of identity.  For more information on some of these terms, see the GLAAD 
Media Reference Guide, https://www.glaad.org/reference/lgbtq and the Glossary of Terms from Egale, the Canada 
Human Rights Trust, https://egale.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Egales-Glossary-of-Terms.pdf. 
My thanks to Jon Davidson, Chief Counsel of Freedom for All Americans, who provided some of the sources that 
were foundational for the preparation of this chapter.   
2 Centers for Disease Control, The Global HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 2006, 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5531a1.htm. 




Fauci, who is a new hero to many Americans for his clarity in press briefings on COVID-19,4 is a 
familiar presence for AIDS activists because of his role in the 1980s and 90s as a leader of the 
federal government’s response to HIV/AIDS.5 
 
Federal withdrawal of antidiscrimination protections 
 
 A recent move by the Trump administration’s Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) to withdraw important legal protections for LGBT people in key areas of health and human 
services6 has made a challenging situation even more precarious.  Some quick background may 
be useful here to put this withdrawal in perspective: 
 
During the Obama administration, HHS adopted a regulation to prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, gender identity and other grounds by entities that receive HHS grant 
funding.7  These entities include homeless shelters, child welfare services that support young 
adults, and services for aging people that provide nutrition, social connection and care, among 
many others. 
 
The 2016 regulation provides, in essence, that organizations receiving HHS grants may 
not discriminate in their programs based on “non-merit factors,” including sexual orientation and 
gender identity.  The full text sets these requirements out in detail:    
 
It is a public policy requirement of HHS that no person otherwise eligible will be excluded 
from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination in the 
                                               
4 Aylin Woodward, The life and rise of Dr. Anthony Fauci, the public-health hero who has become the face of 
America's coronavirus response team, Business Insider, March 27, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/who-is-
anthony-fauci-speech-controlled-by-trump-coronavirus-2020-2. 
5 Tim Murphy, America, Meet Tony Fauci. HIV/AIDS Activists Have Known Him a Long Time, The Body Pro, March 
20, 2020, https://www.thebodypro.com/article/tony-fauci-md-coronavirus. 
6 Notice of Nonenforcement of Health and Human Services Grants Regulation, 84 Fed. Reg. 63809-01 (Nov. 19, 
2019) (“Notice of Nonenforcement”), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hhs-grants-regulation-notice-of-
nonenforcement.pdf. 




administration of HHS programs and services based on non-merit factors such as age, 
disability, sex, race, color, national origin, religion, gender identity, or sexual orientation. 
Recipients must comply with this public policy requirement in the administration of 
programs supported by HHS awards.8 
 
At the time, HHS explained that it already had a similar nondiscrimination policy for HHS 
contractors and that its goal was to make clear that the same policy applied to grant recipients.9  
The agency also required that all HHS grant recipients “must treat as valid the marriages of same-
sex couples."10  
In November 2019, the Trump administration issued a “Notice of Nonenforcement,” 
saying that it would not enforce these antidiscrimination protections for HHS-funded grant 
programs.11  At the same time, HHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would eliminate 
the list of protections and limit other antidiscrimination protections to those set out specifically 
in federal laws that authorize grant programs.12   
While HHS maintains that the purpose of both actions was to “eliminat[e] regulatory 
burden, including burden on the free exercise of religion,”13 the LGBTQ organizations that sued 
HHS in March 2020 to challenge these changes argue that “HHS’s actions give recipients of federal 
funds a license to discriminate in their provision of government-funded services to millions of 
                                               
8 Health and Human Services Grants Regulation, 81 Fed. Reg. 89393 (Dec. 12, 2016) (“2016 Grants Rule”). This 
provision was codified at 45 C.F.R. § 75.300(c). 
9  81 Fed. Reg. at 45271. See also 45 C.F.R. § 75.300(c). 
10  The provision’s full text linked this requirement to the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding marriage equality 
for same-sex couples:  “In accordance with the Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Windsor and in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, all recipients must treat as valid the marriages of same-sex couples.” 81 Fed. Reg. at 45271. 
See also 45 C.F.R. § 75.300(d) 
11 See supra n.6. 
12 https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hhs-grants-regulation-nprm.pdf 
13 HHS Press Office, HHS Issues Proposed Rule to Align Grants Regulation with New Legislation, Nondiscrimination 
Laws, and Supreme Court Decisions, https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/11/01/hhs-issues-proposed-rule-to-
align-grants-regulation.html (Nov. 1, 2019). 
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people.”14  They argue, too, that HHS’s actions “have strongly signaled that service providers 
need not concern themselves with understanding and preventing LGBTQ discrimination.”15   
The complaint identifies LGBTQ individuals and families who are most at risk as a result 
of this withdrawal of legal protection:   
Among those most likely to be impacted are LGBTQ children and youth. Those children 
and youth are particularly vulnerable when placed in out-of-home care or while 
experiencing homelessness, where they are dependent on grantees for care and services. 
In addition, LGBTQ families interacting with the child welfare system are likely to be 
subjected to discrimination. Finally, HHS’s actions invite discrimination against vulnerable 
LGBTQ older people who depend on critical aging services to obtain nutrition, address 
social isolation, and receive holistic care.16  
The organizations argue that HHS’s notice of nonenforcement is arbitrary and capricious in 
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and that the government’s only rationale for 
withdrawing protections – that the earlier regulations did not provide information required to 
comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires special consideration of regulations’ 
impact on small businesses – is factually and legally incorrect.17 
In its description of the lawsuit, Lambda Legal explains that the withdrawal of protections 
creates specific risks related directly to COVID-19, including these: 
● Students experiencing homelessness are susceptible to discrimination as they seek 
shelter through HHS’ Runaway and Homeless Program, at a time when colleges and 
universities have shut down housing to help halt the spread of COVID-19. 
● LGBTQ older adults are now vulnerable to providers that subject them to harassment or 
refuse to offer services, such as home delivered meals, on the basis of their sexual 
                                               
14 See Family Equality, et al. v. Azar, Case 1:20-cv-2403 para. 6 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 19, 2020).  For a copy of the 
complaint, see https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/legal-docs/family_ny_20200319_complaint 
15  Id. at para. 86. 
16 Id. at para. 6 (emphasis added). 
17  Id. at para. 7. 
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orientation or gender identity, at a time when senior centers are shutting down in major 
metropolitan centers to help combat the spread of COVID-19.18 
There is also, as noted above, a harmful signaling effect from the withdrawal of antidiscrimination 
protections.19  This effect reverberates not only among grantees, who are newly freed to 
discriminate but also among LGBT people who may be reluctant to seek necessary help from a 
federal government that has repeatedly expressed hostility through legal action and by other 
means.20 
Heightened health risks and vulnerabilities in seeking healthcare  
 Shortly after COVID-19’s dangers became clear in the United States, LGBTQ health 
organizations began to report on the heightened risks faced by LGBTQ people.  Notably, these 
risks are not tied to medical vulnerabilities associated with sexual orientation or gender identity 
as such, but rather with stigma and discrimination often experienced by people who are LGBTQ 
that in turn affect health behaviors and access to medical care.21  
 
Most basically, as one report explained, LGBTQ Americans are more likely than the 
general population to live in poverty and lack access to adequate medical care, paid medical 
leave, and basic necessities during the pandemic.22  These findings were reiterated in a study of 
                                               
18  See Family Equality v. Azar, https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/family-equality-v-azar. For more on 
the experience of transgender students returning home from college, see, e.g., 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mollyhensleyclancy/coronavirus-college-closures-trans-
students?ref=hpsplash&origin=spl 
19 See, e.g., supra n.15   
20  See, e.g., Lola Fadulu, Trump’s Rollback of Transgender Rights Extends through Entire Government,  N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/us/politics/trump-transgender-rights.html; Michael D. Shear 
and Charlie Savage, In One Day, Trump Lands Three Punches Against Gay Rights, July 27, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/politics/white-house-lgbt-rights-military-civil-rights-act.html. 
21 For discussion of the negative physical and mental health consequences of stigma on LGBT and other 
populations, see, e.g., Karen I. Fredriksen-Goldsen, et. all, The Cascading Effects of Marginalization and Pathways 
of Resilience in Attaining Good Health Among LGBT Older Adults, 57 The Gerontologist S72 (Feb. 2017), 
https://academic.oup.com/gerontologist/article/57/suppl_1/S72/2904646; Mark L. Hatzenbuehler et al., Stigma as 
a Fundamental Cause of Population Health Inequalities, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 813, 813, 816 (2013), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3682466/. 
22 Human Rights Campaign Foundation, The Lives and Livelihood of Many in the LGBT Community are at Risk 




Canadian LGBTQI2S individuals, which reported “greater current and expected impacts of COVID-
19 on their physical and mental health, and overall quality of life” than in the general Canadian 
population.23 
To help raise awareness, dozens of U.S. organizations issued an open letter about the 
coronavirus and LGBTQ+ communities outlining three factors that create increased vulnerability 
related to COVID-19:24 
1. The LGBTQ+ population uses tobacco at rates that are 50% higher than the general 
population. COVID-19 is a respiratory illness that has proven particularly harmful to 
smokers. 
2. The LGBTQ+ population has higher rates of HIV and cancer, which means a greater 
number of us may have compromised immune systems, leaving us more vulnerable to 
COVID-19 infections. 
3. LGBTQ+ people continue to experience discrimination, unwelcoming attitudes, and lack 
of understanding from providers and staff in many health care settings, and as a result, 
many are reluctant to seek medical care except in situations that feel urgent – and 
perhaps not even then. 
 LGBTQ populations also face additional risks related to conditions that are often 
associated with complications from COVID-19.  An analysis of data from the 2018 Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System, which collects state-level data about U.S. residents regarding health-
related risk behaviors, chronic health conditions, and use of preventive services,25 showed, for 
example, that one in five LGBTQ adults aged 50 and above has diabetes,26 a factor that raises the 
risk of complications for individuals diagnosed with COVID-19.27 
 
                                               
23  Egale and Innovative Research Group, Impact of COVID-19, Canada’s LGBTQI2S Community in Focus, April 6, 
2020, https://egale.ca/egale-in-action/covid19-impact-report/. 
24 LGBT Cancer Network, Coronavirus Information, https://cancer-network.org/coronavirus-2019-lgbtq-info/. 
25 For more information, see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, on the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System, https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/index.html. 
26  See supra n.22 at 5. 




 A brief from The Fenway Institute also identifies special concerns for older LGBT adults 
who “already experience higher rates of social isolation than straight and cisgender age peers,”  
adding that the increase in isolation as a result of social distancing can “exacerbate underlying 
mental health issues such as suicidal ideation and substance use.”28   
 
That report and others recognize, too, that while the interaction between COVID-19 and 
HIV is not yet known, people with HIV may be at heightened risk from other conditions, including 




 In light of these data, and in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the absence of 
standardized protections against discrimination by healthcare providers is all the more 
disturbing.  While a 2016 report from HHS reinforced the importance of nondiscrimination rules 
in enabling LGBTQ people to access healthcare,30 federal legal protections against healthcare 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity have been substantially 
diminished, as discussed above.  Adding to these challenges, state-based protections are 
                                               
28 The Fenway Institute, Coronavirus, COVID-19, and Considerations for People Living with HIV and LGBTQIA+ 
People 7 (footnotes and citations omitted) (March 25, 2020) https://fenwayhealth.org/wp-
content/uploads/C19MC-9_COVID-19and-LGBTQIA-and-People-Living-with-HIV-Brief_final2_links.pdf. 
29  California Office of AIDS, COVID-19, Information for People Living with HIV, 
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DOA/CDPH%20Document%20Library/COVID19forHIVPoz_ADA.pdf.  See 
also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, What to Know about COVID-19 and HIV, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/hiv.html; Scott Schoettes, The Current 
Pandemic Underscores That We Still Haven’t Resolved the Last One, 
https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20200327_coronavirus-pandemic-hiv. 
30 Health and Human Services LGBT Policy Coordinating Committee, Advancing LGBT Health and Well-Being 8 
(2016) ( https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/2016-report-with-cover.pdf 
(observing that “[r]educing barriers to discrimination and helping more LGBT people get access to care and 
coverage is ultimately only a first step” toward strengthening health outcomes for LGBT people).  
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inconsistent across the United States,31 and discrimination by healthcare providers remains a 
significant challenge for LGBT individuals and families.32 
Family recognition and COVID-19 
 Although same-sex couples have had the right to marry anywhere in the United States 
since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015,33 discrimination against 
same-sex couples – both married and unmarried – continues to be an issue.  With some 
frequency, employers and service-providers have claimed that faith-based exemptions to 
antidiscrimination laws entitle them to refuse goods or services to same-sex couples.34  Some 
states have also persisted in refusing to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples, offering an 
assortment of other reasons when their actions have been challenged in court.35  
 The special concern around COVID-19 involves situations where one member of a couple 
may be hospitalized and the other may be unable to obtain information about their partner’s 
health.  This is a particular risk for unmarried same-sex partners.  While unmarried different-sex 
partners are often presumed by hospital personnel to be married and therefore entitled to 
personal health information about their spouse, the same presumption may not be as likely to 
be made about same-sex partners.36 
                                               
31 See Movement Advancement Project, Snapshot:  LGBT Equality By State, https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps.  For more specific information about healthcare-related protections, select the “choose an issue” tab and 
choose among healthcare options there. 
32 See Human Rights Watch, “‘You Don’t Want Second Best’” Anti-LGBT Discrimination in US Healthcare (July 23, 
2018),  https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/07/23/you-dont-want-second-best/anti-lgbt-discrimination-us-health-
care. 
33 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
34 See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); see also Human 
Rights Watch, “All We Want Is Equality”:  Religious Exemptions and Discrimination Against LGBT People in the 
United States (2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/19/all-we-want-equality/religious-exemptions-and-
discrimination-against-lgbt-people. 
35 See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Alaska’s Discrimination Against a Gay Couple Shows the Continued Threats to 
Marriage Equality, Nov. 23, 2019, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/11/alaska-marriage-equality-
supreme-court.html; Mark Joseph Stern, Marriage Equality May Soon Be in Peril, July 5, 2017, 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/07/how-the-supreme-court-could-overturn-obergefell-v-hodges.html. 
36 Tara Parker-Pope, Kept from a Dying Partner’s Bedside, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2009, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/health/19well.html.  Parker-Pope’s article describes the experience of 
Janice Langbehn, a woman who was barred from seeing her partner in the hospital and from bringing the couple’s 
children to see their other mother.  In the lawsuit challenging the hospital’s action, Langbehn alleged that a social 
worker at the hospital told her that she was in an “antigay city and state” and that she would need a health care 
proxy to get information.”  Id.  For more on the lawsuit, which was ultimately dismissed, see Lambda Legal, 
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For this reason, LGBT advocacy organizations have offered additional resources to 
support same-sex couples in planning to secure recognition for their relationship should either 
partner be hospitalized with complications from COVID-19.37  These resources also provide 
guidance for couples who are parenting a child together but only one of the two has a legally 
recognized relationship with the child.  This is not uncommon in same-sex couples raising children 
together, where the “non-legal” parent may not be accorded legal recognition of their parental 
rights without taking the additional step of obtaining a second-parent adoption.38 
At least one advocacy organization is also offering analysis of COVID-19 related legislation 
that includes attention to the concerns of LGBT families.39 
Employment discrimination 
The combination of bias toward LGBT people and limited antidiscrimination protections 
means that LGBT people are also more vulnerable to joblessness in the wake of the dramatic 
economic downturn as a result of COVID-19’s spread.  At least one report has indicated that 
LGBTQ people “are more likely to work in jobs in highly affected industries, often with more 
exposure and/or higher economic sensitivity to the COVID-19 crisis.”40  Although there have been 
substantial advances in equality of LGBT people in the past decade, legal protections remain 
uneven, with many LGBT people living in jurisdictions that do not expressly prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.41   
Populations at special risk 
Langbehn v. Jackson Memorial Hospital,” https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/langbehn-v-jackson-
memorial. 
37 See, e.g., National Center for Lesbian Rights, FAQ: Documents and Protections for LGBTQ People and Their 
Families During COVID-19 Crisis, http://www.nclrights.org/legal-help-resources/resource/faq-documents-and-
protections-for-lgbtq-people-and-their-families-during-covid-19-crisis/ 
38 National Center for Lesbian Rights, Family & Relationship Resources, http://www.nclrights.org/our-work/family-
relationships/family-relationships-resources/#parentingnational. 
39 Family Equality, COVID-19 Response Legislation Overview, https://www.familyequality.org/covid-legislation/. 
40 See Human Rights Campaign Foundation Report at 2, supra n. 22 
41 Movement Advancement Project, Nondiscrimination Laws, https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps/non_discrimination_laws.  See also Sejal Singh and Laura E. Durso,  Widespread Discrimination Continues to 




LGBT youth and elders are among the most vulnerable because of heightened risks 
related to homelessness, poverty and social isolation, as described at length in the lawsuit that 
challenges the federal government’s decision not to enforce antidiscrimination protections that 
cover HHS grant recipients.42  Each of these risks, as discussed above, may be exacerbated by the 
coronavirus pandemic. 
Transgender individuals are also among the most vulnerable within LGBT communities to 
discrimination, violence and other harms.  The Transgender Legal Defense and Education Fund 
has released a special “Know Your Rights Guide for Transgender People Navigating COVID-19” 
that addresses healthcare needs of transgender individuals, including information on delays to 
gender-affirming surgery and legal name-changes in this time, along with information about 
many other issues and concerns.43 
LGBTQ immigrants in the United States who may be in detention or needing legal 
assistance related to their immigration status may also find useful resources from Immigration 
Equality,44 the leading advocacy organization for LGBTQ immigrants in the United States.  
Conclusion 
Managing the challenges presented by COVID-19 is daunting for nearly everyone in the 
United States and elsewhere.  For many LGBT people in the U.S., the backdrop of stigma and 
discrimination can make access to healthcare, social services and basic legal protections 
especially difficult.   
At the same time, LGBT communities have developed extraordinary resilience over 
decades of responding to the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, pushing back against stigma, and making 
claims for equality and basic human dignity.  Legal protections, community-based resources and 
social support networks exist in 2020 in a way we could not have imagined when our communities 
first confronted AIDS nearly 40 years ago.  Especially in this difficult time, this difficult history and 
its hard-earned lessons may offer both hope and guidance as we navigate the complex path that 
lies ahead. 
42 See Family Equality Council et al. v. Azar, supra n. 14 
43 Transgender Legal Defense and Education Fund, https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps/non_discrimination_laws. 
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Small businesses are among the hardest hit by the COVID-19 crisis. Many are shuttered, 
and far more face cash flow constraints, raising questions about just how many will survive this 
recession. The government has responded with a critical forgivable loan program but for many of 
these businesses, this program alone will not provide the cash they need to retain workers, pay 
rent, and help their business come back to life when Americans are no longer sheltering in place. 
This essay calls on regulators to find new and creative ways to work with existing intermediaries, 
including banks and online lenders, who have the infrastructure and tools needed to help small 
businesses get the additional loans they need to survive and thrive. Leveraging existing 
institutions could enhance the speed, scale, and scope of the government’s response, all critical 
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The public health crisis posed by COVID-19 may soon be overshadowed by the massive 
economic disruption that lies in its wake.  A severe recession is certain but questions remain 
about just how deep it will sear, how long it will last, and how it will reshape the economy that 
emerges.  Among the critical questions policy makers are facing are how best to support small 
businesses and how to reduce the number of otherwise viable businesses that will be forced 
into bankruptcy as a result of COVID-19 and efforts to slow its spread.   
We argue that in order to minimize the adverse impact on small businesses, lawmakers 
should harness existing mechanisms for extending credit to companies with the potential to 
succeed and for renegotiating the terms of existing loans.  The core idea is that grants to 
support small businesses such as the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) are a critical but 
insufficient response to the cash flow needs of small businesses.  No one yet knows just how 
long the threat posed by COVID-19 and associated activity constraints will last and whether a 
second or even third wave will arise after this one. Nor can anyone foresee what the economy 
will look like when people emerge from their shelters. The government lacks the means to 
provide full support to all of the people and businesses that will suffer so, over the longer term, 
it must consider how best to leverage the money it is investing to get the economy back on 
track and to help people in need.  Banks and other lenders, particularly the new breed of online 
lenders, can help.  
Banks and online lenders have the relationships, information, expertise, and 
infrastructure needed to help get cash into the hands of the small and mid-sized businesses 
that need it. Providing appropriate support to banks and online lenders could also go a long 
way in softening the blow to small and mid-sized businesses as obligations to pay outstanding 
loans can be among the more significant ongoing liabilities these businesses face. Further, 
making an effort to work with a diverse array of intermediaries could expand the pool of 
businesses that ultimately receive help and could also reduce the tendency for the 




The challenge is that banks and online lenders face their own liquidity and capital 
constraints, limiting their capacity to provide the type of aid small businesses so desperately 
need. We provide an overview of why these institutions are critical and how the government 
can best leverage them to maximize the impact of governmental support on the long-term 
success of the small businesses threatened by recent developments. The aim is to provide a 
frame for understanding both the efforts underway and the further steps that could be taken. 
Much of what is called for could be implemented through facilities authorized by the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), including the PPP 
administered by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), but we also point to additional 
interventions policymakers should consider as they contemplate new legislation or other 
regulatory efforts to support small businesses through these difficult times.  Finally, we point to 
policies that may be needed to reduce the systemic risks created by the recent rise of online 
small business lenders. 
Background  
COVID-19 has quickly evolved into the greatest global economic threat of the century. 
These challenges arise in part from the suffering and sometimes passing of those who contract 
COVID-19 but even more from the type of government interventions and behavioral changes 
needed to stop its spread. Among the hardest hit are small and mid-sized businesses, often 
defined as those businesses that have less than 500 employees. According to the Census 
Bureau there are roughly six million such businesses currently operating in the United States. 
Helping these businesses has been a central focus of the government’s interventions.2 One 
reason is the critical role these firms play in the economy. Small businesses are a key driver of 
economic activity. They support the growth and vitality of our neighborhoods, spark innovation, 
and provide a proven pathway for many people — particularly women and minorities — to 
achieve financial success and independence. In recent years, almost one-half of the U.S. 
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workforce worked in a small business and small businesses collectively produced 45% of U.S. 
GDP.3   
A related reason for the emphasis on small businesses, also reflected in the CARES Act, 
is that small businesses embody and reflect certain American ideals. Particularly given concerns 
that the United States has become excessively dominated by large businesses and that those 
businesses exercise too much influence over policy making, many see small businesses as 
critical to the long-term vibrancy of democratic institutions.4 Finding ways to help these 
businesses get the cash they need to survive, while also ensuring their owners are not saddled 
with excessive personal debt in the process, is at the forefront of the current economic policy 
challenges. 
In its early efforts to minimize the economic costs of COVID-19, Congress passed a series 
of laws that provide extensive fiscal support to businesses and individuals.  The CARES Act is the 
most important of the interventions to date, although further congressional action appears 
likely as the economic toll of COVID-19 materializes. In broad terms, the CARES Act seeks to 
help small businesses in two ways.  One is through the PPP’s forgivable loans, which effectively 
operate as grants to help small firms retain most of their employees and weather the other 
short-term challenges they face.  Although a critical first step, these loans alone are unlikely to 
satisfy the medium and longer-term cash-flow and other needs of these businesses.5 Given the 
fluidity of the situation, we explain here in broad terms why it is so critical for policy makers to 
harness existing institutions to meet these needs, and then propose some of the ways they can 
do so. Longer term, we encourage policy makers to think creatively about the country’s reliance 
on powerful middlemen, in finance and elsewhere. We also recognize the importance of  
potential conflicts of issue that can sometimes arise when the government works closely with 
these institutions to provide aid. For now, however, we believe the focus must be on finding 
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the most viable avenues possible for supporting small businesses. We make specific 
recommendations to illustrate what is possible and how, even for these proposals, the 
tradeoffs at stake will need to be evaluated in context.  
A. Lessons on the Importance of Harnessing Existing Institutions 
History, both recent and distant, suggests that the government’s ability to harness 
existing institutions can be key to achieving particular policy goals. During the 2008 financial 
crisis, for example, then Treasury Secretary Paulson asked Congress for $700 billion to buy 
mortgage-backed securities and other troubled assets with the aim of putting a floor under the 
price of those assets. After being given this authority in the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act (“EESA”), however, Treasury quickly changed course, recognizing it was impossible to erect 
its own facilities for valuing and buying up those assets in a manner fast enough to calm 
markets, particularly given the liquidity strains and informational challenges of the time.  
Less than two weeks after EESA became law, the Treasury Secretary interpreted the 
Department’s authority to buy “troubled assets” as sufficient basis for a massive 
recapitalization of the banking system. These interventions proved to be an effective and timely 
way to restore market functioning and allowed the banking system to play a role in the 
recovery that followed.6 Other programs to stabilize markets such as the Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”) were established by the Federal Reserve and supported by 
Treasury and its provision of Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) funds to absorb possible 
losses. Under the TALF program, the Federal Reserve issued nonrecourse loans with a term of 
up to five years to holders of eligible asset-backed securities (“ABS”).  TALF financing was 
intended to support new ABS issuance and increase the flow of credit to consumer and 
business borrowers. Any U.S. company that owned eligible ABS collateral was able to request a 
TALF loan. In the words of the Federal Reserve: “While TALF borrowers benefited from the 
leverage provided by the facility, they served primarily as conduits…. The[] issuers and sponsors 
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of newly issued ABS were the beneficiaries of the program.”7 This is a great example, and one 
being invoked again, of the Federal Reserve and Treasury working together to harness existing 
institutional capacity to promote the extension of credit needed to support the real economy. 
The most relevant lesson is that it is very hard for the government on its own to develop the 
expertise and infrastructure to do what private financial institutions specialize in—assessing the 
value of financial instruments and the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. An additional 
lesson is that a well-capitalized banking system is key for economic recovery. 
Looking further back, we see that the Federal Reserve has attempted to make loans 
directly but with very mixed results. Between 1934 and 1958, pursuant to what was Section 
13(b) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Reserve was authorized to provide working capital 
loans directly to nonfinancial firms.8  In a recent analysis of Section 13(b), George Selgin closely 
details just how difficult it was for the Fed to determine who should get funds—resulting in 
widespread denials of applications—and how poorly those loans nonetheless performed. When 
Congress took away the Fed’s power in 1958, it was acting in accord with, not contrary to, the 
wishes of respected Fed Chairman William McChesney Martin, who had testified that the 
program was inconsistent with “good government” as well as “good central banking.” Both of 
Martin’s critiques pushed for a Fed that was more focused on its core mandates.   
None of this is to belittle the value of government-run programs.  Just the opposite—
public options can be a critical way to provide services and can spur private activity.9 Depending 
on how the next few months play out, a critical reassessment of the country’s reliance on 
financial middlemen may well be warranted. For now, however, the government’s capacity to 
extend credit and provide other aid to businesses in need will likely depend on how successfully 
it harnesses and directs existing intermediary structures. Failure to engage with institutions 
specifically well designed to aid small business could result in a post-COVID-19 world with far 
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more large, powerful businesses and far fewer small businesses critical to the vibrancy of our 
economy and society.    
B. Banks Remain Critical 
That banks are critical is reflected in many of the legislative and regulatory interventions 
to date. The challenges here will be finding new ways to harness bank capacity and ensuring 
banks remain sufficiently well capitalized to work with existing small-business borrowers and 
extend new loans. 
The difficult balance in ensuring banks have both the capital cushions needed to survive 
and lend and the flexibility to make accommodations when appropriate is already leading to 
heated debates. One aspect of the challenge is the need to maintain a long-term perspective 
that reflects the genuine uncertainty of the public health crisis the country and world is facing 
and hence the possibility of greater losses ahead. So far, there has been a tendency to focus on 
ways that banks can help their clients and themselves at the same time. But the more difficult 
and important decisions entail tradeoffs between these groups. If Congress wants to do more 
to help small businesses, and more effectively leverage banks in that process, it must to find 
ways to encourage banks to act even when it is costly for them to do so. This requires far more 
than moral suasion, which could even be counterproductive longer term if banks become 
under-capitalized in the process. Figuring out ways both through and beyond the CARES Act to 
provide targeted subsidies to reward banks for making costly modifications or extending certain 
new loans to small businesses could be a critical complement to the efforts already underway.  
A more troubling development is that, in addition to encouraging banks to work with 
customers, Congress and regulators are giving banks the freedom to renegotiate loans without 
adhering to appropriate accounting standards and are otherwise weakening capital standards.10 
On the one hand, capital and liquidity requirements often act as a buffer, so modest relaxations 
during finite periods of distress may at times be justified. Similarly, excessively rigid adherence 
                                               




to existing and new rules may discourage precisely the type of long-term value-creating 
workarounds that all want to see. On the other hand, these developments can lead in 
dangerous directions. Banks, for example, may opportunistically use these temporary 
relaxations in accounting and other standards to restructure loans that are problematic for 
other reasons. The weakest and worst-run banks may be most likely to engage in such 
concerning behavior. More broadly, an undercapitalized banking system could inhibit recovery 
in the real economy, as vividly illustrated by Japan’s lost decade. Finally, by softening standards 
in ways that reduce the informativeness of banks’ financial statements, these developments 
could breed the type of unknowns that can exacerbate market dysfunction. Take away the 
credibility of the information available and that too could lead to doubt about the banking 
sector and a prolonged crisis.11  
Apart from these dynamics, there are questions about whether the Treasury and 
Federal Reserve could do more to harness banks’ infrastructure for making loans. The big 
problem, again, is that banks’ incentives and society’s interests are not well aligned. Banks 
cannot be expected to do what needs to be done without financial incentives to do so. This is 
an important area for further exploration: Treasury and the Federal Reserve should find ways to 
encourage the extension of new loans to small businesses, with terms that are friendlier than 
what a bank could make on its own, by finding a way for banks to quickly unload such loans. 
This approach could be a good way to help small businesses without threatening bank health.   
The final point to note is that even though banks are critical, they are also not dis-
interested. This has already come through in their role in helping small businesses access PPP 
loans. On the one hand, banks have played a critical role in enabling the program to work and in 
getting money into hands of small businesses in a timely way. Without banks, the program as 
designed would not work. On the other hand, the program and banks involved have run into 
operational challenges that are delaying the distribution of these funds. More disturbingly, 
banks are favoring their own clients, particularly clients with outstanding loans. This is not only 
                                               
11 Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 Virginia Law Review 411 (2017); Kathryn Judge, The 




because it is easier for banks to process these applications—the rationale most provide—but 
also because those banks stand to benefit from the PPP funds. By improving the liquidity and 
solvency of firms receiving the funds, PPP funds make it less likely that a bank’s outstanding 
loan will go into default. These types of conflicts are not a reason to bypass banks in the short 
run but they are a reminder of the importance of identifying and, when appropriate, minimizing 
conflicts when they inevitably arise.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that better capitalized banks do a better job lending 
through the cycle.12 Excessively relaxing capital requirements or allowing troubled banks to 
opportunistically renegotiate with weak borrowers is unlikely to pave the road to long-term 
success. Instead, the aim should be to devise tools that utilize bank expertise and provide 
appropriate incentives for helping businesses in need. 
C. Online Lenders are a Critical and Growing Part of the Small Business Credit 
Ecosystem 
The situation with online small business lenders is significantly more complicated.  
Online small business lenders are the main source of credit for a large and highly vulnerable 
part of the small business ecosystem that banks can't or won't serve effectively.13 Due to their 
capital markets-dependent business model as nonbank finance companies, online small 
business lenders will be forced out of the market just when the liquidity they provide is needed 
most.  Online lenders have already curtailed or ceased lending as their ABS are downgraded 
and funding costs rise precipitously.14 Accordingly, unless the government finds a way to utilize 
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and support these lenders, a wide swath of small business borrowers may face a dire cash 
shortage. As a longer-term matter, it may be advisable to consider reducing the systemic risks 
created by small business lenders that are dependent on the capital markets and thus disabled 
in a crisis.  It may be more prudent to force these lenders into the regulated banking system 
where access to deposit funding and effective capital and liquidity rules will prevent lending 
paralysis. 
It is important to be clear-eyed about how the small business credit market has changed 
since 2008. Banks are no longer the only source of credit for true small businesses, especially 
the type of very small “Mom & Pop” corner stores, laundromats, beauty salons, and coffee and 
sandwich shops that line main streets. Over the last decade, the smallest enterprises have 
increasingly turned to online lenders for their credit needs. The most recent Federal Reserve 
Banks' Small Business Credit Survey indicated that, in 2018, nearly one-third of small businesses 
that applied for credit sought it from an online lender.15  For less traditionally credit-worthy 
businesses, the number was closer to one-half.16  Despite an average loan size much smaller 
than that of a typical bank,17 online lenders extended more than $20 billion in loans to small 
businesses in 2019, overwhelmingly to very small enterprises. Combined with the 
approximately $12-15 billion in aggregate merchant cash advances made to small retail 
businesses in 2019, nonbank lenders provided somewhere between a quarter and a third of all 
credit to the smallest businesses. 
All this growth has brought systemic fragility with it.  If you peel back the skin of an 
online lender, what you find underneath is a finance company, simply a nonbank lender that 
gets all of its funding from the capital markets. Leading finance company names from the past 
like Household, GE Capital, CIT, MBNA, Countrywide, Money Store, and GMAC all relied on the 
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same liquidity model: borrow in the capital markets and lend that money to customers. In good 
times, this model works well. But when funding in the capital markets is unavailable or 
prohibitively expensive, a finance company quickly hits the wall.18 That's why the finance 
companies of the past moved, though not always voluntarily, into the banking system to get 
access to the stable deposit funding they needed to survive and prosper, or they failed.19 
 Because they are so important to the small business credit ecosystem and because they 
are liquidity-challenged relative to banks, online small business lenders will need both short and 
medium-term assistance from the Federal government in order to play a meaningful role in any 
small business credit and economic recovery.  The most immediate short-term solution for 
these lenders and their customers is direct participation by online lenders in the PPP, as 
authorized by the CARES Act.20  The speed and simplicity of online lenders’ processes would be 
a significant advantage relative to the often more bureaucratic loan origination practices of 
banks.  While online lenders have the same incentives as banks to provide PPP loans to their 
existing customers as a means of reducing potential defaults, they also have significant financial 
incentives to make PPP loans to new customers.  This is because, as monoline lenders unable to 
fund traditional loans and without other revenue sources, they need the revenue from PPP 
lending to “keep the lights on” in their origination operations until conditions improve. 
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Recent actions by the Treasury, SBA, and Federal Reserve with regard to both the PPP 
and the related Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (“PPPLF”) appear designed 
eventually to allow online and other nonbank lenders to participate in both programs, although 
online lenders are subject to various application requirements and other conditions (principally 
related to Bank Secrecy Act compliance) which have delayed their participation relative to 
banks. 21  
The problem becomes more complex in the medium term when the immediate COVID-
19 crisis begins to abate but loan performance and economic activity are still depressed.  
Additional term loans and other types of credit will be needed as small businesses begin to 
emerge from lockdown and contemplate a return to more active operations.  But loan losses in 
the online lenders’ historical books (the credit risk of which was largely transferred to the 
capital markets) will remain very high. The loan-secured “warehouse” facilities from banks, 
which these lenders typically use as a source of cash to fund loans in good times, are unlikely to 
be available so long as historic portfolio losses remain a problem. Such facilities are tied to 
quickly funded loan sales/securitizations into the capital markets, and the capital markets will 
not provide funding for new loans in an amount and at a price adequate to support non-
guaranteed lending by online lenders until the economy is fully recovered and credit risks 
return to a more normal range.  Government solutions will be needed for an indeterminate 
amount of time.  We suggest two potential solutions to this problem: one involving direct 
support to online lenders and one supporting capital markets funding as markets recover. 
One way to help small business customers of online lenders secure the financing they 
need would be for the Fed to provide for a limited period a direct secured line of credit facility 
with a 100% advance rate and a concessionary interest rate available to any online lender that 
meets the SBA 7(a) lending volume test for nonbank lenders included in the PPP. Treasury 
should provide direction and loss absorption and online lenders should be required to use the 
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credit for extending small business loans to existing customers.22  This should help online 
lenders keep credit flowing to existing borrowers who would otherwise be cut off because of 
the lenders’ inability to access market capital.  It is important to recognize that the Fed 
normally should not engage in lending of this type, which involves the central bank in what 
could fairly be called the amelioration of business model failure rather than market failure.  
However, the emergency circumstances, the large number of businesses affected, and the 
Treasury loss absorption guarantee make this the best immediate solution. 
Another way that Treasury and the Fed could utilize their current authority would be to 
expand the category of loans eligible for the TALF to include investment grade non-SBA-
guaranteed small business loans, which are currently not included in the program.  Adding 
these loans to the TALF would increase capital markets’ confidence in the ABS issued by online 
small business lenders and improve pricing and funding availability, especially as the economy 
revives and credit outcomes become more predictable. Specifically, the TALF would need to be 
changed in three ways: 
 
● Non-SBA-guaranteed small business loans would be included in the loan types eligible 
for TALF ABS lending.  The current list includes SBA loans, auto loans, student loans, 
credit cards, and even insurance premium finance loans (a tiny business in relative 
terms), but not normal small business loans.  This provision would also help banks, 
credit unions, and other small business lenders who make such loans. 
● All investment grade consumer loan ABS would become eligible for lending.  The TALF 
rules only allow ABS rated AAA by two rating agencies.  For many reasons, the ABS 
issued by nonbank small business lenders typically don’t reach that type of rating and 
are therefore ineligible.  It may even be necessary to add some non-investment grade 
securities to the program, especially those ABS that were investment grade but 
subsequently downgraded as a result of the crisis. 
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● The TALF program would need to clarify that privately (Rule 144A) issued and 
institutionally traded ABS are eligible. TALF in 2008 was limited to buying the publicly 
traded ABS, which dominated the market at the time.  That’s no longer the case today.  
 
These changes would alter the nature of the current TALF significantly by adding an 
element of credit risk that, theoretically, does not exist for today’s TALF-eligible, AAA-rated ABS 
and may arguably be beyond the Fed’s 13(3) authority.  For this reason, and to protect future 
Fed independence, it would be preferable to create a new, parallel Fed lending facility 
specifically for investment grade ABS backed by small business loans (and perhaps for 
consumer installment loans, where there are similar issues)23 with funding and/or loss 
absorption provided by the Treasury.  
Finally, policymakers need to come to terms with the systemic risks associated with 
allowing fragile, capital-market dependent lenders to play a significant role in the provision of 
credit to small businesses.24 There can be little question that allowing a large portion of lending 
to a critical area of the economy to be provided by companies (a) beyond direct federal control 
and (b) doing business in an inherently fragile and procyclical manner creates systemic risks.  
We are seeing these risks play out today. 
It may be time to insist that lending to critical areas of the economy belongs in regulated 
banks, where funding is stable and a regulatory regime intended to support lending in crises 
and recessions is in place. 25  While the COVID-19 crisis situation is unprecedented and there are 
cogent innovation-based arguments to the contrary, it is hard to understand why government 
should be responsible for rescuing lenders that could have designed their businesses to be 
more resilient to liquidity and credit shocks.  One might, and should, also ask why the Financial 
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Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) did not do more to identify and address the systemic risks 
posed by the rise of online small business lending. 
There is no easy way for the government to readily provide the perfect amount of 
support and credit to small businesses. Every path forward is fraught. But failing to provide 
sufficient access to credit poses much greater downside risk than the complications that will 
inevitably arise in efforts to harness the infrastructure embedded in banks and online lenders. 
This paper presents just a few of the ways that the government could more effectively use 
existing intermediaries to help small businesses get the credit they need to survive this 
unprecedented shock.    
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Policymakers presently minimize the role of bankruptcy law in mitigating the financial fallout from 
COVID-19. Scholars too are unsure about the merits of bankruptcy, especially Chapter 11, in resolving 
business distress. We argue that Chapter 11 complements current stimulus policies for large 
corporations, such as airlines, and that Treasury should consider making it a precondition for receiving 
government-backed financing, particularly when the corporation was highly leveraged prior to the 
crisis. For these borrowers, Chapter 11 offers a flexible, speedy, and crisis-tested tool for preserving 
businesses and restructuring liabilities, permitting them to shed drags on their innovation, while 
ensuring that the costs of those improvements are borne primarily by investors, not taxpayers. For 
consumers and small businesses, however, bankruptcy should serve as a backstop to other policies, 
such as the CARES Act. Consumer bankruptcy law’s primary goal is to discharge debts, but that’s not 
what most consumers need right now. What they need is bridge financing and forbearance until the 
crisis ends and they get back to work. These key policy levers—bridge financing and forbearance—are 
available in theory to small businesses in Chapter 11 as well. The practical reality, however, is that 
bankruptcy is unattractive to many owner-managers who are essential to the business but may have 
their ownership interests wiped out in bankruptcy. Even putting that issue aside, our bankruptcy 
courts likely lack the capacity to serve a deluge of small business bankruptcy cases. Although we 
believe that bankruptcy should serve as a backstop during the current crisis, this backstop may be used 
heavily in the months ahead. We therefore encourage policymakers to ensure adequate funding for 






Social distancing guidelines have shut down large sectors of the American economy.2 Many U.S. 
households and businesses are now experiencing a sudden decline in income and, with it, a 
mounting inability to pay debts. This is a problem that bankruptcy law can address. For 
                                               
1 We thank Ken Ayotte, Douglas Baird, Vince Buccola, Tony Casey, Jared Ellias, Katharina Pistor, David Skeel, and 
Kate Waldock for helpful comments. 
2 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Trump Extends Social Distancing Guidelines through End of April, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 
29, 2020 (available here). 
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households, bankruptcy is a pathway to eliminate financial stress: the law can halt collection 
efforts and reduce or discharge debts in exchange for assets or future income. For businesses, 
bankruptcy resets the bargaining table with creditors: Companies are given time to renegotiate 
debts, renovate operations, renegotiate contracts, and propose a repayment plan consistent 
with their ability to pay. This typically involves wiping out the rights of old shareholders and 
converting old debt into new equity. Through these procedures, debtors receive a “fresh start” 
and the economy is, presumptively, better off. 
 
These solutions are time tested. When the financial crisis of 2008 threatened some of the largest 
U.S. industrial corporations, including General Motors and Chrysler, bankruptcy was the 
solution.3 When industry-wide distress destabilized the airline industry during the early 2000s, 
bankruptcy was the solution for Delta, United, Northwest, and U.S. Air, among others.  
 
Should policymakers rely on our bankruptcy laws to help mitigate the financial stress suffered by 
consumers, small businesses, and large corporations today?4 We offer two answers: Bankruptcy 
should be a central part of policies targeting large corporations but should be used only as a 
backup to other policies for consumers and small businesses.  
 
Before explaining these punchlines, we provide an overview of how bankruptcy works. 
 
2. How It Works: Consumer and Corporate Bankruptcy 
 
Three “chapters” of the U.S. bankruptcy law provide the primary avenues of relief for distressed 
consumers and businesses:  
                                               
3 And the federal government assisted these businesses through the bankruptcy process, as discussed later in this 
essay. 
4 Our essay is related to the work of Ken Ayotte and David Skeel, who analyzed the pros and cons of bankruptcy 
versus bailouts for financial institutions during the 2008 financial crisis. Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. Corp. Law. 469 (2010). 
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● Chapter 7 (a liquidation proceeding available to both individuals and businesses);5  
● Chapter 11 (a restructuring proceeding used primarily by corporations);6 and  
● Chapter 13 (a repayment plan available to individuals with regular income).7  
 
A bankruptcy petition triggers an “automatic stay,” halting collection efforts by all creditors 
anywhere in the world.8 For individuals, the automatic stay gives the debtor time to assess his or 
her situation, negotiate with creditors (especially secured creditors), and either liquidate assets 
(Chapter 7) or propose a plan of repayment (Chapter 13). For businesses in Chapter 11, the stay 
affords time to assess firm value, determine claim amounts, restructure operations or contracts 
or leases, and propose a plan of reorganization. 
 
The automatic stay may be the most important benefit of a bankruptcy filing, especially during 
the COVID-19 crisis, because it prevents most creditors from collecting or liquidating their debts. 
During a crisis that is expected to be temporary, this “pause button” may be all that many debtors 
and businesses need. Equally important, it is a benefit that debtors obtain simply by filing a 
bankruptcy petition; no judicial action is needed.  
  
For consumers, Chapters 7 and 13 offer different kinds of trade-offs. Both discharge virtually all 
of the consumer’s debts but at different costs. In Chapter 7, the consumer must relinquish assets 
that exceed what state or federal law says the consumer absolutely needs for his or her fresh 
start. She will also lose some assets, such as a home or car, if these are subject to mortgages or 
liens. The process is speedy: For the honest debtor who discloses all assets to the court, it can be 
completed within a matter of weeks.  
                                               
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. 
6 §§ 1101 et seq. 
7 §§ 1301 et seq. 
8 § 362. There are important exemptions to the automatic stay. One permits the counterparties to swaps, repos, and 
other financial contracts to terminate the contracts and seize collateral. See generally Edward R. Morrison, Mark, J. 
Roe, and Christopher S. Sontchi, Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors, 69 Bus. Lawyer 1015 (2014). This exception was 
critically important during the previous crisis, which began in the banking sector where many financial contracts 





For consumers who want to retain assets that would be lost in Chapter 7, the better option is 
Chapter 13. Instead of giving up assets, the consumer gives up “disposable income” for a period 
of three to five years.9 Every month, the consumer pays off secured creditors and, if any income 
remains after covering living expenses, pays the remainder to unsecured creditors.10 This isn’t 
easy. Legal fees are substantially higher in Chapter 13 as compared to Chapter 7.11 Worse, 
roughly two-thirds of consumers are unable to make the payments required by Chapter 13.12 
Their cases are dismissed or converted to Chapter 7.  
 
For businesses, the choice between Chapters 7 and 11 is more straightforward. Chapter 7 is a 
funeral; Chapter 11 is a shot at renewal. Specifically, Chapter 7 turns the business over to a 
trustee, who is charged with liquidating its assets and distributing proceeds to creditors. Chapter 
11 leaves the business in the hands of management, which is given an opportunity to obtain new, 
senior financing13 and propose a reorganization plan that values the going concern firm, reduces 
debts to a level consistent with the firm’s ability to pay, and implements essential operational 
changes (e.g,, renegotiating labor contracts). Creditors vote on the proposed plan. If the court 
approves the plan, the reorganized firm exits bankruptcy with a new capital structure: Old debts 
are eliminated and replaced with new debts owed by the newly reorganized firm; old shares are 
deleted and replaced with new shares issued by the reorganized firm. One fundamental rule 
looms in the background as management crafts a plan: Senior creditors must be paid before 
junior creditors who must be paid before shareholders receive anything. This is the “absolute 
priority rule,” which generally means that shareholders are wiped out in Chapter 11 
reorganizations.14 Junior debt may be wiped out too. The only creditors who retain rights after 
                                               
9 § 1325(b)(2). See also Official Form 122C-2, available here. 
10 § 1326.  
11 See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, and Deborah Thorne, “No Money Down” 
Bankruptcy, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev 1055 (2016). 
12 See, e.g., Edward R. Morrison and Antoine Uettwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies, 173 J. Instit. & Theoret. 
Econ. 174 (2017), and sources cited therein. 
13 The liquidity-enhancing role of Chapter 11 is the focus of Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Law 
as Liquidity Provider, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1557 (2013). 
14 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun, and Lawrence A. Weiss, Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 11, 
29 J. L., Econ. & Org. 461 (2013). 
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the firm is reorganized are those whose claims are (a) most senior and (b) collectively consistent 
with the firm’s ability to pay. Among these creditors, equity in the reorganized firm is typically 
transferred to the most junior creditors. 
 
The Chapter 11 process was designed with large corporations in mind (indeed, it is modeled on 
old rules for restructuring railroads) and during the past forty years the process has become user-
friendly for these businesses. Large corporate Chapter 11 cases tend to be speedy because, 
among other things, most of the businesses have professional support and the foresight to 
negotiate with creditors before a bankruptcy filing, thereby clearing the way for a less 
controversial, or even pre-approved, reorganization plan (these are called “prenegotiated” and 
“prepackaged” cases). Frequently, this negotiation will not only clear away creditor objections, 
but will also involve the debtor’s commitment to sell the firm quickly after the bankruptcy filing.15 
Proceeds from the sale will then be distributed to creditors in order of lien rights and payment 
priority. 
 
Some of the largest U.S. corporations have used Chapter 11 to remedy distress and emerge 
financially healthier. These corporations include airlines (such as United and Delta), car 
manufacturers (General Motors and Chrysler), financial institutions (CIT Group), and oil 
companies (Texaco). Other major corporations have used Chapter 11 as a quick way to merge 
themselves with other corporations via a 363 sale. A good example is American Airlines. It 
acquired TWA through a 363 sale. Subsequently, during its own Chapter 11 case, American 
merged with U.S. Airways. 
 
Chapter 11 works well in crises too. General Motors and Chrysler provide good illustrations. Both 
neared death during the 2008 financial crisis but were taken into Chapter 11 where each received 
                                               
15 See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby and Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy, 123 Yale L. J. 862 (2014); Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan L 
Rev 751, 777–88 (2002). 
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financial support from the federal government.16 Each was sold off to a buyer within weeks.17 
The speedy bankruptcies, financed by the federal government, allowed both companies to 
renegotiate or shed legacy liabilities that had been a drag on innovation for decades. In the 
process, the U.S. government was also able to, in essence, rescue the supply-side chain of these 
auto giants, thereby preserving jobs up and down the entire auto industry. Whatever the federal 
government decides to do now for the aerospace or airlines industries, this is recent precedent 
that government-supported restructurings can help stabilize the American economy – and prove 
a good investment for taxpayer funds.  
 
This is not to say that Chapter 11 is perfect. It can generate important disruptions in operations 
as investors jockey for recoveries. One study, for example, finds that workers suffer long-term 
declines in wages when their firms enter bankruptcy.18 Additionally, scholars have shown that 
the dynamics of a Chapter 11 case, including its duration, costs, and ultimate outcome, depend 
on contestable and hard-to-predict judicial decisions about creditor priority and firm value.19 
Finally, scholarship has shown that secured creditors have outsized influence over the process. 
This is because the firm’s pre-bankruptcy secured creditors are typically the same financiers (and 
usually the only available financiers) of the bankrupt business. This gives them outsized influence, 
which can lead to quick sales at “fire sale” prices instead of reorganization.20  
 
Although these downsides of Chapter 11 are important, we think they can be managed during 
the current crisis. Workers suffer large declines in wages when their firms become unprofitable, 
regardless of whether the firms file for bankruptcy. Although a filing can exacerbate this wage 
decline in normal times, it’s unclear whether to expect the same effect during this crisis, 
                                               
16 Many other businesses also used Chapter 11 successfully during the crisis, but received no government support, 
including Lear Corp. and Visteon Corp. in the auto parts industry and Tronox Inc. in the chemicals industry. 
17 See Anthony J. Casey and Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 479 (2015). 
18 The same authors find that workers receive wage premiums at firms with high bankruptcy risk. John R. Graham, 
Hyunseob Kim, Si Li, and Jiaping Qiu, “Employee Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy,” working paper (available here). 
19 See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey and Julia Simon-Kerr, A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1175 
(2015); Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization 
Bargain, 115 Yale L. J. 1930 (2006). 
20 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte and Jared A. Ellias, “Bankruptcy Process for Sale,” working paper (2020); Kenneth M. 
Ayotte and Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 2 J. LEGAL ANAL. 511 (2009). 
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especially if the government is the primary supplier of liquidity to the bankrupt firm and uses that 
power as leverage to influence payroll (as it is currently doing under the CARES Act). The risk of 
“fire sales” in the current environment depends on the influence exerted by secured lenders. If 
they too are stressed, the lenders may prefer quick cash from fire sales instead of illiquid (but 
higher valued) claims against the reorganized firm. The risk of fire sales, therefore, depends 
critically on the extent to which government policy (through action by the Federal Reserve) 
mitigates financial stress in the financial sector. Additionally, if a stressed banking sector is 
unwilling to finance firms in Chapter 11, the government can play an essential role in providing 
that financing and, at the same time, prevent unnecessary fire sales and preserve jobs.  
 
A more fundamental weakness of Chapter 11 is that it offers a poor fit for many small businesses. 
Thirty percent of firm value can be burned up by professional fees.21 Additionally, around two-
thirds of all small-business Chapter 11s terminate in liquidation or dismissal (which leads to 
liquidation under state law).22 These outcomes are due in part to the fact that most small 
businesses do not undergo regular audits and have few or no human resources dedicated to 
financial management.23 Thus, when they enter Chapter 11, their financial affairs are difficult to 
unscramble. As a result, the vast majority never file a bankruptcy petition; they simply close 
shop.24 This is one reason why we are skeptical that bankruptcy is an appropriate remedy for 
small businesses during the current crisis.  
 
Congress has taken steps to mitigate the weaknesses in Chapter 11 for small businesses. Last 
summer, it passed the “Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019,”25 which went online on 
February 19, 2020. The Act’s central feature is that it eliminates part of the absolute priority rule 
                                               
21 Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, and Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 61 J. Fin. 1253 (2006). 
22 Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 Mich. L. 
Rev. 603 (2009); Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcy, 105 
Colum. L. Rev. 2310 (2005) (“Serial Entrepreneurs”); Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical 
Study of Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies, 50 J. L. & Econ. 381 (2007) (“Bankruptcy Decision 
Making”). 
23 Baird and Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs, supra; Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra. 
24 Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining around Bankruptcy: Small Business Distress and State Law, 38 J. Legal Stud. 255 
(2009). 
25 It is now Subchapter V of Chapter 11. 
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in bankruptcy. This is important because many businesses are organized around the skills of the 
owner-manager. Without her there is no business. An absolute priority rule that wipes out the 
owner-manager is a rule that strongly discourages her from helping the business navigate its way 
through bankruptcy. Under the new law, by contrast, a small business owner can retain her 
equity interest even if unsecured creditors will not be paid in full, so long as the Chapter 11 plan 
commits all of the business’s “disposable income” to these creditors for a three to five-year 
period. This abrogation of the absolute priority rule makes Chapter 11 substantially more 
attractive to small businesses for two reasons: first, a business owner will no longer be deterred 
for fear of losing ownership. Second, by retaining her interest, she has a stronger incentive to 
help the firm revive itself, including paying off its remaining debts. 
 
The trouble with the new law is its limited scope. Originally it applied only to businesses with 
debt under about $2.7 million; the CARES Act raised the debt limit to $7.5 million. Even at that 
limit, however, scholars estimate that only 59 percent of all Chapter 11 cases would qualify,26 
and the vast majority of cases are filed by small businesses. Moreover, the Act has some 
administrative challenges: It appoints a “standing trustee” to monitor the debtor’s progress in 
proposing and completing the multi-year plan of reorganization. The trustee may help identify 
nonviable businesses early on (seeking their dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7), and help viable 
businesses craft a feasible plan. It is unclear whether there are adequate standing trustees to 
assist with the potential increase in post-COVID-19 filings by small businesses. What we do know, 
however, is that neither these trustees nor the bankruptcy courts have substantial experience in 
administering these cases.  
 
3. The Limits of Bankruptcy Law During a Crisis 
 
The weaknesses of bankruptcy law fall into three categories. First is the take-up problem. Those 
who could benefit from bankruptcy may avoid it because of its costs. This is a big problem in 
                                               




normal times and could exacerbate the current crisis. For consumers, there has long been a 
perceived stigma associated with a filing. Additionally, a bankruptcy filing is a “flag” on credit 
reports for many years. As a result, studies have shown that only a fraction of consumers who 
could benefit from bankruptcy actually petition for bankruptcy protection.27  
 
The take-up problem looms large for businesses too because shareholders’ rights take a backseat 
to creditor demands, particularly if the business is insolvent or undercapitalized. Owners and 
shareholders of any size business are likely to resist a process that wipes out their rights, 
especially if they think the business could possibly recover in the near term. Indeed, because 
shareholders are typically wiped out in bankruptcy, a corporation’s directors may delay filing in 
an effort to preserve share value.  
 
A second weakness is liquidity: For consumers, the “fresh start” of bankruptcy is a discharge of 
old debts and not access to cash necessary to pay expenses when income has fallen during a 
crisis. Indeed, for many consumers, a discharge of debts is the wrong prescription for their 
stress:28 After the crisis ends and they get back to work, they will be able to pay their debts. What 
they need is financial assistance and perhaps forbearance with respect to debts that are coming 
due now. For businesses, too, liquidity is a key problem: Their ability to survive depends critically 
on access to loans (or cash collateral) that allow the firm to make payroll, pay rent, purchase 
inputs, etc. The current crisis may make banks reluctant to extend credit. To the extent that the 
crisis harms the financial condition of banks themselves, moreover, we may find that cash-
strapped banks are not only reluctant to lend but also aggressively seek liquidation of firms in 
bankruptcy. We saw this during the previous crisis.29 
 
                                               
27 See, e.g., Michelle J. White, Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J. L. Econ. & Org. 205 (1998). 
28 Both consumers and creditors are harmed by an unnecessary bankruptcy discharge: Consumers become 
ineligible to obtain another discharge for many years (8 years must pass between Chapter 7 discharges); creditors 
receive only a fraction of what they are owed in the typical consumer bankruptcy. 
29 Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99 Geo. L.J. 1615 (2011); Sarah 
Pei Woo, Simultaneous Distress of Residential Developers and Their Secured Lenders: An Analysis of Bankruptcy and 
Bank Regulation, 15 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 617 (2010).  
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A third weakness is the limited capacity of our bankruptcy courts. The bankruptcy process is a 
bargaining environment, overseen by a judge, where creditors and shareholders jockey for 
payoffs as they decide the fate of the firm. Judges are called on to make critical decisions, under 
extreme time pressure, based on potentially-biased and highly-contested information supplied 
by the parties. This is true in normal economic times. The burden on the judicial system will be 
extreme during a crisis that brings an unprecedented flood of cases into the courts. We know, 
for example, that judges change their behavior when caseloads spike: A sudden increase in 
caseloads makes courts more likely to liquidate small firms, reorganize big firms (but take longer 
to do so), and terminate cases of firms that end up filing for bankruptcy again.30 If these decisions 
by time-strapped judges are errors, we should worry about the errors that may occur when 
courts are inundated by filings. 
 
These weaknesses—take-up, liquidity, and system capacity—mean that bankruptcy law cannot 
serve as a primary policy response for the stress faced by consumers and small businesses today. 
For consumers, bankruptcy doesn’t provide the essential remedies that they need right now: 
liquidity and forbearance. For small businesses, it may be possible to tap liquidity from 
government-backed lenders in bankruptcy but the flood of cases would overwhelm the 
bankruptcy courts. Equally important, the prototypical small business is run by an owner-
manager whose participation is essential to the business survival. Unless the absolute priority 
rule is modified for small businesses generally (currently it is modified only for businesses with 
debt under $7.5 million), small business owners may prefer to liquidate their businesses outside 
of bankruptcy rather than lose their ownership interests in bankruptcy.  
 
For these reasons, we think non-bankruptcy policies, especially those extending liquidity and 
forbearance, are the optimal response to the distress of consumers and small businesses.31 
Specifically, we recommend that Congress enact policies that create an automatic stay for the 
                                               
30 Benjamin Iverson, Get in Line: Chapter 11 Restructuring in Crowded Bankruptcy Courts, 64 Mgmt. Science 5370 
(2018). 
31 The National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC) has made the same recommendation in a recent letter to Congress 
(available here). (Disclosure: Morrison is a member of the NBC.) 
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benefit of consumers and small businesses. Congress did this for members of the military through 
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003. It is time to do it again but for consumers and small 
businesses generally. Many may still file for bankruptcy, especially if government policies are 
inadequate. For them, bankruptcy can serve as a relief-valve, provided the government takes 
steps immediately to expand the capacity of our judicial system. 
 
We are more optimistic about the role of bankruptcy law in resolving the distress of large 
corporations. The crisis has destabilized all businesses but many were likely to suffer distress 
regardless of a pandemic. The past decade saw a dramatic increase in corporate debt, especially 
leveraged loans, that allowed financially distressed “zombie companies” to survive without filing 
for bankruptcy by repeatedly refinancing their debts. By some estimates, zombies account for 
sixteen percent of publicly traded U.S. firms.32 By the end of 2019, a large proportion of even 
investment grade debt was vulnerable to a ratings downgrade.33 These statistics imply that a 
substantial proportion of stressed businesses today merit financial restructuring (or even 
liquidation) in bankruptcy instead of, or in addition to, financial aid from the federal government, 
such as the CARES Act.34 It would, in our view, be a mistake to extend further financing without 
requiring a simultaneous bankruptcy filing: The financing would allow these firms to use public 
funds to further delay a necessary restructuring.35 
 
The government should therefore treat Chapter 11 as a tool that works in tandem with other 
policies to mitigate financial stress in the corporate sector, particularly for large corporations that 
were approaching distress prior to COVID-19. For those businesses that need restructuring, the 
                                               
32 See “International banking and financial market developments,” BIS Quarterly Review (September 2017). See 
also Ryan Bannerjee and Boris Hoffman, Zombie Firms: Causes and Consequences, BIS Quarterly Review 
(September 2018). 
33 See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, “The Credit Cycle Before And After The Market’s Awareness Of The Coronavirus 
Crisis In The U.S.,” working paper (April 2, 2020). 
34 See Sec. 1105, Senate Bill No. 3548, 116th Congress (Proposed March 19, 2020), available here, and H.R. 748, 
116th Congress (signed into law March 27, 2020), available here. 
35 Our point extends beyond corporations that took on excess leverage. It applies as well to companies that, prior 
to the crisis, were experiencing operational problems or facing large liability for past errors. Chapter 11 is an 
appropriate venue for resolving these problems while also receiving government financial assistance. Absent a 
Chapter 11 filing, government financial assistance will be doing double-duty: (i) mitigating the liquidity shock 
arising from the COVID-19 crisis and (ii) funding the firm’s efforts to resolve pre-crisis mistakes.  
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government can still provide liquidity but in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding that enables 
financial restructuring, facilitates operational changes necessary to cope with a post-COVID-19 
world,36 and forces investors to shoulder the costs of distress that was exacerbated by excess 
leverage. 
 
Although a large number of big corporate cases would tax our bankruptcy courts, these cases 
come with professionals (lawyers, accountants, investment bankers) who reduce some of the 
burden on the courts.37 More importantly, the speed of a bankruptcy case is largely dictated by 
the institution providing the liquidity. Cash is king. The government, therefore, could play an 
important role in preventing unnecessary asset fires sales and pushing the process toward a 
reorganization that preserves viable firms (and American jobs). This is precisely what we saw in 
the Chrysler and GM cases. Nonetheless, even if the administrative costs of Chapter 11 would 
not be low, we think they are offset by an important benefit of a bankruptcy process that permits 




Federal, state, and local governments are already implementing policies, including financial 
assistance and forbearance, that will help stabilize household and business finances and limit the 
need for bankruptcy filings. Nonetheless, bankruptcy undoubtedly has an important role to play 
in the fallout from the COVID-19 crisis. Many consumers and businesses will file for bankruptcy 
when their inability to pay debts results in default or otherwise triggers creditor debt collection 
efforts such as foreclosure.  
                                               
36 For example, bankruptcy law gives the firm special powers (unavailable outside of bankruptcy) to renegotiate 
contracts and labor agreements and jettison assets that are incompatible with expected changes in the economic 
environment. 
37 Costs might also be mitigated if cases are filed in bankruptcy courts with substantial accumulated expertise with 
corporate distress such as Delaware and the Southern District of New York. Though controversial, “forum shopping” 
by corporations has resulted in a large flow of complex corporate bankruptcies to these courts, allowing them to 
develop expertise that’s needed in a crisis. General Motors, for example, is a Detroit corporation that filed for 
bankruptcy in New York during the 2008 financial crisis. See Jared A. Ellias, What Drives Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? 




Accordingly, it is important for lawmakers to consider how best to prepare the landscape for this 
new, and likely historic, wave of distress.  For large corporations, Chapter 11 should be openly 
and seriously considered as an optimizing tool to prevent firm liquidation and equally protect the 
public fisc, particularly for businesses that require more than short-term liquidity to survive post-
COVID-19. In fact, Chapter 11 may even pave the way for industry consolidation or other 
innovations to operations. While shareholders may lose their investments, businesses and jobs 
will be preserved.  
 
Similarly, for consumers and small businesses, while bankruptcy is not as immediately helpful as 
forbearance or direct income supplements, it will certainly be utilized if this short-term liquidity 
crisis becomes long term.38  For this reason, we believe it’s equally important for lawmakers to 
expand the capacity of the courts to administer this influx of cases, particularly if lawmakers want 
to see small businesses take-up the benefits of SBRA. 
  
                                               
38 Indeed, the CARES Act has taken steps to make the bankruptcy code more attractive to distressed 
consumers. The Act amends the code to exclude emergency payments to individuals from the code’s income 
eligibility thresholds. The Act also permits existing Chapter 13 debtors to request plan modifications based on 
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A folk proverb from the American West teaches that the most important ingredient of a 
successful rain dance is timing. And the timing couldn’t be worse for signed corporate deals 
hanging in the balance at the onset of the novel coronavirus pandemic.  As of March 2020, we 
estimate that there were over 300 significant mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions 
signed and waiting to close, representing over half a trillion US dollars in economic value. The 
fate of these deals has been thrown into considerable doubt by the COVID-19 crisis. And, in an 
uncanny resemblance to the onset of the financial crisis in fall 2008, corporate lawyers 
everywhere are spending their shelter-in-place hours scouring the terms of these deals in a 
frenzied search for an escape hatch that might unwind the transaction. 
  
In lawyer-speak, the most likely candidate for an escape-hatch is something called a force 
majeure (or “Act of God”) provision, which governs when changed circumstances are deemed 
so significant as to obliterate an otherwise enforceable contract. In business lawyer-speak, force 
majeures are usually called “material adverse change/material adverse effect” (hereinafter 
MAE) provisions; but they work pretty much the same way, conditioning a party’s (usually the 
buyer’s) duty to close a deal on the non-occurrence of a specific set of contingencies. MAEs are 
virtually ubiquitous in M&A; and—unlike many other boilerplate terms—they are heavily 
negotiated at the time of the transaction. This is for good reason: when an MAE is triggered, 
billions of dollars can hang in the balance. 
                                               
1 This chapter is based on a series of blog entries we originally posted on the Columbia Blue Sky Blog. The original 




Some recent deals—such as Morgan Stanley’s acquisition of E*Trade (announced on February 
20)—explicitly account for COVID-19 through their MAE, typically deeming it not to constitute a 
force majeure. But most “legacy” transactions—signed up before the coronavirus threat 
exploded—are far more opaque. Consider, for example, LVMH’s pending $16 billion acquisition 
of Tiffany & Co., announced in late 2019 and subsequently approved by Tiffany shareholders, 
but still not closed. The MAE in that deal is representative, featuring both affirmative and 
negative provisos that can be thought of metaphorically as something akin to a slice of Swiss 
cheese: 
  
● The affirmative terms represent the cheese, and they lay out situations that would allow 
LVMH to walk away. Included are contingencies that would materially affect the 
“business, condition (financial or otherwise), properties, assets, liabilities (contingent or 
otherwise), business operations or results of operations of Tiffany and its subsidiaries, 
taken as a whole.” Also included are contingencies that “would reasonably be expected 
to prevent, materially delay or materially impair” the closing of the deal. 
  
● The negative terms represent the holes in the cheese, and they specify specific carve 
outs or exceptions to the affirmative provisions. Like many MAEs, the carve outs are far 
more numerous, and they include 
o   changes or conditions generally affecting Tiffany’s industry 
o   general economic or political conditions in any country where Tiffany operates 
(including China); 
o   changes in the market price or trading volume of the Tiffany’s securities or 
credit ratings  
o   geopolitical conditions, including the outbreak or escalation of hostilities, acts 
of war, sabotage, terrorism; 





Conspicuously absent from either the cheese or the holes in the Tiffany deal is any explicit 
mention of a global pandemic. It seems likely that colorable arguments might be made on both 
sides. Although many of the items enumerated in the affirmative provisions may well be 
captured by the COVID-19 outbreak, several exclusions could touch on it as well. This deal may 
thus fall into a relatively difficult and far grayer (if not Gruyère) zone. 
  
And that begs the question of whether the language of MAE provisions in the aggregate might 
be used to unwind signed deals in the face of a pandemic. To get a handle on this question, we 
deployed some tools of machine learning and natural language processing, an approach that 
has already been shown to be helpful in studying MAE provisions as well as other business 
contracts. 
  
To take on this question, we updated a data set that we had already been collecting and 
cleaning, consisting of announced transactions and meta information associated with the deals 
(all drawn from FactSet). The combined volume of the deals is around 10 trillion USD. The 
dataset covers acquisitions in two dozen distinct industries for deals spanning the years 2003 
through the end of 2020, thus providing a broad view of over fifteen years of market practice 
(including, importantly, the financial crisis). In all, our data set consists of 1702 MAE provisions 
over an 18-year time span (including about 80 of relatively larger deals representing around 
$250 billion).2 
  
In analyzing the MAEs, we first focused on language that expressly captures a global pandemic 
like COVID-19. To ensure that we capture all (or nearly all) of the language relevant to COVID-
19, we assembled a list of the terms most similar to the words “disease” and “pandemic” from 
three data sources: (i) WordNet, a large lexical database of English maintained by language 
                                               
2 As referenced above, FactSet lists over 300 transactions that are pending as of March 2020, representing around 
$550 billion in value. There can be considerable latency in the public disclosure of these deals, however 




experts; (ii) GloVe, a representation of ordinary English language; (iii) Contracts-word2vec, a 
language model based on roughly half a million agreements submitted to the SEC by publicly 
registered companies. We then verified the results by hand. The resulting vocabulary includes 
terms specific to the outbreak of a contagious disease, such as “pandemic,” “epidemic,” and 
“public health.” But our list also includes broader, more general terms such as “act of god” and 
“force majeure”—gray area terms that do not explicitly cover pandemics but one might imagine 
arguments going either way. The complete list includes a total of 50 key terms. Within our data 
set, 15 of these terms appear with positive frequency, as reflected in the figure below. The 
figure further subdivides between (i) general terms (pictured in red), that arguably carve out a 
variety of force majeure events including pandemics; and (ii) specific terms (pictured in blue) 
that explicitly invoke the term “pandemic” or its semantic equivalents. 
 
  
Applying this list to our MAE data, our key finding is that—like the LVMH/Tiffany agreement 
discussed above—less than one out of eight MAE provisions in our data set explicitly carve out 
pandemics from force majeure events. Indeed, as the left-hand panel of the figure below shows, 
the majority of definitional carve-outs—a little more than half—do not even address a 
pandemic (or pandemic-like) outbreak—either with explicit terms or with “catch-all” terms 
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(such as “Act of God”, “Calamity”, or “Force Majeure”) that arguably have sufficient breadth 
and scope to do so. Of the remainder that arguably address COVID19, the trigger usually comes 
through the broad, catch-all provisions (36.2%) rather than through an explicit phrase related to 
pandemics (12%). That said, as the right-hand panel of the figure illustrates, pending deals 
appear to skew much more discernibly towards carve-outs (of both species): Nearly 24% of 
pending deals carve out pandemic (or pandemic-like) contingencies explicitly, and 42% contain 
the more general “act of god” carve-out language.   
  
Panel A. Full Data Set (2003-Pres.) Panel B. Pending Deals (as of 3/26/2020) 
 
Digging a little deeper, it becomes evident that the shift in carve-outs is actually part of a 
longer-term sea change whose seeds were sown over a decade ago. The time series charts 
below track the year-by-year prevalence of general carve-outs (left panel), pandemic-specific 
carve-outs (center panel), and their union (right panel) since 2003. General force majeure 
carve-outs became significantly more prevalent around 2009 − coinciding with the emergence 
from the great recession (well, at least the last one). But note that pandemic-specific carve-outs 
also started to go viral at around the same time (having been virtually non-existent prior to 
2009). Although global economic conditions had much to do with the rapid adoption of general 
force majeure language, the pandemic-specific trend was more likely a byproduct of the 
contemporaneous H1N1 crisis that unfolded during the spring of 2009. And this fraction 
continued to rise through the two waves of the MERS crisis (first in 2012 and then again in 
2015). By 2019, fully 23% of deals specifically carved out pandemics from coverage in the MAE. 
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A. General Carve-Outs B. Pandemic-Explicit Carve-Outs C. General or Explicit Carve-Outs 
 
It is worth reiterating that when an MAE provision features language bearing on a pandemic 
(via either explicit or general terms), our data suggest that it invariably enters through a carve 
out to the MAE (the holes in the cheese) rather than through an affirmative provision (the 
cheese itself). Consequently, when present, such provisions would appear to push pandemic-
related risks onto the buyer (and away from the seller). A typical example of an explicit 
pandemic-like provision is the private equity acquisition of the telecom company ComScope in 
2010. That provision reads (in relevant part): 
  
"Company Material Adverse Effect" means a change, event or occurrence that has a 
material adverse effect on the financial condition, business or results of operations of 
the Company and its Subsidiaries taken as a whole; provided, however, that none of the 
following, and no changes, events or occurrences, individually or in the aggregate, to the 
extent arising out of, resulting from or attributable to any of the following shall 
constitute or be taken into account in determining whether a Company Material 
Adverse Effect has occurred or may, would or could occur: 
… 
(3) epidemics, pandemics, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados or other natural disasters 
… 
provided, further, that, with respect to [clause (3) above, inter alia], such changes, 
events or occurrences do not materially and disproportionately adversely affect the 
Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, compared to other companies 




This clause is a good indication of the typical location of an explicit provision (in the carved-out 
Swiss-cheese holes in the MAE). But it also exposes the fact that carve-outs can come with a 
significant lawyerly grain of salt: After expressly carving out contingency from the definition of 
an MAE, the ComScope provision proceeds to carve it right back in if the pandemic affects the 
seller disproportionally, relative to a benchmark of other competitors in the industry. 
 
Carve-ins like the one above are far from aberrational. Indeed, a significant fraction of MAEs 
that purportedly exempt a laundry list of enumerated risks carve back in aspects of those same 
risks through similar “disproportional effects” qualifiers (whereby an excluded contingency still 
counts as a force majeure if the target suffers hardships that are disproportionate to some class 
of peers). The figure below demonstrates that ComScope deal’s language is far from 
anomalous, by assessing prevalence with which MAE terms that invoke a general or specific 
carve-out then include a “disproportional effects” modifier after the carve-out.3  Note that the 
strong tendency towards carve-ins for disproportional effects appears to hold even when the 
carve-out uses more general provisions (right-hand panel), focusing on broad act of god 
contingencies (rather than pandemics in particular). Our preliminary analysis suggests, 
moreover, that disproportionate-effects carve-ins appear with roughly the same frequency (or 
perhaps a little higher) in pending deals. Thus, while carve-outs have no doubt become more 
prevalent over time, a portion of their impact has been blunted mechanically by carve-ins that 
are typically riding shotgun. 
                                               
3 The results reported on here do not reflect a tedious hand-verification that the disproportional-effects language 
modifies the pandemic/act-of-god carve-out (rather than some other carve-out), we have performed this tedious 




Disproportional Effects Carve-In 
(2003-Pres.) 
 
The upshot of this observation is that, for most deals, the question of whether COVID-19 
triggers the MAE clause may turn further on a finely-grained analysis of how the pandemic has 
affected a company vis-à-vis its peers. For targets that are especially susceptible to pandemic 
risks relative to others in the industry, then, the “disproportional effects” carve-in may shift risk 
right back to the seller. 
 
A second pressing question is whether the more general language carving out acts of god and 
force majeure events from the MAE definition should be read to apply to COVID-19 in the first 
place. In other words, should one of these general terms be interpreted as a semantic 
substitute for an explicit term that invokes pandemics? One way to get at that question is to 
look at the text of the MAE definitions themselves—and in particular the frequency with which 
we observe pandemic-specific language enumerated as an example of an act of god or force 
majeure event versus a stand-alone phenomenon. The figure below displays the relative degree 




Overlap in General and Specific Terms (2003-Pres.) 
 
As the figure demonstrates, when specific language is invoked, it tends to be split evenly 
between (a) being an enumerated example of a general force majeure provision (57% of the 
time); and (b) standing alone without also invoking the more general language (43% of the 
time).  Although this result may be consistent with a variety of interpretive theories, it does 
seem inconsistent with some of them. For example, it would seem to cast doubt on the 
argument that general force majeure language can never be interpreted as reading on 
pandemic risks, since a large fraction of MAE provisions make the connection explicitly. But it 
also casts some doubt on the opposite proposition that general language always captures 
specific pandemic risks: indeed, in our reading, the vast majority of provisions with general 
language tend to enumerate a variety of different specific contingencies (such as weather, 
climate change, terrorism, and the like), perhaps making it telling that the pandemic language is 
not included as an enumerated example. 
 
Although it is easy to get caught up in the quantitative structure of MAE provisions to the 
exclusion of other considerations, it is important not to lose sight of the broader institutional 




- Judicial Reticence. By any account, common-law courts aren’t pushovers when it comes 
to nullifying contractual obligations. Contract law has long resisted the temptation to 
rescue a regretful party once foundational risk allocation decisions seem locked in. This 
canonical attribute of contract law carries over to M&A, too: for at least two decades, 
Delaware courts have consistently held that buyers wishing to bail out of a deal “ought 
to have to make a strong showing to invoke a Material Adverse Effect”. 
 
- Burdens of Proof.  Consistent with the foregoing view, MAEs are generally interpreted 
by courts to constitute conditions subsequent to the obligation to close (rather than as 
conditions precedent, as many often mis-label them). The key upshot of this designation 
is that the initial burden of proof to invoke an MAE rests squarely on the shoulders of 
the party alleging excuse (almost always the buyer). And if the underlying evidentiary 
case is unclear, or if competing arguments produce an approximate stalemate on the 
merits, then the case is resolved in favor of the party seeking enforcement of the 
contract (usually the seller).  
 
- Durational Significance. One of the few consistent lodestars in existing MAE 
jurisprudence is that the target’s unanticipated hardship must be durationally 
significant, and not merely a hiccup in revenues or earnings over a quarter or two. But 
the economic dislocation caused by COVID-19 is so fresh and unfamiliar that reliable 
forecasts of long-term implications are largely impossible. (The historic and careening 
volatility in the financial markets of late ably attests to this fact.) And thus, as of this 
writing at least, many buyers are likely to find themselves unable to scare up the 
evidence needed to carry their burden of proving a durationally significant adverse 
effect in the post-COVID world. (Though tourism-intensive industries may have the best 
shot).   
 
- Precedential Tea Leaves. Finally, as we noted in our prior post, the time span of our 
original data set also coincided with an era in which no Delaware opinion had ever found 
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an MAE to have been triggered. Like many other hot streaks, however, this one 
eventually came to an end in the fall of 2018, with the Chancery Court’s Akorn v. 
Fresenius opinion. The precedent has no doubt bolstered the confidence of rueful 
buyers in pending deals who are now contemplating invoking their MAEs. (And we note 
in passing that the MAE in Akorn specifically carved out pandemics, subjecting the 
exclusion to a “disproportionate effects” carve-in.) Nevertheless, it is important to 
understand that while Akorn no doubt sent a message that the “MAC is Back” as a front-
line issue for M&A doctrine, the underlying facts of the case diverge considerably from 
current circumstances (involving highly target-specific issues pertaining to regulatory 
clearance and outright regulatory fraud). 
 
In the light of above points, we conjecture that the average M&A buyer will face a heavy slog in 
asserting that COVID-19 represents a deal-killing force majeure, even when the MAE contains 
no carve outs for pandemics (general or specific). The odds grow longer still, of course, in the 
presence of such carve-outs. 
 
So this must imply that savvy acquirors need to abandon all plans to declare an MAE, right? Not 
so fast: notwithstanding the uphill battle (and long odds) faced by buyers asserting MAEs, we 
can think of several reasons why rational and sophisticated parties might still pursue this 
strategy: 
 
● First, pressing the MAE issue can buy precious time for the acquirer. Although MAE 
litigation moves substantially faster in Delaware Chancery Court than does commercial 
litigation in other venues, the process is still far from instantaneous. Moreover, the 
temporary closure of courthouses in Delaware and potential delays in litigation 
schedules due to the outbreak may well lead to unusually protracted timelines. That, in 
turn, could afford buyers an opportunity to amass additional evidence about the 
durational significance of the COVID-19 crisis (while preserving the option to abandon 




● Second, even if the current saga proves to be short-lived, it is already raising fears of a 
medium-term liquidity crunch. The potential delaying effect of an MAE kerfuffle can also 
be a hidden source of liquidity for cash buyers, at least until the current market tumult 
resolves and greater sense of order returns to capital markets. 
 
● Finally, invoking the MAE may be part of a larger portfolio of strategies that buyers 
might deploy in attempting to walk from − or potentially restructure − a signed deal. 
Several other strategies suggest themselves too, including asserting the failure of other 
closing conditions (related to, inter alia, financing, regulatory clearance, solvency, and 
tax status). Moreover, in many deals acquirors could conceivably threaten a backup 
strategy of using a “reverse termination fee” (“RTF”) to permit them to exit a deal in 
exchange for paying what amounts to liquidated damages to break away. The figures 
below plot the prevalence of reverse termination fees as a function of each type of MAE 
carve-out, concentrating on both all deals in our data set (left panel) and pending deals 
(right panel). As illustrated in the figures, RTFs appear to be most common in deals 
where there are both general and specific carve-outs − i.e., those deals that would (all 
else held constant) be least amenable to granting force majeure walking rights. 
Moreover, the deals that have neither general nor specific carve-outs for pandemic risks 
tend on the whole to be more likely to offer RTFs to compensate. 
  
A. Prevalence of RTFs by Carve-Out Type 
(2003-Pres) 
B. Prevalence of RTFs by Carve-Out Type 




For the deals that include RTFs, one can drill further to assess the relative size of the RTF 
(as a percentage of the transaction value) by carve-out type. As the figures below 
demonstrate, RTFs tend to be the lowest when there is neither a general nor a specific 
carve out. Recall that this same group as a whole was relatively less likely to have an RTF 
to begin with. On the whole, then, RTFs and MAEs tend to operate as weak substitutes 
for one another; but there is still ample room for many buyers to use them together as 
part of a multi-pronged approach to busting up a deal (or, more likely, to get it 
restructured). 
  
A. Size of RTF by Carve-Out Type 
(2003-Pres.) 
B. Size of RTF by Carve-Out Type 
(Pending Deals, 3/2020) 
 
We close by reminding readers of two additional points. First, M&A is but one domain where 
force majeure provisions are ubiquitous. One can also find them in financing contracts, supply 
contracts, consumer contracts, employment contracts and many others. In these other settings, 
another factor may play a critical role as well: the presence of a long-term relationship, in which 
both parties may interact over the course of months, years, or even decades. In such contexts, 
non-legal considerations may be as important (if not more so) than legal ones. Thus, even if a 
party believes that it may have the legal ability to walk away from a deal on the basis of an 





Second, it is important to remember that this area of law remains − much like force majeure 
terms themselves − relatively opaque and open to competing arguments. We doubt that this 
core feature (or is it a bug?) will resolve itself any time soon. In the meantime, much may be 
left up to courts and lawyers to work out, if (as we expect) buyers begin to assert walking rights 
on the basis of a less-than-clear MAE. And that observation brings us to a final prediction, which 
our analysis permits us to state with some degree of confidence: If you are an M&A litigators on 
either the plaintiff or defendant side (and you remain healthy over the next few months), your 
timing couldn’t be better. 
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A comparative Perspective on Commercial Contracts and the impact of  
COVID-19 - Change of Circumstances, Force Majeure, or what? 
Christian Twigg-Flesner, Professor of International Commercial Law, University of Warwick 
Introduction: Contracts and the Pandemic 
The COVID-19 pandemic which has spread rapidly around the globe will be devastating for 
millions of people.  Some will contract the Sars-Cov-2 virus and a vast number will be affected by 
the wide economic consequences the pandemic will bring. A key issue affecting businesses (and 
consumers) is the impact of the pandemic and its consequences on many existing contracts, 
particularly those where performance is to occur over a period of time and/or to commence at 
some point in the future. For contracting parties, the pandemic and its consequences could not 
have been foreseen. A party which cannot perform as agreed will seek to be excused from doing 
so and to escape liability for breach of contract. In the context of many commercial relationships, 
there will be scope for negotiations and agreed adjustments to existing contracts.1 Failing such 
negotiations, there are two common contract law devices which will be pressed into service: (i) 
contractual provision for unforeseen events in the case of force majeure or hardship; and (ii) 
provisions of the applicable domestic contract law dealing with unforeseen or unforeseeable 
events arising after a contract has been concluded. Where neither the contract nor the applicable 
law provides a solution, a failure to perform will trigger whichever remedies are provided by the 
applicable law as well as a duty on the aggrieved party to act to mitigate the extent of its losses.2 
The robustness of the contract laws around the world in providing workable solutions will be 
tested by the pandemic. This could prompt either a recalibration of existing doctrines or the 
development of new rules (whether limited to the consequences of this pandemic3 or as a 
1 For contract law scholars in the common law world, the implications for the doctrine of consideration, as well as 
promissory estoppel, will be interesting. 
2 Space precludes a discussion in this paper of the particular issues which might arise with regard to remedies for 
non-performance/breach of contract, e.g., in applying the remoteness test for contract damages, or the extent of 
the duty to mitigate. 
3 For example, Germany has already made COVID-19 specific changes to the Introductory Law to the Civil Code which 
permit consumers and small businesses to withhold performance in certain circumstances. These changes are 
currently set to expire at the end of June 2020 (see Art.240, §1 “Moratorium”).   
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general revision of the law). This paper will provide a brief comparative perspective of relevant 
provisions for commercial contracts, focusing on the international dimension as well as selected 
national rules. 
 
Contractual Risk Allocation: Force Majeure clauses 
Most commercial contracts contain a force majeure clause of some kind to deal with events 
occurring after a contract has been concluded and which are beyond the reasonable control of 
the parties. The effect of such events will affect the ability of either or both parties to a contract 
to perform their obligations as agreed, whether that be by making performance more onerous, 
more costly, or altogether impossible. A force majeure clause will stipulate how the occurrence 
of such an event will affect the contract, e.g., by permitting the parties to suspend performance, 
requiring cost adjustments or the renegotiation of elements of the contract, precluding 
termination for breach where that breach is caused by the event, or even bringing the contract 
to an end.4 The precise effects of invoking a force majeure clause may depend on the duration of 
the event triggering the clause – if it is of limited temporary effect, then contract performance 
might merely be suspended, but if its duration cannot be determined, the contract may be 
terminated. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) issued an updated force majeure 
clause in March 2020 (an update to the 2003 version5) in response to the pandemic6 and 
recommended its use in international commercial contracts.  
 
There is, however, no uniform conception of force majeure. The ICC’s 2020 clause defines a force 
majeure event as “the occurrence of an event or circumstance that prevents or impedes a party 
from performing one or more of its contractual obligations under the contract.”7 The impediment 
must have been (i) beyond the reasonable control of the party seeking to rely on the clause and 
(ii) one that could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time of contract conclusion and (iii) 
                                               
4 See e.g, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003 for a range of consequences 
arising from a force majeure event. 
5 Available at https://iccwbo.org/resources-for-business/model-contracts-clauses/force-majeure/ [accessed 13 
April 2020] 
6 Available at https://iccwbo.org/publication/icc-force-majeure-and-hardship-clauses/ [accessed 13 April 2020] 
7 Paragraph 1 of the ICC Force Majeure Clause 2020. 
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with effects that could not reasonably have been avoided or overcome by the affected party.8 
The first two aspects are satisfied if one of the specific events listed in paragraph 3 of the clause 
has occurred. Indeed, force majeure clauses frequently spell out in some detail the kinds of 
events that will trigger it, often based on previous occurrences which had a significant impact on 
contract performance.  
 
Relevant events might include political or societal disruption (war, border closures, closure of key 
shipping routes; strikes or rioting), legal disruption (major changes to the legal context for the 
transaction), or natural events (floods, earthquakes). Whether the particular event which has 
occurred triggers a force majeure clause will depend on the wording of that clause, i.e., whether 
the event which impedes performance is listed in the clause.  
 
In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, a force majeure clause which expressly mentions 
pandemics would be applicable and triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, if the 
contract does not mention pandemic specifically,  it may be possible for a party to rely on another 
event mentioned in the clause. The ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003, which will be the relevant 
clause in most international commercial contracts rather than the 2020 version, includes 
“epidemics” among the list of factors deemed to constitute a force majeure event but not a 
“pandemic”. This is also the case in the March 2020 version. However, as a pandemic is an 
epidemic of global proportions, the clause might still be triggered.  Alternatively, other events, 
such as “prolonged break-down of transport”9 might trigger the clause: if the goods supplied 
under the contract rely on air freight and airports are closed because of the pandemic, the clause 
would apply on that basis. Some clauses contain a catch-all rider along the lines of “any other 
event beyond the control of the parties” or similar, which should cover the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
It will next be essential to establish a causal link between the trigger event and the ability of a 
party to perform the contract as agreed. The fact that an event listed in a force majeure clause 
                                               
8 These aspects resemble the conditions under which a party is exempt from liability for non-performance under 
Art.79 CISG (see below). 
9 Also mentioned in both the 2003 and 2020 versions of the ICC Force Majeure Clause. 
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has occurred will not suffice unless there is an impact on the ability of the parties to perform. It 
will be necessary to show that the reason why a party cannot perform is caused by the trigger 
event, so if the event relied upon in the clause is a “pandemic,” then the reason why the party is 
unable to perform must be related to the pandemic. For example, social distancing rules and 
restrictions to non-essential business activities might make it impossible to perform the contract 
during the period when these restrictions are in place. On the other hand, the fact that the price 
of goods or components required for performance has changed might not be sufficient. 
 
Finally, the party seeking to rely on the force majeure clause would have to demonstrate that 
there are no reasonable alternative steps available to it to avoid the consequences of the trigger 
event, or at least to mitigate its effects. For example, it may be possible to source goods or 
components from a different supplier. 
 
If a force majeure clause can be relied upon successfully, then the precise consequences will 
depend on the outcome the clause provides for. The clause may merely suspend performance 
without either party incurring liability for non-performance, exonerate a party from any liability 
for non-performance, or bring the contract to an end. Both the 2003 and 2020 versions of the 
ICC limit relief from performance and liability for non-performance to the duration of the 
impediment. 
 
Legal rules for cases of unforeseen events after contract formation 
Should a contract not contain a force majeure clause at all, or should the clause be drafted in 
such a way as not to capture the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties could seek to rely 
on the legal rules of the law governing the contract which deal with this situation. For example, 
in English Law, the doctrine of frustration applies in some narrow circumstances where an event 
occurs after a contract has been concluded which makes the contract impossible to perform10 
(e.g., due to the loss of the subject-matter of the contract, or commercial impossibility), or would 
                                               
10 Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S 826. 
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make performance “radically different”11 from what was agreed in the contract. Mere financial 
hardship for one of the parties would not suffice. The event in question must have been 
unforeseen, or even unforeseeable,12 by the parties, and neither party must have directly or 
indirectly brought about the event relied on. Where the doctrine operates, the effect is that the 
contract is terminated as a matter of law. The threshold for engaging the doctrine of frustration 
is high,13 and it will not assist if one of the parties has assumed the risk of the event occurring, or 
its consequences,14 under the contract. 
 
In contrast, Art.313 of the German Civil Code (BGB)15 deals with the consequences of a significant 
change in the circumstances forming the basis of the contract (“Störung der 
Geschäftsgrundlage”). If the parties would not have entered into the contract at all or only on 
different terms, had they foreseen this change, then modification of the contract can be 
demanded. This is subject to the requirement that, taking account of all the circumstances of the 
particular case including the contractual risk-allocation, upholding the contract would not be 
acceptable to one of the parties.16 If it is not possible to modify the contract, or if the modification 
cannot reasonably be expected to be imposed on the party affected, then that party may 
withdraw from the contract or, in the case of a long-term contract, terminate by giving notice.17 
In French Law, Art.1218 of the French Civil Code contains a statutory provision for force majeure 
for events beyond the control of the parties which were unforeseeable at the time of contract 
formation and which make performance impossible. If performance would still be possible but 
unduly onerous on one party, then that party could plead hardship under Art.1195 of the French 
                                               
11 E.g., Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696 and The Sea Angel [2007] EWCA Civ 547. 
12 Walton Harvey Ltd v Walker and Homfrays [1931] 1 Ch 274; Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v John 
Walker & Sons Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 164. 
13 The Sea Angel [2007] EWCA Civ 547. 
14 See Canary Wharf v European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335, a case arising out of the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU. The European Medicines Agency, which was headquartered in London, moved to Amsterdam and sought to 
escape a 25-year lease on its premises. The judge concluded that, whilst withdrawal from the EU was not foreseeable 
in 2011, when the lease was entered into, the parties has foreseen the possibility that the EMA might vacate its 
premise early and provided for this in the lease. Consequently, the lease had not been frustrated. 
15 An English translation is available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.htm [ 
accessed 13 April 2020]. 
16 Art.313(1) BGB. 
17 See Art.313(3) BGB, 
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Civil Code. Where force majeure is invoked, contract performance is either suspended if the event 
is temporary or the contract is terminated. In a hardship situation, the affected party can request 
renegotiation of the contract.  Where this is rejected by the other party or unsuccessful, the 
parties can agree to request judicial assistance or terminate the contract. 
 
In the context of international commercial law, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG)18 exempts a party from liability for non-performance 
where “the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and … he could not reasonably 
be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract or to have avoided or overcome it, or its consequences.”19 This exemption lasts for the 
duration of the impediment only.20 The effect of Art.79 CISG is that there is no liability for 
damages but the other party can exercise any of the other rights in respect of non-performance.21 
Consequently, if the impediment is such that the non-performance amounts to a fundamental 
breach,22 the contract may be avoided.23  
 
By way of comparison, according to Art.7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (UPICC), a party’s non-performance is excused if this was “due to an 
impediment beyond its control”.24 This is subject to the proviso that the non-performing party 
“could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at time of the 
conclusion of the contract”25 or have mitigated the impediment or its consequences. 
Furthermore, Art. 6.2.2 UPICC deals with hardship, which occurs “where the occurrence of events 
fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract,” either because the cost of performing has 
increased or the value of the performance provided has been reduced. The event in question (i) 
                                               
18 Applicable to international commercial contracts for the sale of goods; ratified by 93 states. 
19 Art.79(1) CISG. Compare the definition of “force majeure” in the ICC’s Force Majeure Clause 2020, paragraph1 
(see above). 
20 Art.79(3) CISG. 
21 Art.79(5) CISG. 
22 As defined in Art.25 CISG. 
23 Arts.49 and 64 CISG. 
24 Art. 7.1.7(1) UPICC. 
25 Ibid. Presumably, this includes making appropriate provision for this in the contract, suggesting that the 
impediment was not foreseen or reasonably foreseeable. 
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must have occurred or become known after the contract was concluded; (ii) could not reasonably 
have been taken into account before the contract was concluded; (iii) is beyond the control of 
the party suffering hardship; and (iv) must be one in respect of which the party suffering hardship 
did not assume the risk.26 
 
The examples from these legal regimes show that there are several common features, although 
there are differences in the detail, and their application will, of course, vary in light of relevant 
case-law. However, for present purposes, a number of broadly comparable common features can 
be noted. First, the event or impediment must have arisen after the contract had been concluded. 
Second, the event must at least have been unforeseen at the time of conclusion or even not 
reasonably foreseeable. There is some variation in what precisely is required in this regard – to 
say that the event/impediment was not foreseen sets the bar lower than to say that the 
event/impediment was not reasonably foreseeable – something can be foreseeable without 
having been foreseen. Third, there must be no provision in the contract in respect of the 
event/impediment or its consequences, i.e., no force majeure and/or hardship clause, nor 
specific contractual risk allocation of the consequences of the event/impediment. If the contract 
does make such provision, then the parties can no longer rely on whatever background provisions 
for unforeseen events there might be under the governing law. 
 
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, these three aspects raise particular issues. The 
pandemic was declared by the World Health Organisation on 11 March 2020, although the effects 
of the spread of the Sars-Cov-2 virus could be felt long before then. In respect of many contracts 
concluded from mid-to-late February onwards, it may be difficult to argue that the 
event/impediment only occurred after such contracts were concluded. That said, it may be 
arguable that the stringent social distancing measures and increasing restrictions of commercial 
activities could be treated as separate events/impediments which could not be relied on in 
respect of any contracts concluded after such measures had been announced but might be 
                                               
26 Similar provisions can also be found in the Principles of European Contract Law, Art. 6:111 (change of 
circumstances) and Art.8:108 (excuse due to an impediment). 
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relevant impediments in respect of contracts concluded earlier. However, the rapid pace of 
developments from the emergence of the virus to a full-blown pandemic would make such 
distinctions of limited relevance in practice.  
 
Secondly, the question of whether the pandemic and its consequences were foreseen, or 
reasonably foreseeable, will matter. Indeed, clarity about whether the requirement is that it was 
foreseen or reasonably foreseeable will be crucial: a party seeking to rely on frustration, force 
majeure, or hardship will be able to do so more readily if it can show that the event/impediment 
was not foreseen even if it was reasonably foreseeable. Of course, if an event/impediment was 
reasonably foreseeable, arguing successfully that it was not foreseen would mean having to 
overcome a high evidentiary threshold. The fact that something was reasonably foreseeable will 
effectively raise a rebuttable presumption that it was foreseen. But clarity on what the relevant 
standard is will be important. 
 
Furthermore, it will be essential to determine what precisely must have been reasonably 
foreseeable: would it suffice that there was a possibility that there might be a pandemic which 
could be seriously disruptive or would it be necessary that a pandemic caused by a novel type of 
coronavirus spreading rapidly around the globe was reasonably foreseeable? In respect of any 
contracts concluded before December 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic was certainly not foreseen, 
nor was it reasonably foreseeable that there would be a COVID-19 pandemic let alone its severe 
and immediate impact on ordinary activities. However, it is less obvious that the possibility of a 
pandemic was not foreseeable. Only 11 years ago, the Swine Flu (H1N1 influenza) pandemic 
affected many countries around the world. In the intervening years, there were outbreaks of 
SARS and MERS which were contained. In that sense, the possibility that a pandemic, whether 
from an influenza virus or coronavirus, might occur at some point was not unforeseeable. 
However, the question would have to be whether any kind of pandemic during the contract 
period was not only foreseeable but whether it was reasonably foreseeable by the parties. The 
point here is that the question of whether the event/impediment was foreseeable may depend 
on the degree of precision that is required to identify the event/impediment. A low standard of 
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precision would mean that the law would rarely be of assistance whereas too high a degree of 
precision might, in contrast, make it too easy to invoke frustration or hardship. So while a 
relatively high degree of precision would be justified, it should not be too high.27 Consequently, 
the question should be whether the rapid development of a pandemic which would necessitate 
measures causing serious disruption was reasonably foreseeable. The answer to this is almost 
certainly going to be that it was not. 
 
This leaves the third question,  whether the risk of serious disruption as a result of the pandemic 
were assumed by either party under the terms of the contract. What matters here is whether 
there was an assumption of risk regarding the consequences of the pandemic, e.g., with regard 
to the possibility to continue normal business operations, suspension of activities etc. If the 
contract makes provision for this, then the contractual risk allocation will govern the situation 
and frustration/hardship no longer apply. 
 
In short, for many contracts concluded before December 2019, there is a reasonable prospect 
that rules on frustration, hardship, or something similar will be of assistance. The difficulty may 
lie in respect of the legal consequences arising from the application of these rules. The 
consequence of frustration in English law is that the contract is terminated by operation of law 
and the rather complex adjustments under the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 might 
come into play for financial adjustments. There is no scope for suspending performance, liability 
for breach, or to provide an opportunity for renegotiation. Under Art.79 (5) CISG, a party unable 
to perform is exempt from liability in damages for breach of contract. In contrast, under Art. 6.2.3 
UPICC, in the case of hardship, renegotiation would be the first step, and if that failed, a court 
could either bring the contract to an end on terms or amend the contract “with a view to restoring 
its equilibrium”.28 If the situation falls under the force majeure provision of Art. 7.1.7 UPICC, non-
performance is excused, although the other party may terminate the contract for a fundamental 
                                               
27 Note Marcus Smith J’s observations that “There will, no doubt, be many cases where something can be foreseen 
as a theoretical possibility, but where neither party can be criticised for failing to take it into account. The court must 
also beware of framing questions of foreseeability too closely to the exact, specific, nature of the supervening event 
that ultimately occurred.” (Canary Wharf v European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335, paras [211]-[212]. 
28 Art. 6.2.3(4)(b) UPICC. 
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non-performance. Whether immediate termination is preferable to renegotiation or contract 
variation by court order will depend on the circumstances of each contract and its wider 
economic context. 
 
Is a different approach needed for the COVID-19 pandemic? 
In responding to novel circumstances, the instinctive reaction of lawyers is to delve into their 
legal toolbox to see which tools they can use to solve the legal problems which have arisen. 
However, for some problems, the tools they have may not be sufficient and new tools may have 
to be created. The brief discussion above reveals that when contracts are considered individually, 
reliance on appropriately drafted force majeure clauses and the background rules of the 
applicable law for post-formation unforeseen events will cover many contracts affected by the 
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and might also provide an appropriate solution for many of 
those contracts. However, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is such that the number of 
contracts affected will be enormous. Moreover, it is not just a selected category of contracts 
which is affected but a wide-range of contracts across the economy. This will include many 
contracts which are part of contractual networks or supply chains. With so much commercial 
activity slowing down or grinding to a halt altogether, this will be an instance where lawyers and 
law-makers will have to be creative and think beyond the current law to develop new legal 
solutions. Such solutions could be limited in scope to the current COVID-19 epidemic, but they 
could also be of a more general nature, i.e., the pandemic could be the impetus to strengthen 
contract law now in case of any future severe-impact global disruption. The COVID-19 pandemic 
might feel unique to us but chances are this will not be the last global disruption on this scale. 
 
An immediate solution that might be appropriate in many instances would be to enable the 
suspension of obligations under a contract for a period of time without penalty/liability. In other 
words, performance could effectively be frozen until it becomes possible to relax restrictions and 
allow commercial activity to resume again. One example of a specific COVID-19 response along 
these lines are the temporary changes made to German law permitting consumers and small 
enterprises to withhold performance on defined economic grounds until 30 June 2020 in respect 
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of contracts entered into before 8 March 2020.29 This right to withhold performance is only 
available if the other contracting party’s economic situation would not be unduly affected as a 
result.30 Any related litigation would provide some indication of how this kind of approach would 
work practically. It is, however, a fairly cautious approach, and, for now, limited to a brief period 
– although on current projections, a longer period might be needed. 
 
Conclusion 
The key message of this note is that there are Contract Law mechanisms available to deal with 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on many contracts. Whether these solutions are suitable 
in light of the economic context resulting from the measures taken by governments around the 
world to stem the spread of the virus remains to be seen. The crisis may provide the impetus for 
a review of how contract law regimes deal with the impact of major unforeseeable events on 
existing contracts. Short-term responses will be most appropriate for now, but they would not 
obviate the need for a more thorough look at this issue with a view to reviewing national rules 
on unforeseen post-formation circumstances. 
 
  
                                               
29 Introductory Law to the Civil Code, Art.240, §1(1) and (2). For a brief analysis (in German), see M. Schmidt-Kessel 
and C. Möllnitz, “Coronavertragsrecht – Sonderregeln für Verbraucher und Kleinstunternehmen” (2020) NJW 1103. 
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The peaceful resolution of disputes is among the most important earmarks of a regime 
attached to the rule of law.  Even in countries in which, for one reason or another, courts do not 
work especially well, civil peace is of paramount importance.  The absence of effective 
institutions for the administration of justice between and among private parties would spell a 
high degree of social disorder. 
Even in the absence of a crisis such as we are experiencing, justice systems face a number 
of challenges in this day and age. Does a jurisdiction have a sufficient number of persons qualified 
to administer justice, and what are the consequences of a shortfall?  In the same vein, is civil 
justice operating under formalities that generate delays disproportionate to the purposes they 
serve?  Do the procedures that are in place sufficiently allow parties to adequately present their 
case and adequately rebut their adversary’s? Is access to justice prohibitively expensive, most 
likely due less to court costs than to costs of representation by counsel? Are there safeguards in 
place to ensure the independence and impartiality of decisionmakers, and do they work? Is 
institutional bias or corruption a problem? Overall, does a justice system exhibit the qualities 
widely viewed as essential:  procedural fairness, accuracy, and efficiency? 
Long-distance Justice  
These are concerns we have even in ordinary times, and irrespective of any exogenous 
factors may come into play.  It is on top of these concerns that there have now emerged a whole 
new set of concerns traceable to the circumstances in which the prevalence of the Coronavirus 
has placed us.  Some of these have never arisen before, at least not in the magnitude we are 
experiencing.  How great a threat are they to the principles upon which our justice systems have 
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been built, and how can they be addressed most fairly and workably?  How must we alter our 
modes of conduct in order to serve the purposes that our activities are meant to achieve, and to 
what extent are those changes technologically and humanly feasible?   
In the discussion thus far, reference has been made, if only implicitly, to courts of law. 
However, civil disputes are obviously no longer resolved solely in national courts. They can be 
resolved amicably or through mediation or conciliation. But, especially in international 
transactions, arbitration has become an especially favored mode of dispute resolution.  
The most important challenges for the administration of justice, whether judicial or 
arbitral, is obviously technological. As a result of the pandemic, the great majority of business 
and professional interactions are now taking place strictly online, and the administration of 
justice is no exception.  This means big change. This is due largely to the fact that, particularly in 
litigation, but much less so in arbitration, we have traditionally operated on the assumption that 
the proceedings associated with the administration of justice take place in-person, with parties, 
counsel, witnesses, and court reporters all performing their roles in the presence of one another 
and, of course, in the presence of the adjudicator.  This assumption must be jettisoned.  
Virtual Proceedings 
 It is important to distinguish at the outset between phases of litigation or arbitration that 
are conducted “before” a judge or arbitrator and those that are not.  In a great many 
circumstances, counsel traditionally perform their tasks and interact directly with opposing 
counsel without involvement of a court or tribunal. Pleadings, briefs and memorials are as easily 
submitted to the court or tribunal as well as opposing counsel as they have been up to now, i.e., 
remotely, via email or courier service.  That is equally the case for pre-trial discovery and 
settlement negotiations.  
Attention is therefore best focused on those moments in which proceedings ordinarily 
take place before a court or tribunal.  Some proceedings before a court or tribunal, such as case 
management conferences, have also for a long while been performed at a distance, whether 
telephonically or online. Therefore, what remains to be considered are mostly hearings 
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themselves. These are the occasions when “change of venue” from a physical courtroom to a 
virtual courtroom stands to be most disruptive.  
Even so, thanks to available platforms such as Zoom, there is no obvious reason why what 
transpires in a physical courtroom or hearing room cannot largely be replicated online.  All that 
is required is that the judge or tribunal chair establish a meeting and invite all relevant parties to 
participate. These platforms appear to accommodate as many persons as are ever likely to 
participate in any given proceeding. As a result, an online hearing should unfold mostly as it 
would in person. Oral argument can obviously be performed online, as can examination and 
cross-examination of witnesses, transcription by a court reporter, or interpretation to and from 
a foreign language, with no one needing to be in the same room.  To this extent, the situation is 
not unlike those university professors, such as myself, who conduct their classes online. 
The Arbitration Scene 
The use of video-conferenced hearings in arbitration was already well advanced when the 
pandemic struck.  Online hearings have been a technological reality for some time. The 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which administers the 
lion’s share of investor-State arbitrations, reports that it sees every year a steady uptick in the 
number of hearings online.  In 2019, about 60 per cent of the 200 hearings and sessions organized 
by ICSID were held by video-conference. Indeed, “block-chain” arbitration, which is obviously 
100% online, is a reality, if by no means yet a widely popular one. 
ICSID reports that its video-conferencing platform does not require special hardware or 
software and that a computer with an internet connection and webcam is sufficient for effective 
and secure participation. Hearings with hundreds of participants have been held online. The 
available platforms are sufficiently sophisticated for the purpose.  All participants have the ability 
to share audio and video, as well as content such as PowerPoint presentations. A virtual chat 
function allows participants to communicate individually strictly with one another or with the 
entire group. A virtual court stenographer provides a real-time transcript of the proceeding, 
visible to all participants on the video-conference. Particularly in arbitration, but also in litigation, 
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demonstratives, as they are called, are increasingly in use.  It makes little difference whether they 
are exhibited by power-point online rather than in a hearing room.   
Thus, arbitral chairs (and solo arbitrators) are readily acting as hosts, convening sessions 
online, by inviting participants in whatever manner the platform in use provides.  It is not proving 
particularly difficult for participants to learn how to navigate the platform that an arbitrator 
selects, whatever shape individual learning curves may take.  This process is well underway in a 
large number of arbitral proceedings, with no particular technical difficulties. 
Although individual arbitrators are proving capable of launching and managing an online 
arbitration, nothing prevents the arbitral institutions, such as the American Arbitration 
Association or the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration, under 
whose aegis the vast majority of arbitrations take place, from establishing an institution-wide 
system available to all tribunals proceeding under their auspices.  This is happening in ICSID, 
which has its own online system, that it is making available also to arbitrations conducted under 
other institutional rules or the UNCITRAL Rules. There is an ICSID hearings team that works 
directly not only with the tribunal, but also with the parties, so that they perform their role with 
confidence. ICSID IT staff members are present throughout hearings to ensure they run smoothly.  
It is already apparent that all the other leading arbitral institutions are heading down the same 
path.  
The Litigation Scene 
Arbitral institutions appear to be significantly ahead of the courts. According to reports, 
at present, judges are scrambling individually to equip themselves with Zoom and like 
technologies, and it is not clear that courts are developing video-conference systems for use by 
all their individual judges in the fashion in which arbitral institutions are developing such systems 
for their tribunals.  It would clearly be advisable for them to do so.   
 
The Administrative Office of the US Courts recently made the following 




● to hold in-person court proceedings only when absolutely necessary, utilizing 
videoconferencing or audio-conferencing capabilities where practicable 
● to conduct jury proceedings only in exceptional circumstances 
● to limit the number of family members who attend proceedings 
● to stagger scheduling of critical court proceedings to reduce the number of people in 
seating galleries, wells of courtrooms, conference rooms, and public waiting areas, and 
● to limit staff at critical courtroom proceedings to fewer than 10 people, and ensure that 
they are at least six feet apart.1  
As can be seen from this inventory, it is by no means anticipated that all judicial 
proceedings will take place online.  While in-person court proceedings are to take place “only 
when absolutely necessary,” they are evidently expected, at least to some extent, to continue.  
Only if they were to continue, would, for example, it be necessary to “stagger scheduling of 
critical court proceedings to reduce the number of people in seating galleries, wells of 
courtrooms, conference rooms, and public waiting areas” or “limit staff at critical courtroom 
proceedings to fewer than 10 people, and ensure that they are at least six feet apart.” State court 
systems are moving at different rhythms; some have no choice but to go online (or else suspend 
activity altogether, at least temporarily), since some state courthouses are closed due to the fact 
that persons found to be virus-infected had recently attended proceedings there. But there is 
progress.  The American Bar Association very recently conducted an instructional webinar in 




The fact that courts and tribunals are equipped to carry on business reasonably well does 
not mean that nothing changes.  One need only visualize how court and arbitral proceedings 
ordinarily unfold. Consider witness testimony. A witness may be examined remotely, but 
something is inevitably lost in the process. Clearly the opportunity for counsel and court or 
                                                             




tribunal to observe a witness’ demeanor is greatly reduced.  Body-language remains unseen.  Nor 
is there any way to know to what extent, if at all, a witness, in testifying is being coached by 
someone sitting next to him or her, but not visible on a screen, or is consulting documents that 
he or she would not be permitted to consult in a courtroom or hearing room.  
There is much discussion of the impact of the pandemic on the conduct of jury trials. It is 
entirely possible for jurors to observe civil and criminal proceedings on line, once their home 
computers are equipped, or even to deliberate online, but the absence of physical proximity 
between jurors and witnesses, as well as among jurors while deliberating, cannot help but make 
a difference. Moreover, many of the ground rules governing the conduct of jury trials presuppose 
a degree of sequestration of jurors from others – though, ironically not much of a problem with 
the current prevalence of shelter-in-place orders.   
In litigation, counsel may approach the bench to address the judge beyond hearing by 
others. Similarly, in arbitration, members of the tribunal, faced with a difficult objection by 
counsel, will retire from the hearing to the tribunal’s breakout room, or simply the corridor, to 
exchange views and reach a ruling.  Ways must be developed by which this can take place without 
hearing by others in the “room”.  It is common, again in arbitration, for fact witnesses to be 
sequestered while other fact witnesses testify, so as to disable witnesses from molding or 
tailoring their testimony in accordance with what another witness may have said.  Now, the 
witness will need to be removed from the room technologically.  
Similarly, counsel ordinarily take signals from the way in which adjudicators physically 
react to their oral advocacy or examination of witnesses, whether by grimaces or raised 
eyebrows, or hopefully a benign countenance. There can essentially be no movement on the part 
of those who are speaking. Changes in advocacy styles may well result. Put more simply, we are 
accustomed to experiencing litigation and arbitration as theater.  Much of the cast will be present 
at all times during online hearings, but not all visible to one another, with the element of drama 
necessarily subsiding. With the move to online adjudication, the atmosphere will have undergone 
a profound, if subtle, change, in these and so many other ways, the implications of which will 




 One of the first things courts and tribunals do, once assembled, is establish a calendar for 
the proceedings.  Arbitral tribunals, more so than courts, are likely to produce early on a calendar 
reflecting the entire length of the proceedings, from beginning to end, procedural step by 
procedural step.  Deadlines abound, not only in the calendar, but over time.  Uncalendared 
motions will be made, in the wake of which all parties will be given a fixed deadline by which to 
state a position.   
 Some proceedings will have been well underway by the time the dislocation and 
disruption occasioned by the pandemic have occurred.  The proceedings will have to be 
conducted differently midstream.  Short-term delays are inevitable. But for all the reasons stated 
above, courts and tribunals have it largely within their means to adapt usual litigation and 
arbitration activities to the demands of the technologies that will now govern.  We have no choice 
but to believe that courts and tribunals will exercise the good judgment and common sense we 
ascribe to them in making the necessary rulings on requests for relaxing the ground rules and, in 
doing so, striking a sound balance between efficiency and fairness. 
 It is also a watchword of both litigation and arbitration that the parties to a dispute must 
enjoy “equality of arms,” i.e., an equal opportunity to make their case and refute their 
opponent’s.  As courts and tribunals make whatever adjustments they do to the calendar, they 
need to be correspondingly sensitive to due process in all its manifestations. 
Conclusion 
 It is useful in conclusion to put what has been said in a somewhat larger perspective. 
First, how does the magnitude of the “upheaval” – to use a somewhat hyperbolic term – 
in the administration of justice compare to the upheaval to be experienced in other fields of 
endeavor.  Some fields of endeavor may be adapted to the technologies at our disposal more 
readily than others and, conversely, technologies may be adapted to some fields more readily 
than others.  
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It may work to the advantage of litigation and arbitration that both entail well-established 
staged forms of activity, marked by a more or less recurring set of discrete steps. No litigation or 
arbitration is “routine,” but these activities do tend to be “routinized.” No less important, dispute 
resolution is largely a matter of words, oral or written. A sphere of activity in which words loom 
so large lends itself well to the technology to which we are all turning for the conduct of business 
and professional activity under present circumstances. 
Second, some activities were already set on a novel technological path long before the 
pandemic occurred.  Such is the case of arbitration and, unfortunately, much less so in the case 
of litigation.  Already years ago, the arbitration community was on a quest to make fuller use of 
available technologies.  A law journal dedicated to that very purpose – The Journal of Technology 
in International Arbitration – was established some time ago and is prospering. The motivation 
for technological innovation in arbitration, much like the motivation for “expedited” or “fast-
track” proceedings, was largely one of economy in time and cost, to which concerns over 
consumer arbitration have contributed. Thus, adaptation to a pandemic was not required in 
order for this transformation to take place. In other words, greater and better use of technology 
was already identified as distinctly in arbitration’s best interests and, according to some, 
inevitable. If that is the case, the present pandemic is only hastening arbitration’s progress, albeit 
somewhat precipitously, down a path it was destined to travel anyway. 
Reform in civil procedure reform has always moved at a distinctly slower pace than reform 
in arbitral procedure.  Arbitral institutions operate in a highly competitive market, revising their 
rules every several years, if only to borrow innovations that other arbitral institutions will have 
recently introduced.  For the most part no such competition prevails in civil litigation at the 
national level, and the intervals between procedural reforms are decades – many decades – 
rather than years. For these and other reasons, modernization in civil litigation has not kept pace 
with modernization in arbitration.  But the functionality of national court systems depends on 





Driver for Contactless Payments 
 
 
Ronald Mann, Albert E. Cinelli Enterprise Professor of Law; 
Co-Director, Charles Evans Gerber Program in Transactional Studies, Columbia Law School 
 
 
Before the virus, my payments course discussed why so few of us paid for purchases with 
cash. Those conversations emphasized the inconvenience of carrying and using cash. When the 
course turned to payment cards, we discussed how the increasing speed of card-based 
transactions had made cards relatively more attractive to merchants. More broadly, my scholarly 
writings on the subject emphasized the societal downside of cash, the likely connection between 
crime and the dependence of an economy on cash transactions; that might be true because of 
the utility of cash either for sheltering criminal transactions or for avoiding taxation.1  
As a consumer, my primary experience with cash before the virus was standing in checkout 
lines observing the sluggish pace of cash transactions in front of me. Like so many things in our 
lives, the advent of the virus has changed the situation markedly. From the earliest days of 
infection, it has been far more unsettling to observe cash transactions knowing that the virus 
persists on paper and metal surfaces for days.2 
The dynamic that has driven the choices merchants offer in face-to-face retail transactions 
will change as well. Driven by the private exigencies of the retail environment, the last few 
decades have witnessed private mechanisms spreading cash-less retail transactions, 
predominantly card-based. In some countries, policymakers have supported that spread, 
reacting to the societal costs of a heavy reliance on cash by adopting rules that limit or even aim 
to eliminate the use of cash.3 More recently in this country, however, as a few businesses have 
                                               
1 See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 102-05 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2006). 
2 See Neeltje van Doremalen, et al., Aerosol and surface stability of HCoV-19 (SARS-CoV-2) compared to SARS-CoV-1, 
New Engl. J. Med. (Mar. 17, 2020) (DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc2004973). 




refused to accept cash, local policymakers have pushed back, reasoning that a refusal to accept 
cash excludes less affluent purchasers (frequently unbanked) from fair access to commerce. 
Among others, Massachusetts,4 New Jersey,5 New York,6 Philadelphia,7 and San Francisco8 have 
banned cashless businesses. Indeed, the present Congress has considered two bills that would 
extend such a ban to the federal level.9 The likelihood that Amazon’s cashier-less stores (Amazon 
Go) would refuse cash payments has been a particular stimulant to those bills.10 
This essay makes two basic points about the effect of the virus on that mix of policy, legal, 
and institutional arrangements. First, policies fostering the use of cash in retail transactions are 
much harder to justify in the world of the virus, as it is harder to make those transactions safe for 
purchasers, cashiers, or the populace in general. Second, the slow pace of the shift from card-
based payments from swipe to chip, with the slower drift to phone-based payments, is more 
worrisome now, where fully contactless payments are safer for all involved than authentication 
either by swipe or chip. 
                                               
Virginia Harrison, This Could Be the First Country to Go Cashless, CNN Money (June 2, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/02/technology/cashless-society-denmark/; Abigail Adams, Norway’s Biggest Bank 
Calls for Country to Stop Using Cash, Int’l Bus. Times (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/norways-biggest-
bank-calls-country-stop-using-cash-2276140. 
4 See Ed Shanahan & Jeffery C. Mays, Cashless Businesses? City Council Says No, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 2020, at A21. 
5 See Aaron Moselle, US Ban Proposed on Cashless Businesses, Phila. Tribune, May 21, 2019, at 2B. 
6 See Shanahan & Mays, supra note 4. 
7 See Moselle, supra note 5; Christian Hetrick, Phila. Passes Ban on Cashless Stores, Phila. Inquirer,  Mar. 1, 2019, at 
A7. 
8 See Joshua Sabatini, SF Approves Ban on Cashless Stores, S.F. Examiner, May 7, 2019. 
9 Payment Choice Act of 2019, H.R. 2650 ((116th Cong., 1st Sess.); Cash Always Should Be Honored Act, H.R. 2630 
(116th Cong., 1st Sess.). 
10 See Sabatini, supra note 8; Robert Channick, Amazon Go Stores Will Give Accepting Cash a Go, Chi. Trib., Apr. 11, 




I. Cash Payments 
As mentioned above, the willingness of businesses to accept cash before the virus reflected 
the intersection of two conflicting trends: the creeping superiority of card-based payments from 
the merchant’s perspective and the increasing perception of policymakers that a refusal to accept 
cash disproportionately affects the large underbanked segment of the populace.11 The advent of 
the virus shifts the relevant considerations markedly. Now, cash payments are a danger not only 
to the individuals directly involved, but to society at large, as they spread the virus through the 
population. Nor is it a simple matter to sanitize those transactions, given the difficulty of 
removing the virus from paper, especially the cotton-and-linen weave of American currency.12 
Relatively speaking, the card-based payment is much safer, as the cashier typically need not 
touch the card and the cardholding purchaser can disinfect the card after any contact with a 
terminal at the point of sale. 
That new factor — the contagion of cash transactions — should change the reaction of local 
policymakers, who now should discourage cash payments and welcome the efforts of merchants 
to shift purchasers toward card-based payments. I doubt legislators will take seriously the notion 
of obligating merchants to refuse cash payments. Nor do I consider it realistic for the United 
States to move rapidly toward the eradication of the domestic currency. I do see, though, a few 
initiatives that might align the public and private interests to accelerate the trend away from 
cash. 
 
A. Public Policies 
The increasing societal cost of cash transactions justifies the use of policy levers to reduce 
the use of cash. The most obvious response would repeal the cash-obligating ordinances several 
                                               
11 See Shanahan & May, supra note 4 (noting that one in nine NYC households has no bank account); Sabatini, supra 
note 9; Hetrick, supra note 7. 
12 Jenny Surane et al., Is It Safe to Use Cash During Outbreak?, L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 2020, at C2.. Perhaps the problem 
would be different in the United Kingdom or one of the other countries that now issue currency made of plastic 
rather than paper. See Kirill Adamovich, Which Countries Use Polymer Banknotes, PaySpace Mag., Feb. 10, 2020, 
available at https://payspacemagazine.com/banks/which-countries-use-polymer-banknotes/  
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cities and States recently have passed. The most prominent of those probably is the New York 
City ordinance, which ironically came into effect this winter, just weeks before the virus spread 
through the city.13 If that recommendation seems obvious and overdetermined, consider the 
remarkable circumstances of the Delaware legislature, in which a legislator introduced a bill 
obligating businesses to accept cash in March of 2020, well after the pandemic had reached our 
shores.14 
The second proposed response reflects the relatively arbitrary choice between cash and 
card. For most of us, the choice between using cash or a card often reflects much less of a rational 
calculation about the costs and benefits of the competing payment devices than it does some 
combination of habit and rough rule of thumb.  Most suggest, for example, that they use cash for 
transactions below a certain threshold. In part, that habit might have developed because 
merchants often have prohibited purchasers from using payment cards for small transactions.15 
To the extent the choice for cash is a “soft” choice founded in habit rather than calculation, 
policymakers should be able to alter that choice for many transactions by raising awareness 
about the private and social costs of payments with cash: they are dangerous not only for the 
purchaser that pays with cash, but for society more broadly. In the same way that we accept the 
costs of social distancing as a group, even though third parties reap most of the benefits, 
appreciation of the risks of cash should lead to a cognizable shift away from cash and toward 
card-based payments.16 That suggests that public-service announcements and advertisements 
might substantially alter behavior. At the same time, to facilitate the use of cards in small 
                                               
13 The City Council passed the bill on January 23, 2020. See Shanahan & May, supra note 4. 
14 Sarah Gamard, Proposed Del. Bill Would Ban Stores from Refusing Cash, Wilmington News J., Mar. 11, 2020, at A3 
(discussing the introduction of Senate Bill 220 on March 10). 
15 See 15 U.S.C. 1693o-2(b)(3)(A) (preventing network rules that bar surcharge for accepting credit cards on 
transactions below ten dollars). 
16 I would expect the apparent riskiness to cash to drive a shift toward card-based payments even without 
government support.  It will be quite some time, though, before data would document such a shift. 
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transactions, Congress should reconsider the Dodd-Frank provision validating merchant 
payment-card minima.17 
It is harder to address the limited access of the unbanked to payment cards.18 It is beyond 
the scope of this essay to recapitulate the causes of that problem or the various solutions that 
other scholars have proposed. I should mention, though, the ready ability of stored-value cards 
as a mechanism for mitigating that problem. As I have written in previous work with Liran Haim, 
stored-value cards provide a simple way to get those without bank accounts into the mainstream 
of modern payments. As we explain, stored-value cards already are used successfully for all 
federal payments to unbanked individuals. They also are commonly used for recurring salary 
payments to the unbanked.19 Rolling out similar programs at the state and local level should put 
an even larger share of the populace in a position to choose card-based payments over cash. 
 
B. Merchant Initiatives 
Public policy and legislation has played only a minor role in the shift over the last half 
century from cash to payment card at the point of sale. Rather, the dominant force driving that 
shift was the relative desirability of those transactions for merchants and purchasers. Hence, 
initiatives that accelerate that shift are at least as likely to come from merchants as they are to 
come from legislators.  
One key point is the likely alignment of the public and private interests in sanitizing retail 
payment transactions. Merchants understand that our choices among competing retailers rest in 
part on our perception about the safety of those retailers. Retailers that mandate social 
distancing and offer conspicuous disinfection of their stores are more attractive than those that 
do not. The same will be increasingly true for payments, as purchasers gain awareness of the 
relative risk of cash payments as opposed to card-based payments. A few likely merchant 
responses come to mind. 
                                               
17 See supra note 15. 
18 See, e.g., Shanahan & May, supra note 4. 
19 Putting Stored Value Cards in Their Place, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989 (2014). 
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The first is softer, parallel to the informational response suggested above: when purchasers 
offer to pay with cash, cashiers could suggest that they pay instead with a card.20 That would 
parallel the common efforts of merchants in recent decades to shift payments from credit cards 
to debit cards. In this context, though, the savings would come not from decreased out-of-pocket 
costs, but rather from the safety to the store’s own employees (who would touch the currency 
of fewer purchasers) and from the increased perception of the store’s safety (as customers less 
commonly observe contagion-preferent cash transactions). 
A second initiative, parallel to retailer segregation of checkout lines by payment type, would 
be to funnel all cash payments to separate “cash-only” payment lines. That would reassure card-
using purchasers that they could pass through a checkout line that had not been infected with 
currency-borne virus. Similarly, it would support more careful disinfectant procedures for the 
cash-only transactions. It might be easier for a merchant to more rigorously sanitize the checkout 
station and cash drawer after each transaction involving the receipt or distribution of cash if the 
cost of slowing the pace of transactions was borne largely by the purchasers making the relatively 
risky choice to pay with currency. 
 
II. Card-Based Payments 
It is only a first step to support the shift from cash payments (with their inherent contact) 
to card-based payments (at least potentially contactless). Concerns about contagion create a new 
fault line in the ongoing deployment of advancing technologies for card-based payments. 
Specifically, where the advances of the last few decades have been driven by concerns about 
enhancing security, the circumstances the industry now confronts suggest an entirely new 
motivation for accelerating the use of advancing technologies. 
To explain, the most important story of the century to date has been the shift away from 
the authentication of retail card transactions by a swipe of a magnetic strip on the back of the 
card. The basic problem with swipe-dependent authentication always has been that malfeasors 
easily could produce forged cards that readily could be used to conduct transactions at retail 
                                               
20 This is already happening. See Surane et al., supra note 12 (discussing Dick’s Drive-in in Seattle). 
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stores without detection by conventional payment terminals. Most of the world shifted to chip-
laden cards early in the century, implementing an encryption system that is impervious to 
forgery, at least under current technological conditions. The United States, though, did not shift 
to that technology until 2015. That technology is now widely deployed in retail establishments in 
the United States, as substantially all issuers of credit and debit cards have replaced stripe-
bearing cards with chip-laden cards, and the great majority of retail merchants now use terminals 
that interrogate the chip to validate the authenticity of the card.21 
A few years later, Apple released the Apple Pay application on its cellphones, subsequently 
mirrored by Android Pay and Samsung Pay for phones from other manufacturers. That 
technology essentially mimics the authentication of the chip cards so that transactions conducted 
by any of the phone-pay applications are as secure as transactions conducted with chip cards 
(assuming that the holder of the phone is an authorized user of the card).  
The deployment of those technologies left a wide gap in retail authentication regimes 
between the great majority of retail commerce (in which transactions are secure - authenticated 
by a chip or phone) and those lingering pockets of retail commerce at which terminals rely on a 
swipe as opposed to the chip (at this point, most of those transactions occur at gasoline stations). 
But the advent of the virus brings a different dichotomy, between the transactions in which the 
card contacts the payment terminal (those in which a card is swiped or a chip inserted) and the 
phone-based transactions that are wholly contactless. In the former case, the card necessarily 
contacts a terminal that has contacted numerous previous cards, each of them a plastic surface 
possibly carrying the virus. In the latter case, the purchaser need not contact any surface at all to 
complete the payment transaction.22 The new milieu, then, is one in which cardholding 
purchasers, and thus the merchants that wish to attract them, have a strong incentive to ramp 
up their acceptance of phone-based payment applications. 
                                               
21 See, e.g., MRONALD J. MANN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 8-9 (7th ed. 2020); Visa Chip Card 
Update (Dec. 2018), available at 
 https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/regional/na/us/visa-everywhere/documents/emv-chip-infographic-q4.pdf. 
22 I do not consider the intermediate step of contactless “tap-and-pay” transactions, which are available at a much 
larger group of merchants than phone-pay transactions. In my experience, it is not routinely practicable to conduct 
those transactions without the surface of the card firmly contacting the terminal. 
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To date, the use and acceptance of those applications has increased incrementally.23 The 
relatively limited use of those applications by consumers has limited the incentives of merchants 
to expend the resources to upgrade their payment terminals to accept the phone-based 
applications. The discussion above suggests that the increased consumer awareness of the 
relative safety of wholly contactless payment transactions might change both sides of that 
dynamic.  As cardholding purchasers seek to avoid contact with objects in the retail 
establishments that they patronize, they should increase the frequency with which they use 
those applications. Similarly, as merchants compete to attract customers by enhancing the 
apparent safety of their establishments, they will have an increased incentive to be seen to 
embrace those applications as the safest possible instrumentalities of payment. 
 
III. Conclusion 
The pressure for contactless payments well might affect areas other than the two I 
emphasize above. Among other things, it might accelerate the decline of check usage,   interpose 
another obstacle to merchant preference for PIN-based authentication of payment-card 
transactions, or spur more restaurant owners to adopt European-style pay-at-the-table card 
terminals. It is enough for this short piece if I have illustrated a few of the most important changes 
it might support. 
                                               
23 See, e.g., Chance Miller, Apple Pay Usage Continues to Lag in the United States, New Data Suggests, 9to5Mac, 
Aug. 29, 2019, available at https://9to5mac.com/2019/08/29/apple-pay-adoption-united-states/. 
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Appendix 1: COVID legal alerts from top 20 law firms  
+ CPRBLOG organized by TOC 
  
 
Politics and Elections 
● Election law and pandemics 
○ Skkaden: Political Law Considerations  
○ CPRBLOG: Presidential Power in a Pandemic  
 
 
Economic Life  
● Payments in a Post-virus World  
○ Arnold & Porter: Policy Developments Related to the Coronavirus Pandemic Part 
II: The CARES Act 
 
● Contract Re-negotiations  
○ Covington: COVID-19: Preparing for Its Effects on Government Contracts 
(nothing available yet) 
○ Dechert:  Will Global Pandemic Excuse Contractual Performance? 
 
● Harnessing Lending Capacity  
○ Paul Weiss: Gov. Cuomo Requires New York-Regulated Banks to Grant 
Forbearances in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Issues Related Directives to 
NY DFS 
 
● Small Business Bankruptcy  
○ Arnold & Porter: EU Commission Adopts Emergency State Aid Framework to 
Enable EU Member States to Support Businesses in the COVID-19 Outbreak 





○ Baker McKenzie 
■ Managing Environmental Compliance Amidst COVID-19 Operational 
Disruptions 
■ Amidst Coronavirus Setbacks, Sustainability Remains Key to the Future of 
Belt and Road Initiative | Newsroom 
 
○ Covington: Inside Energy & Environment: Developments in law and policy of 




○ Hogan Lovells: A review of MAC Clauses in a COVID-19 Climate in Japan  
 
○ Kirkland  
■ COVID-19 Resource Center 
■ Compensation Challenges in the Current Frozen Energy World | 
Publications 
■ COVID-19: Latest Updates on Energy Regulatory Agencies and Electric 
Grid Operators | Publications 
■ Department of Energy Announces Purchase of Crude Oil for the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserves | Publications 
 
○ Morgan Lewis: Challenges to Environmental Investigations and Cleanups During 
the COVID-19 Crisis  
 
○ Sidley: Environmental Settlements: Force Majeure Claims Related to COVID-19 
 
○ Skkaden: Impact on Energy and Infrastructure Projects 
 
○ CPRBLOG 
■ Trump’s Bungling o Coronavirus Response Mirrors His Approach to 
Climate Crisis 
■ CPR, Allies Call on Trump Administration to Hold Open Public Comment Process 




● Health Insurance in times of crisis  
○ Arnold & Porter: Latest Guidance of the EMA and European and UK National 
Authorities on Crisis Management of Clinical Trials and Medicine Supplies During 
the COVID-19 Pandemic 
○ Debevoise: Coronavirus Response Act Signed Into Law: Employers’ New 
Obligations Regarding Paid Sick Leave and FMLA Amendments 
○ Greenberg Traurig: Government, Regulatory, and Tax 
○ Jones Day: HHS Issues Limited Waivers of HIPAA Sanctions and Penalties for 
Hospitals in Response to COVID-19 




○ Paul Weiss: New York State Legislature Considers Bill Affecting Certain Rents and 






○ Arnold & Porter: DOL Issues First Guidance on Paid Sick Leave and Expanded 




○ Arnold & Porter  
■ Coronavirus and Declining Work—What Options Are Open to UK 
Employers? 
■ California Employers Who Shut Down or Conducted a Mass Layoff on or 
After March 4 Must Still Provide Notice Under Cal-WARN to Take 
Advantage of Executive Order 
○ Baker McKenzie: COVID-19 Global Employer Guide 
○ Covington: Workplace Guide to COVID-19: Solutions to Employment and Benefits 
Challenges (Download the audio recording and presentation.) 
○ Dechert: Coronavirus Response Act Signed Into Law: Employers’ New Obligations 
Regarding Paid Sick Leave and FMLA Amendments 
○ DLA Piper: Workforce and Employment 
○ Morgan Lewis  
■ Labor-Management Relations in the Midst of a Pandemic Conflict or 
Accommodation   
■ Responding to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus: Top-of-Mind Employee 
Benefits Questions for Employers 
○ Paul Weiss  
■ New York Passes Emergency Paid Sick Leave Law for COVID-19 Relief 
■ COVID-19: Layoff and Furlough Considerations for Employers 
○ CPRBLOG  
■ Safeguarding Workers and Our Economy from the Coronavirus - Part I  





● Force Majeure in Corporate Deals  
○ Arnold & Porter: The Impact of Coronavirus on Existing Commercial Leases 
○ Baker McKenzie: Coronavirus Outbreak: Global Guide to Force Majeure and 
International Commercial Contracts 
○ Hogan Lovells: COVID-19 and the supply chain – contracts and force majeure 
(future webinar) 
○ Dechert: COVID-19 Coronavirus: The Consequences on Contract Performance 
and the Resolution of Disputes 
○ Paul Weiss: Force Majeure Under the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic 
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● Litigation & arbitration under lockdown  
○ Latham & Watkins COVID-19: RESOURCES FOR RESPONDING TO BUSINESS AND 
LEGAL ISSUES 
○ Paul Weiss New York and Delaware Take Steps to Toll Limitations Periods and 
Extend Other Deadlines in Light of COVID-19 Emergency 
○ Shearman New York Issues Important Orders Regarding Court Filings and 
Limitations Periods In Light of COVID-19 with Potentially Far-Reaching 
Consequences 
○ Skkaden Judicial Response to COVID-19 Crisis 
 
 
Prisons and Incarceration  
● Criminal law in times of health crisis  
 
 
Human rights without borders 
● Immigration and border controls  




○ Arnold & Porter: Managing Financial Distress in the Coronavirus Crisis—
Reconsidering Fiduciary Duties and Liability Management Transactions 
○ Baker McKenzie: Coronavirus (COVID-19) - Addressing Implications and 
Mitigating Risks on Critical Transactions 




○ Arnold & Porter: COVID-19: Tax Measures Package for Companies 
○ Davis Polk 
■ Tax Relief: Senate Passes CARES Act 
Client Memorandum, March 26, 2020 
■ Tax Provisions of the Senate Stimulus Bill 
Audio Recording with Partners Rachel Kleinberg & Michael Mollerus, 
March 26, 2020 
187 
 
■ Internal Revenue Service Permits Taxpayers to Defer Certain April 15th 
Tax Payments 
Client Memorandum, March 19, 2020 
■ Estate Planning Considerations in the Current Environment 
Client Memorandum, March 19, 2020 
○ Shearman: Current Estate Planning Opportunities 








Appendix 2: New York-Based Legal Information 
 
1. Access to  
a. Free legal services: https://www.nycbar.org/for-the-public/free-legal-services 
b. Low cost legal services: https://www.nycbar.org/for-the-public/low-cost-legal-
services 
c. Alternative dispute resolution:  
i. Co-op and Condo Mediation 
ii. Housing and ADR 
iii. Employment and ADR 
iv. Consumer Issues and ADR 
v. Family Issues/Divorce and ADR 
vi. Worker’s Compensation and ADR 
vii. Environmental Issues and ADR 
viii. Small Claims and ADR 
ix. Can I use ADR if I am already in trial, litigation or administrative 
proceedings? 
x. Find a mediator 
xi. ADR News/Media/Research 
d. Legal Forms & Resources 
i. Small Claims Court Guide: https://www.nycbar.org/for-the-public/legal-
forms-and-resources/small-claims-court-guide-overview 
ii. Glossary of terms: https://www.nycbar.org/for-the-public/legal-forms-
and-resources/small-claims-court-guide-overview/glossary 
iii. Real estate forms: https://www.nycbar.org/for-the-public/legal-forms-
and-resources/real-estate-forms 
iv. Statute of limitations -  The NY Governor has signed Executive Order 
202.8, TOLLING statutes of limitation until April 19, 2020.  
 I hereby temporarily suspend or modify, for the period from the date of this 
Executive Order through April 19, 2020 the following:In accordance with the 
directive of the Chief Judge of the State to limit court operations to essential 
matters during the pendency of the COVID-19 health crisis, any specific time limit 
for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or 
other process or proceeding, as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, 
including but not limited to the criminal procedure law, the family court act, the 
civil practice law and rules, the court of claims act, the surrogate's court 
procedure act, and the uniform court acts, or by any other statute, local law, 
ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, or part thereof, is hereby tolled from the 
date of this executive order until April 19, 2020; 
The date of the Executive Order is March 20, 2020. 
2. COVID19 court announcements are also available at: www.trialacademy.org/covid19.  
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3. COVID-19 and the NY Court System: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/. 
 
4. NY City Executive Orders  
● Executive Order NO. 55  -3/8/2020 
 
● Emergency Executive Order NO. 98 - 3/12/2020 
 
● Emergency Executive Order NO. 99 - 3/15/2020 
 
● Emergency Executive Order NO. 100 - 3/26/2020 
 
● Emergency Executive Order NO. 101 - 3/17/2020 
 
● Emergency Executive Order NO. 102 - 3/20/2020 
 





Appendix 3: Rules Regarding Medical Labs Running COVID-19 tests 
 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/02/feds-allow-state-public-
health-labs-test-covid-19  (Feds to allow state public health labs to test for COVID-
19, Feb 19, 2020) (https://perma.cc/BVE9-TSRH) 
 
https://www.massdevice.com/fda-lets-states-approve-covid-19-tests/  GUIDANCE 
DOCUMENT  - Policy for Diagnostic Tests for Coronavirus Disease-2019 during the 
Public Health Emergency  Immediately in Effect Guidance for Clinical Laboratories, 
Commercial Manufacturers, and Food and Drug Administration Staff (MARCH, 
2020) (https://perma.cc/UH38-RJX3) 
● https://www.fda.gov/media/135659/download Policy for Diagnostic Tests 
for Coronavirus Disease-2019 during the Public Health Emergency 
Immediately in Effect Guidance for Clinical Laboratories, Commercial  





● The FDA letter approving New York State to authorize the state's 28 public 
and private labs to begin manual, semi-automated and automated testing 
for novel coronavirus, or COVID-19. 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/Jill_
Taylor_Letter.pdf ( https://perma.cc/ZSG9-CGVM) 
 
Interim Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines for Handling and Processing Specimens  




Guidance for COVID-19 Testing for CAP-Accredited Laboratories 
https://www.cap.org/laboratory-improvement/news-and-updates/guidance-for-covid-







Appendix 4: Additional Resources 
Human Rights under Strain  
Immigration and Travel 
Update on Visas for Medical Professionals, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs 
Immigration Equality - COVID-19 Alert Information and Updates, Immigration Equality 
 
LGBT Issues 
Coronavirus Information, National LGBT Cancer Network 
COVID-19 Information For People Living with HIV - 03/16/2020, California Office of AIDS 
What to Know About HIV and COVID-19, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
FAQ: Documents and Protections for LGBTQ People and Their Families During COVID-19 Crisis, 
National Center for Lesbian Rights 
 
Public Life and Social Welfare  
Elections and Voters Rights 
2020 State Primary Election Dates, National Conference of State Legislatures 
Election Emergencies, National Conference of State Legislatures 
https://www.vote.org/absentee-voting-rules/, Vote.org 
 
General public health law related to COVID-19 
Health Justice Strategies To Combat COVID-19: Protecting Vulnerable Communities During A 
Pandemic, Benfer, Emily A. & Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Affairs (March 19, 2020) 
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Governmental Public Health Powers in the COVID-19 Pandemic—Stay-at-home Orders and 
Business Closures, Gostin, Lawrence O., JD; Lindsay F. Wiley, JD, MPH, JAMA Network (April 2, 
2020) 
Global Health and the Law, Lawrence O. Gostin, J.D., and Devi Sridhar, Ph.D., New England Journal 
of Medicine (May 1, 2014) 
NCSL Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resources for States, National Conference of State Legislatures 
Thinking Globally, Acting Locally — The US Response to Covid-19, Rebecca L. Haffajee, J.D., Ph.D., 
M.P.H., and Michelle M. Mello, J.D., Ph.D, New England Journal of Medicine (April 2, 2020) 
 
Privacy in Health Care 
Information for Consumers: Privacy Rule, New York State Office of Mental Health 
 
Emergency law 
Public Health Emergency Law (PHEL), CDC Train 
Issue 3 | Emory University School of Law | Atlanta, GA, Emory Law Journal 
Responsibilities in a Public Health Emergency, National Conference of State Legislatures 
 
CDC and NIH resources 
Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine | Quarantine, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 
Order for Quarantine Under Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act 42 Code of Federal 
Regulations Part 70 (Interstate), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
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Specific Laws and Regulations Governing the Control of Communicable Diseases | Quarantine, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Resources on state law 
State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, National Conference of State Legislatures 
Coronavirus and the courts, National Conference of State Legislatures 
State Law in a Pandemic Response, National Conference of State Legislatures 
State Data and Policy Actions to Address Coronavirus, Kaiser Family Foundation (April 16, 2020) 
 
Resources on quarantine law 
Do State Lines Make Public Health Emergencies Worse? Federal Versus State Control of 
Quarantine by Polly J. Price, Price, Polly J., Emory Law Journal (April 25, 2018) 
A Coronavirus Quarantine in America Could Be a Giant Legal Mess, Price, Polly J., The Atlantic 
(February 16, 2020) 
Origins of Federal Quarantine and Inspection Laws, Harvard Law School 
Raising the Yellow Flag: State Variation in Quarantine Laws, Katz, Rebecca, PhD, MPH, Andrea 
Vaught, MPH, Adrienne Formentos, MS, and Jordan Capizola, Journal of Public Health (July 1, 
2019) 
Ensuring Compliance With Quarantine by Undocumented Immigrants and Other Vulnerable 
Groups: Public Health Versus Politics, Rothstein,Mark A., JD and Christine N. Coughlin, JD, 
American Journal of Public Health (September 2019) 
 
Employment rights  
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COVID-19 and Your Workplace Rights: Caring for Yourself and Your Family (Including FAQs), A 
Better Balance (March 19, 2020) 
Resources for Workers Impacted by COVID-19, AFLCIO 
COVID-19 and the American Workplace, U.S. Dept of Labor 
Coronavirus: What You Need to Know, National Governors Association  
State Workforce Agencies Respond to Coronavirus (COVID-19), National Association of 
Workforce Agencies 
Resources for Policymakers to Support Workers During the Coronavirus Pandemic, National 
Employment Law Project 
The Upshot: Who Qualifies for Paid Leave Under the New Coronavirus Law, Claire Cain Miller, N.Y. 
Times (March 19, 2020) 
FACT SHEET: New York State’s Paid Sick Leave Law, A Better Balance (April 2, 2020) 
New Paid Leave for COVID-19 | Paid Family Leave,  New York State 
Which Companies Still Aren't Offering Paid Sick Days?, Roselyn Miller et al., Better Life Lab (April 
2, 2020)  
Supporting Food Service and Preparation Workers during the COVID-19 Pandemic, Anuj 
Gangopadhyaya and Elaine Waxman, Urban Institute (March 2020) 
 
Housing and Eviction 
COVID-19 and Changing Eviction Policies Around the Nation, Princeton University, Eviction Lab 
Special Relief for those Potentially Impacted by COVID-19, U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs 
We Need a Country-Wide Moratorium on Water Shutoffs Amid Coronavirus Food and Water 
Watch  
Health Justice Strategies To Combat COVID-19: Protecting Vulnerable Communities During A 
Pandemic, Emily A. Benfer & Lindsay F. Wiley, (March 2020) 
COVID-19: Coronavirus and Housing/Homelessness, National Low Income Housing Coalition 





The Economy Under Lock-down 
Contracts during COVID-19  
ICC Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses - ICC, International Chamber of Commerce 
 
US Courts during COVID-19 
Judiciary Preparedness for Coronavirus (COVID-19), United States Courts 
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